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The Naval Postgraduate School has a long commitment to 
achieving excellence in Professional Military Education (PME) . 
Since 1989, in accordance with the directives of the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the School has been engaged in a 
sustained and purposeful effort to develop and expand the joint 
components of PME, recruiting faculty and students and creating 
new programs and curricula toward that end. The School's Phase I 
Program for Joint Education (PJE) received certification in 
December 1995. 
This Self-Study offers a comprehensive examination of the NPS 
Phase I PJE. It assesses two years of collective efforts among 
faculty and staff to act upon the recommendations of the 1995 
PAJE Team for strengthening the School's program. As such, it 
documents the NPS PJE's formidable strengths, while also 
indicating specific areas of needed--and planned-improvement. 
The descriptive material and supporting documentation 
contained in the following pages demonstrate NPS's. dedication to 
fostering high-quality joint professional military education, in 
keeping with its continuing commitment to meet the challenges and 
standards set by the Chairman's Joint Vision 2010 and the Concept 
for Future Joint Operations. 
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The need for a postgraduate school originated from experiences 
gained through the U.S. "Great White Fleet" around-the-world 
cruise of 1907-1909, in which many problems surfaced in areas 
that required greater emphasis on technology, diplomacy, and 
politics. In 1909, following a review of the world cruise 
experience, the Secretary of the Navy formed a graduate division 
at the Naval Academy which specialized in advanced education in 
science, engineering, and technology for line officers. That 
USNA division was renamed the "Naval Postgraduate School" in 
1921. The school remained at Annapolis until 31 July 1947, when 
the 80th Congress enacted legislation and created NPS as a 
separate institution. On 22 December 1951, the entirety of the 
Naval Postgraduate School was loaded on railcars and transferred 
to its current location in Monterey, California. 
NPS Focus on Joint Warfighting Readiness 
Educating "officers of the line" has always been a primary goal 
of NPS. Between 1947 and 1960, NPS was also known as the 
"General Line and Naval Science School." Building on its 
traditional strength in scienc~ and engineering areas, NPS 
expanded and added Operations Research in 1953, Systems 
Management in 1956, and the National Security Affairs in 1972. 
Emphasis on warfare subspecialties has long been a hallmark of 
NPS, and the first joint warfare curriculum (C3I - now C4I) 
stood up in 1978. The C4I curriculum sponsored by the Joint 
Staff (J-6). Other joint-sponsored curricula at NPS currently 
include CINCSOC, as primary co-sponsor for Special Operations 
and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), the Joint Staff (J-38) and 
Navy Information Warfare Activity, as primary co-sponsors of the 
new Information Warfare curriculum, and the Joint Staff (J-6) as 
a co-sponsor for Space Systems Operations. The Modeling, 
Virtual Environments & Simulation (MOVES) curriculum is co-
sponsored by N6M and the US Army's Simulation Training and 




The focal point of this Self-Study is the uniqueness of the NPS 
Program for Joint Education. Unlike the other intermediate-
level PME Service institutions, the primary mission of NPS is to 
provide graduate-level education. While education at NPS cannot 
be classified in the same manner as that of purpose-built 
Service PME/PJE institutions, the special curricular structure 
at NPS enables PME/PJE students to pursue unique combinations of 
both professional military and complementary academic subjects 
in a wide variety of militarily relevant fields. These cover 
the range of policy analysis and technical areas identified in 
the Chairman's JV 2010 and Concept for Future Joint Operations 
as being increasingly important to achieve full implementation 
of 2010 warfighting concepts and capabilities in our future 
joint force structure. 
The NPS Program for Joint Education (PJE) 
The NPS PJE, formerly known as the "Joint Education Electives 
Program" (JEEP), has its origins in the mid 1980's, when the 
Secretary of the Navy mandated that all U.S. officers at NPS 
take one "Professional Military Education (PME)" course in 
"Joint and Maritime Strategy." NS 3252, was the designation 
given to the course and over time it has become the cornerstone 
of both the NPS PME program and of the Program for Joint 
Education (PJE). The PJE at NPS is a natural outgrowth of eight 
years of experience in teaching that common core ILC PME course. 
The normal PJE course sequence begins with NS 3252, followed by 
NS 3020, "The Operational Level of War," then a choice of one of 
two C4ISR courses (NS 3154 - SECRET or NS 3159 - TS/SCI), and 
the "capstone" course, NS 3230, "Strategic Planning and the 
Military." The PJE sequence is structured.to cover all CJCS 
Phase One PJE Learning Areas and Objectives, as well as a 
majority of the Chairman's Special Areas of Emphasis. 
The courses are offered in a truly joint education learning 
environment. One quarter of the NPS student body is from 
outside the Navy Department. Officer students spend, on 
average, 18-24 months both learning and living together. In 
addition to classroom interactions in both PJE and graduate 
courses, the fact that most student families live in extensive 
on-base housing enhances their joint and multinational 
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acculturation. There are over 200 NPS international students 
from over 40 different countries, with whom lasting ties are 
made which can help promote the US/Coalition Stra~egy into the 
twenty-first century. Beyond this overarching joint 
acculturation, PJE students benefit from the joint and combined 
discourse fostered by robust student-mixes in both PJE and other 
curricular courses, and from the strong and diverse civilian 
faculty expertise, augmented by multiple series of guest 
lectures. PJE students also attend frequent joint and combined 








The NPS PAJE Self-Study 
The self-study that follows was compiled during the Fall and 
Winter of the 1998 academic year, and represents a snapshot of 
our continuing self-assessment and improvement program. Every 
effort has been made to answer forthrightly all the questions 
contained in the Self-Study guidelines, Appendix C to Enclosure 
D (of CJCSI 1800.01). This report is structured to follow 
closely the "key issues" arrangement of the appendix. We 
respond to each of the points, and in some cases our responses 
are followed with supporting documentation. Additional 
supporting information will be made available as needed during 

















a. Institutiona1 Purpose 
(1) Provide a copy of your mission statement and other official 
documents describing the institutions program(s) and reflecting 
the school's educational philosophy. 
The Naval Postgraduate School was established to serve the 
advanced educational needs of the Navy. In its mission 
statement, which appears at the head of the NPS catalog, the 
School pledges to 
Increase the combat effectiveness of US and Allied 
armed forces and enhance the security of the USA 
through advanced education and research programs 
focused on the technical, analytical, and managerial 
tools needed to confront defense related challenges of 
the future. 
The School's educational philosophy is best conveyed in the 
"Graduate Education Statement" by the Chief of Naval Operations, 
which serves as the preface to the NPS catalog: 
Selection for graduate education at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) is one of the most visible 
symbols of the confidence the U.S. Navy has vested in 
an individual's professional ability and career 
potential. 
The rigorous educational programs offered at NPS are 
among the most technically advanced and academically 
challenging in the country. They not only fulfill the 
Navy's need for specialists in any high-tech fields; 
they also provide students with a sound basis for 
achieving a broadened perspective on global issues and 
cha+lenges that lie ahead. 
Students will expand their breadth of knowledge in a 
particular discipline and will reinvigorate their 
ability to successfully analyze and solve the complex 
challenges we face. These important skills will help 
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guide our Navy into the 21st century through fresh 
thinking and innovation. 
Our Navy is the world's best. The richly rewarding 
educational experience of attending the Naval 
Postgraduate School will help its graduates maintain 
that status while producing our Navy's future leaders. 
The School's programs and educational philosophy are the subject 
of two guiding documents: 1) a Secretary of the Navy Instruction 
entitled "Policies Conce~ning the Naval Postgraduate School," 
SECNAVINST 1524.2A, dated 4 April 1989; and 2) a Chief of Naval 
Operations policy statement entitled "Graduate Education 
Policy," dated 27 July 1994. Copies are provided as Appendix 
6.a. The most current guide to how NPS translates its 
educational philosophy into concrete programs and initiatives is 
the 1998 NPS Strategic Plan, an excerpt of which appears below. 
THE NPS MISSION 
Increase the combat effectiveness of US and Allied armed forces and enhance the 
security of the USA through advanced education and research programs focused on the 
technical, analytical, and managerial tools needed to confront defense-related 
challenges. 
THE NPS VISION 
• To be the world leader in defense related graduate education and 
supportive research 
• To prepare the intellectual leaders of tomorrow's forces 
• To be the DoD university of the future 
NPS GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
We are committed to: 
• Creating braggingly happy customers 
• Treating everyone with respect and dignity 
• Honesty, integrity, and commitment 
• Creativity, innovation, teamwork and high quality performance 
• Developing the full capabilities of all our students, staff and faculty 
• Investing in the technology and facilities needed to fulfill our mission 
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THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL STRATEGIC PLAN -1998 
1. Introduction. 
The Naval Postgraduate School is unique among institutions of higher education: we 
are tasked with creating educational programs that will increase the combat 
effectiveness of our armed forces. Over the years we have carried out this mission with 
a high degree of success. But the two worlds in which we must operate, the academic 
world and the military world, are both undergoing rapid and traumatic changes. The 
academic world is grappling with the problems of effectively creating interdisciplinary 
programs while maintaining the integrity of existing disciplinary structures, and the even 
larger issue of the most effective and creative ways of exploiting the promises of high 
technology, particularly information and communications technologies. The military 
world is facing fundamental changes in the processes of warfare resulting from 
advances in several technologies, including information and communications 
technologies. Many military thinkers are predicting a Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) based upon information, communications systems and precision weapons. The 
official guide to changes we should expect is provided by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in "Joint Vision 2010" and its follow-on studies. This document foresees 
a time when information age technologies will give our forces almost complete 
battlefield knowledge, the communications systems needed to link sensors to shooters, 
and the weapons and organizations that will allow the precise application of 
overwhelming power when and where it is needed. And, of course, there is the political 
reality of what it takes to balance our nations' budget. 
The message for NPS is very clear: in a time of decreasing budgets we must be certain 
that our educational process will support the information, communications, weapons 
and organizational needs of our nations' military, and that will .provide our nation with 
the skilled, capable officers who can leverage future technologies. We must position 
ourselves to take full advantages of the potential efficiencies new technologies offer the 
academic world. Along with a Revolution in Military Affairs we are caught up in a 
Revolution in Academic Affairs. We should also not forget that revolutions imply rapid, 
violent, and unpredictable change. The status quo will not be an option. We must 
continue to transform NPS into an organization that can meet these challenges. 
2. The Background. 
The process of change was begun in 1995, and resulted in our first "Strategic Business 
Plan." which addressed six vital issues. In 1997 this plan was revised, and the initial six 




• Position NPS to meet the challenges of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" 
(RMA) 
• Increase the efficiency and effectiveness of NPS 
• Develop the technologically integrated "University of the Future." 
• Develop a consensus within each service on the importance of Graduate 
Education as an investment in human capital. 
• Obtain the resources needed to accomplish our mission 
• Create the correct balance between funding current operations and 
reinvestment 
• Recruit, develop and retain high quality staff 
• Recruit, develop and retain a high quality faculty 
We have seen a number of changes already. In 1995 we gained Joint Professional 
Military Education (JPME) Phase I certification for curricula in the National Security 
Affairs Department; we must work to extend this important program to our other 
curricula. The Academic Council recently approved two innovative curricula. One is an 
interdisciplinary resident program in modeling, virtual environments, and simulation. 
The other is an on-site program in leadership education and development for company 
officers at the Naval Academy. Both of these curricula already have students enrolled, 
and they are critical steps in supporting the educational needs of Joint Vision 2010. At 
the request of the Director of the Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control 
Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N-6), we are developing a 
new Unrestricted Line (URL)-focused curriculum in information operations and are 
providing a common core of subject matter in six related information sciences and 
operations technical curricula. Our students have continued to make important 
contributions to the Strategic Studies Group's (SSG) work on developing innovative 
ideas for future naval warfare. We also have established a new program with the Office 
for Naval Research (ONR) to support innovation in naval warfare. We have developed 
a long-term network architecture for our campus, and expect to have it installed and 
operating before the end of the year. The basic cable infrastructure is designed to 
provide the reliability and performance necessary to support our networking needs for at 
least .a decade. We are striving to recapitalize our instructional laboratories and library 
with new equipment and have reorganized their administration and operation in order to 
decrease staffing requirements. We have set up a marketing group to see that our 
strengths and capabilities are made known to the Navy's leadership. 
3. The 1998 Strategic Plan 
The eight initiatives, which concerned us in 1997, remain important and have been 
updated to reflect changes necessary to respond to our environment. In particular, 
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objectives for FY98 have been identified that build on FY97's accomplishments. These 
eight initiatives are interconnected, and involve all members of the NPS community. In 
this section we will briefly review the issues involved; detailed accounts and specific 
objectives for each initiative can be found in the Appendix. 
Initiative No. 1: Position NPS to meet the challenges of the Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA). 
There is an emerging consensus among military thinkers and planners that our forces 
will continue to get smaller, but will be highly dependent upon information technologies. 
Our challenge here is to focus the many strengths of our faculty in the technology areas 
into coherent programs that can provide our students with the skills needed to 
understand and exploit developments in the information, communications, and precision 
weapons arenas. These programs will need to be very interdisciplinary, with a stress on 
systems integration and systems engineering. To properly respond to the RMA 
challenges we will need to make sure that our faculty and students are aware of the 
implications of the RMA, and are familiar with Joint Vision 2010, and the ideas of 
Network Centric Warfare (see "Surface Warfare" November/December 1997, "Naval 
Institute Proceedings" January 1998, pages 28-36). Institutionally we must continue to 
examine our departmental and divisional structure, as well as the structuring of our 
curricula, for responsiveness to these challenges. To provide our students with the 
fullest possible exposure to Professional Joint Education (PJE) we should explore 
opportunities to partner with the Naval War College to allow students at both institutions 
to benefit from the unique strengths of each. By creating a virtual university through 
distributed learning we can enhance the capabilities of both institutions. 
Initiative No. 2: Increase the efficiency and effectiveness of NPS 
The organizational health and existence of NPS depend increasingly on ·our ability to 
demonstrate our effectiveness in achieving an academic mission, which contributes to 
the broader effectiveness (readiness) of DoN and DoD. To thrive in a time of 
diminishing budgets/resources it is imperative we execute our mission with increasing 
efficiency. Absent enhanced levels of both effectiveness and efficiency, NPS will be 
forced to accept fewer students and/or cut academic programs. Either will certainly 
contribute to increased organizational vulnerability. We must inculcate in the entire 
NPS community and all major stakeholders, the need, desirability, and feasibility of 
major changes throughout NPS in pursuit of significant improvements in efficiency and 
effectiveness. This will require us to develop skills in leading and managing change, 
both with others and within ourselves. 
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Key elements in this strategy are to: search for new "markets"; develop tailored new 
"products" for present and new customers; develop pedagogical innovations and adopt 
technical innovation for existing and new programs; and realize organizational 
efficiencies through reliance on true reinvention, reengineering, and TQL efforts, 
including the development and adoption of new incentive programs. 
Success will certainly require new and innovative educational and research programs, 
which in turn will rely on our ability to dramatically improve our physical infrastructure 
and truly become a "University of the Future". These efforts will likewise be significantly 
supported by an increasingly robust Distributed Learning (DL) effort, with specific 
emphasis on Network-Based Learning (NBL). 
Initiative No. 3: Develop the technologically integrated DoD "University of the 
Future." 
The academic world is very actively examining how best to exploit developments in 
information and communications technologies. The key issue is the use of technology in 
the delivery of instructional processes, both synchronously and asynchronously. This 
includes smart classrooms using networked computers and high-quality projection 
systems, distance learning centers, distributed learning, multimedia materials, computer 
laboratories, just-in-time learning systems, and entire supporting activities. We face a 
number of potentially very serious challenges here unless we address the issue 
vigorously and with focused attention. 
We need to recognize that the entry price in ter:ms of infrastructure investment is very 
high. Nevertheless, we must invest in developing a base-wide broadband network 
system. We must establish the capability of students to access our courses, particularly 
those in the refresher quarters, from their many different work environments in order to 
reduce the total time spent in residence at NPS. We need to determine the feasibility of 
offering complete graduate-degree programs to government employees using 
distributed learning. We must market our well-honed ability to create militarily relevant, 
technical and interdisciplinary programs that cannot be duplicated elsewhere. We must 
capitalize on our distinguished faculty who are equipped with appropriate DoD 
knowledge skills. We must invest in the hardware and software to support the delivery 
of intellectual content, and to provide the scholarly information resources necessary for 
the NPS teaching and research programs wherever they are delivered. · 
We must explore the already introduced concept of a virtual Naval university linking 
DoD education and training institutions including: NPS, the Service Academies, the 
War Colleges, and the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET). By creating a 
virtual DoD university that links us electronically with other DoD institutions, we will be 
able to exploit the unique strengths of each, and avoid expensive duplications. 
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Initiatives such as the Navy Virtual Library Project, coordinated by the Librarian of the 
Navy, and the Military Education Research Library Network (MERLN) project of the 
Military Education Coordinating Committee Library Working Group are creating virtual 
information resources accessible across Navy commands and other DoD institutions. 
NPS is an active partner in these initiatives. Digitization of information created by NPS 
students and faculty, such as distribution of NPS theses in electronic format, offers 
potential cost savings, and more rapid and broader access to information. 
Initiative No. 4: Develop a consensus within each service on the importance of 
Graduate Education as an investment in human capital. 
Clearly warfare in the future will be different in very significant ways from warfare of 
today. Change will happen faster than ever before, and the officer corps and those of 
our allies will need the ability to anticipate and quickly adapt to these changes. If the 
services are to continue to develop the ideas imbedded in Joint Vision 2010, they will 
need a high percentage of officers with a graduate level understanding of science, 
technology and management, along with a solid understanding of systems engineering 
and integration. And while training is valuable in preparing officers to deal with known 
challenges, it is education that gives them the capability to deal with the unknown and 
uncertain. 
Given this, it is clear our services should value advanced education for what it is, a 
strategic investment in each officer who receives it and for our nation's future. 
We believe three changes are needed to ensure that the Armed Services have the 
educated human· capital they require in their officers' corps. First, officers themselves 
must understand the need for education in the areas of technology, analysis, strategy, 
information, and the operational sciences. They, and those who influence their 
decisions, must believe that advanced education is not only necessary, but indeed 
critical to success in their careers. Secondly, officers should have the opportunity to 
pursue advanced education that provides a return on investment not only in selected, 
primarily shore duty assignments, but also in career developing operational billets. And 
lastly, stable, adequate support must be provided for graduate education of the officers' 
corps. Our strategy is to expedite these changes throughout DoD. 
We must use every forum to carry the message on the importance of Graduate 
Education as a strategic investment in human capital forward throughout DoD, 
particularly within the Navy where we are designated the CNO's advisor on graduate 
education. We must partner with key stakeholders in each of our markets to create the 
right educational experiences for their personnel. We must also pursue a strategy of 
educating junior officers and those who influence them about the opportunities available 
and influence them to pursue graduate education. 
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one of the best of their career is investment well spent and we must exert effort to make 
them "braggingly happy." Additionally, alternative means of delivery such as distributed 
education and distance learning (discussed in initiative three) are areas that must be 
expanded to provide additional opportunities to officers not enrolled in traditional 
programs in residence and in the civilian institutions program. 
Initiative No. 5: Obtain the resources needed to accomplish our mission 
We have laid out a clearly articulated mission for NPS. To execute this mission we 
must obtain adequate resources, and we must use those resources as efficiently as 
possible. Given today's budgetary realities, we must be able to demonstrate that 
investing in quality, focused educational programs produces a tangible Navy-wide 
benefit. It is essential that we provide the Navy leadership with well defined, prioritized 
requirements that can be defended throughout the entire budget process. New 
resources will have to be linked to new requirements, which in turn must _be linked to 
clearly defined fleet needs. 
We need to explore the trade-offs that are possible between investing in new 
educational technology, and the resulting savings in faculty and staff labor. We must 
determine whether we can afford to service all of the curricula we now support; perhaps 
efficiencies can be generated by reducing the number of curricula by consolidation of 
closely related sub-specialties. A comprehensive study may identify areas of 
opportunity that will allow us to free up dollars for reinvestment into our infrastructure. 
The DoD budget is very tight, and promises to be so for many years to come. To 
compete successfully for resources in this climate, we must have a clear commitment to 
providing the Nation with the very best, most efficient graduate programs that are 
tailored to the unique needs of our armed forces. Our Strategic Plan reflects this 
commitment. 
Initiative No. 6: Create the correct balance between current operations and 
reinvestment 
Intra-year funding instability has been the norm at NPS, with the result being reductions 
to non-labor accounts. This has resulted in an imbalance between labor and non-labor 
expenditures, and an inability to invest in faculty and course development as the labor 
account is used entirely for utilization rather than recapitalization of personnel. 
Organizational effectiveness depends on resources devoted to both current operations 




As budgets have declined, we have continued to support a relatively stable number of 
staff and faculty billets cutting down significantly on the amount of Operating Target 
(OPTAR) available for lab, library and network upgrades and recapitalization. We have 
maintained a stable level of teaching support but have neglected faculty and staff 
development investments. We have, however, created a small reinvestment fund from 
efficiencies. 
We need to establish the true cost of each of our educational programs, and to consider 
competing only in those areas where we have a clear comparative advantage and 
sponsor support to guarantee adequate funding for operations and investment. We also 
need to evaluate the return on investment in our support activities, and we need to 
determine the optimal way of obtaining the needed support. 
We need to strategically evaluate programs and functions, and focus our resources on 
programs most critical to combat effectiveness. Additionally, we need to examine labor 
costs in order to provide for savings or redistribution among programs. 
Initiative No. 7: Recruit, develop and retain high quality staff 
The human resource systems for recruiting, developing and retaining high quality staff 
must be linked and aligned with the overall business strategy for the School. The 
present civil service system for General Service (GS) and Wage Grade (WG) has been 
cumbersome for hiring and rewarding, especially for high quality technical staff. Many 
of these systems will be regionalized in FY99 creating additional challenges. Improving 
the skills of our workforce is of paramount importance to the future of NPS due to 
reduced employee numbers, decreased mobility opportunities, and decreased new-hire 
opportunities, yet budgetary constraints have restricted monetary awards for 
outstanding performance, and allowed for limited training opportunities. 
To cope with these constraints and to make progress in this initiative, we must design 
processes, within our control, that will enable managers to identify career paths, 
redesign jobs to fit new organizational structures, improve the skills of the current 
workforce, distinguish high performers from low performers, provide equal opportunities 
to all employees, and identify the best qualified applicants for critical vacancies. We 
must focus on leadership development for staff supervisors/managers at all levels, 
including department chairs. They must be given the opportunity to enhance their 
management skills and to learn new skills to keep pace with increasingly complex job 
demands and be creative personnel managers. We should review staff positions for 
"career ladder" designation where appropriate and design an awards program 
consistent with our budget and mission. We should examine the use of graduate 
education opportunities as a hiring and retention device. We must also improve the 
two-way communications between staff and the administration. 
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Initiative No. 8: Recruit, develop and retain high quality faculty 
NPS needs a unique faculty combining both scholarly and military expertise to support 
its mission. The basic job of recruiting and developing faculty largely belongs to the 
academic departments who tend to recruit faculty for their disciplinary expertise. This 
focus on discipline expertise is almost inevitable for young (that is recently graduated) 
faculty, since they are usually recruited directly from the top academic programs in the 
country. We have generally recruited our senior faculty directly from the academic 
world. We have certainly recruited excellent faculty, in general, but faculty lacking any 
real exposure to military challenges. This has led to problems when we need faculty to 
participate in the interdisciplinary activities. As we reduce the size of our tenure track 
faculty in response to declining budgets, we need to formulate a carefully articulated 
hiring strategy that provides more balanced hiring between disciplinary and 
interdisciplinary requirements. 
We must also provide our faculty with an effective orientation and professional 
development program. A viable faculty development program must include an exposure 
to the great ideas that are forming the military forces of tomorrow. Faculty need this 
knowledge to develop pro-active curricula. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The ultimate question is: "How do we preserve faculty excellence, plan for the future, 
and become flexible and adaptive at the same time?" It will take the cooperation of all 
members of the NPS community to make the NPS vision a reality. In many areas we 
will have to completely change the way we have done business for years. It will affect 
every one of us in one way or another. The world around us is changing at an ever-
increasing pace. The military services, in particular, have undergone almost 
unbelievable changes since the end of the Gulf war. As the Revolution in Military Affairs 
comes to pass it will touch almost every aspect of the military establishment. We may 
envision a world in which cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles replace fighter 
and attack planes. What will replace today's fleets, air wings, etc.? What new 
organizations will arise? What are the implications of Command, Control, 
Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C41SR) 
and Precision Weapons? What new educational requirements will we be facing? Our 
students are the ones who must face these issues. We must continue to prepare them 
to do so. 
14 
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(2) Exp1ain how the institution conducts the PJE. If the 
PJE is embedded in the core curricu1um, identify where and 
how it is integrated. 
The PJE at the Naval Postgraduate School is viewed 
internally as a natural outgrowth of direction in 1985 from 
the Secretary of the Navy, with initial planning at NPS in 
1986. This effort originally was intended to introduce a 
new four-course sequence of focused professional studies 
into every curriculum at the School. The initiative 
evolved throughout the late 1980s, supported by each 
successive Secretary of the Navy, and resulted in the 
inclusion of one professional studies course into the core 
curriculum for all U.S. officer students, beginning in Fall 
1989 and continuing to the present. This course, NS 3252, 
"Joint and Maritime Strategy," provides each NPS student 
with an overview of many intermediate-level PME subjects 
and covers portions of four of the five Learning Objectives 
in Learning Area One (National Military Capabilities and 
Command Structure) of the Program for Joint Education. 
In December 1994, the Chief of Naval Operations approved 
designation of selected curricula taught at NPS as meeting 
his prerequisites for classification as Intermediate-level 
Professional Military Education. These selected curricula 
were, and still are: Strategic Planning and International 
Organizations and Negotiations; Area Studies; Joint 
Intelligence; and Special Operations/Low Intensity 
Conflict. The PJE is integrated into these four curricula 
but can also be taken as previously mentioned, as a stand-
alone sequence to augment any curriculum or non-resident 
course of study. 
The Fall 1995 CJCS PAJE Team visit to NPS resulted in CJCS 
"authorizing the Services to approve initial Phase One PJE 
certification for NPS graduates who successfully completed 
the Joint Education Electives Program (JEEP) course 
sequence as currently taught." Also, the PAJE 
Certification Team made numerous suggestions, and these 
have been incorporated into today's stand-alone four-course 
joint education course sequence. The PJE courses are taught 
in seminar style, placing maximum emphasis on affective 
learning techniques to take best advantage of joint and 
service expertise inherent in the mix of students. 
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(3) Identify noteworthy institutional strengths or 
limitations. 
The fundamental institutional strength of the Naval 
Postgraduate School is its status as a fully-accredited 
graduate school, 'actively engaged in the pursuit of joint 
and combined education through teaching and research. For 
decades the School has proven remarkably adept at covering 
a wide range of subject matter, from general ideas to 
technical studies. In the past decade it has been bringing 
these tremendous resources to bear on the requirements of 
Joint Professional Military Education. NPS's academic 
excellence is continually reaffirmed by the School's 
ability to win the maximum accreditation from the major 
academic groups. 
Association Date Max Term Term Accredited(yrs) Due 
WASC 1990 8 8 1998 
ABET 1996 6 6 2002 
NASPAA 1993 7 7 2000 
PAJE 1995 2 2* 1998 
WASC: Western Association of Schools and Colleges 
ABET: Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology 
NASPAA: National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration 
PAJE: CJCS Process for Accreditation of Joint Education 
*The 1995 PAJE was an initial "2 year certification". This PAJE effort is for accreditation. 
Another principal institutional strength is the School's 
outstanding faculty, which combines both scholarly and 
military expertise. An emphasis on faculty excellence is 
embedded in virtually all elements of the School's 
operations, to include the ongoing recruitment, 
development, promotion, and retention, of the more than 
three hundred faculty. Faculty must be good teachers, able 
to interact effectively with the officer students, as well 
as be good researchers. Faculty flexibility, adaptability, 
and innovation are NPS hallmarks. As faculty at a graduate 
educational institution, they keep abreast of the latest 
research in their respective fields. Indeed, in most cases 
they themselves are on the leading edge. This enables NPS 
to create new courses on priority topics, such as anti-
terrorism and counter-terrorism, and even to create entire 
new curricula, such as Information Warfare, to meet the 
changing security environment. Courses are continually 
updated to meet the needs of the curricula sponsors and to 
remain current and relevant. 
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Faculty are held to the highest standards of academic 
rigor, both in their teaching assignments and in their 
research projects. It is the faculty's active engagement 
with students--in the classroom and in one-on-one 
mentoring, advising, and instructional situations--that 
makes NPS a truly exceptional academic institution. Few 
graduate schools in the country can match the School's 
performance in terms of faculty-student contact hours. 
A further NPS strength is its ability to combine classroom 
teaching with hands-on laboratory experience. For example, 
students in the Program for Joint Education have easy 
access to the Global Communication and Control System 
(GCCS) and Siprnet (Secure Internet) . Since 1995 the PJE 
courses have been augmented with new interdisciplinary 
Laboratory exercises to take advantage of evolving NPS 
capabilities in Joint War-gaming. These capabilities 
include: the Secure Systems Technology Laboratory (SSTL) 
with access to the Global Command and Control System 
(GCCS), Global Broadcast System (GBS), Situation Influence 
and Assessment Model (SIAM) and, in the SCIF, the Joint 
Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and the 
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS). 
An institutional limitation is the misperception that 
education at NPS is too "technical" in focus. In fact, the 
School's educational programs offer students a broad-based 
understanding of the art and science of war, at both the 
tactical and operational levels. NPS's technical assets, 
far from exhausting the School's strengths, constitute an 
integral and enriching component of a multifaceted 
educational program. 
A further limitation is that the services hav~ not been 
supportive of PME at NPS. This has slowed our progress to 
achieve a better service mix in the PJE courses. As a 
result, the exemplary jointness of the NPS student body has 
not been fully reflected in the PJE classes. 
Another limitation is the fact that the PJE curriculum has 
been anchored in the Department of National Security 
Affairs, a situation that has served to hinder the 
expansion of the program. As indicated by the 
organizational diagram provided and described in the 
following section, we have taken significant steps to 
remedy this situation by making the Program for Joint 







(1) Develop an orqanizational diaqram hiqhlightinq those 
sections directly affecting the PJE (whether the joint 
educational program is a separate course or integrated into 
the core curriculum) . 
It should be noted that significant changes in key NPS 
personnel have occurred in the past six months, including 
the appointment of a new Superintendent, the re-alignment 
of the National Security Affairs Department under a new 
Division Dean and the appointment of a new Director of 
Professional Military Education. A copy of the school's 
organizational diagram is shown below. 
Director 
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A depiction of the organizational relationships that now 
exist is shown here. 
NPS Executive Board 
- Resource and programatic review 
- As required 
I 
PME/PJE Coordination Committee 
- Forum for academic, administrative, resource and student input 
- Meets monthly 
...L -1.·····························1 
Director, Professional Military Education (04) Director, Institute for Joi nt Warfare Analysis 
-Advises on PME and PJE - Coordinates joint research 
- External liaison with Joint Staff and Service Staffs 
:I_ 
JPME Coordinator (04J) PME Coordinator (04P) 
- PJE coordination, assessment, and development - Navy PME coordination, assessment, and development 
- Liaison with service representatives - Liaison with sponsored Chairs 
(2) Provide a copy of the organizational manual (or school 
catalog), identifying those billets directly involve~ with 
the PJE (whether the program is a separate course or 
integrated into the core curriculum) . 
The recent NPS organizational changes help to align the 
entire joint education program. Most significant in this 
regard is the shift of the PJE from the NSA Department to 
the administrative purview of the newly created Directorate 
for Professional Military Education, Code 04. This 
facilitates improvements in specifically PJE-related 
activities: for example, allowing the program to take 
better advantage of NPS's significant war-gaming 
capabilities in order to enhance the PJE capstone course, 
NS 3230. The organization manual is currently being 
rewritten to reflect the organizational changes described 
above, and under 3. b. (1). The dra£t text describing the 
new directorate and the organizational responsibilities 
follow. 
Director, Professional Military Education (Code 04) 
Basic Functions: 
The Superintendent and Provost's chief advisor on 
PME and NPS's Program for Joint Education. 
Billet Requirements: 
Senior Naval Officer (06) and faculty member who is 
qualified as a Joint Specialty Officer with recent 
Joint operational experience. 
Masters Degree. 
Duties, Responsibilities and Authority: 
- 19 -
04/22/98 
Plan, develop and evaluate PME and JPME programs. 
- Exercise operational and supervisory authority over 
the PME and JPME Coordinators, including the 
establishment of common policies and procedures for 
PME/JPME programs. 
- Ensure, through periodic reviews, that both PME and 
PJE curricula are current, and that they reflect the 
stated objectives of both the Service and Joint 
Staffs. 
- Act as a resource manager for billets, personnel, 
and monetary assets assigned to the PME Directorate. 
Function externally to the institution; interface 
with the Joint Staff, Joint Community, Service Staffs 
and other PME/PJE institutions. 
Chair the NPS PME/PJE Coordination Committee 
Prepare the Superintendent on Military Education 
Coordinating Committee (MECC) issues and attend the 
MECC Working Group. 
Organizational Relationships: 
- Reports to the Superintendent for the performance of 
assigned duties and coordinates with the Provost on 
all academic matters. 
The PME Coordinator (Code 04P) and JPME Coordinator 
(Code 04J) report directly to the Director, 
Professional Military Education in the execution of 
their duties. 
Professional Military Chairs will coordinate matters 
dealing with PME/JPME with the Director, Professional 
Military Education, via the PME Coordinator. 
Service Representatives will coordinate matters 
dealing with PME/JPME with the Director, Professional 
Military Education, via the JPME Coordinator. 
PJE Course Coordinators will coordinate matters 
dealing with PME/JPME with the Director, Professional 
Military Education, via the JPME Coordinator. 
(3) List any p1anned organizational changes possib1y 
affecting the PJE and explain their planned implementation. 
The only planned change is to amend the NPS mission 
statement so that it better reflects the School's 
commitment to joint education. 
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(4) Identify any special committees involved with 
curriculum review or quality control of the PJE. 
The PME/PJE Coordination Committee is the working group 
that meets monthly to address PME/PJE curriculum and 
quality control issues. Curriculum review and quality 
control of the NSA courses that make up the PJE, are also 
done through the NSA Department's normal biennial 
curriculum review and quality control process. This process 
is discussed in 4.b. (4) "Describe how program deficiencies 
are identified and required instructional or curriculum 
modifications are coordinated." of this study. 
(5) Identify organizational strengths or limitations 
affecting the ability to conduct a high-quality PJE. 
The primary strength is the institutional recognition that 
the PJE complements the NPS Mission by nurturing joint and 
multinational military perspectives, teamwork, and problem 
solving. There is a strong undercurrent to develop 
competencies in joint warfighting and prepare officers to 
work in the joint environment. This recognition is 
manifest in the creation of the new directorate and 
elevates PME and JPME to an Institutional (NPS) vice 
Departmental (NSA) level. Functionally this provides 
better access to the Superintendent and Provost, oversight 
by the NPS Executive Board (NEB) and quality control by the 
PME/PJE Coordination Committee. The new organization also 
provides expansion opportunities to the other services and 
curricula. 
The only limitations to this new organization are that the 
Director of PME, the PME Coordinator, and the JPME 
Coordinator are all dual hatted. The Director billet is 
also the Chair for Tactical Analysis, the PME Coordinator 
billet is also the Chair for Strategic Planning, and the 
JPME Coordinator billet is also an Area Studies Instructor. 
While this is a limitation in terms of time available, it 
is also a strength in that all three positions are involved 








a. Academic Program 
(1) List any courses offered by the schoo1 that meet PJE 
objectives (the primary 1earning areas and 1eve1s of 
1earning specified in Enc1osure C) . Provide a copy of the 
course sy11abus and a rationa1e for course sequencing. 
The previous seven-course choice within the four-course PJE 
series that was certified in November 1995 has been pared 
down to five. The remaining two-course option is due to 
NPS's ability to cover C4ISR-related PJE learning 
objectives at both SECRET GENSER and TS/SCI levels for 
,students who possess applicable security clearances. All 
five Joint courses have been extensively revised (one is 
entirely new) to incorporate both applicable 1995 PAJE Team 
suggestions (based on the old MEPD) and the new Learning 
Areas and Objectives mandated by the OPMEP. Additionally, 
three of the five courses take direct advantage of leading 
edge NPS Laboratory facilities to provide a real-world 
reinforcement of normal classroom learning methods and 
activities. Since the PAJE certification, achieving full 
coverage of revised learning objectives with maximum 
standardization through the Joint course series has been a 
paramount goal. 
A matrix providing the crosswalk between OPMEP learning 
objectives and PJE courses follows. The course syllabi 
with descriptions and applicable OPMEP Learning Areas and 
Objectives identified are provided as Appendix b. In 
addition to the Learning Areas, twelve of the sixteen PJE 
Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) are addressed in one or 
more lectures and PJE courses. In fact, NPS offers entire 
curricula in three SAE subject areas: Civil-Military 




LA&O coverage of the PJE 
1. Nat. Mil. Capabilities 
& Command Structure 
2. Joint Doctrine 
3. Joint & Multinational 
Forces at the 
Operational Level 
4. Joint Planning 
& Execution 
5. Systems Integration 
at the Operational 
Level of War 
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b.--* * *- * 
c.--* * * 
d.--*- * * 
·*--* a.----* * ---
b.--* *--- * 
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JPME SAE and JV 2010 coverage of the PJE 
NS 3252 NS 3020 NS 3154/9 NS3230 SGL 
1. Force Protection ... ... . .......... ... "'k .................................................... "'k 
2. Professional Military Values.... "'k 
* * 
3. Environmental Security -- not covered 
4. Peace Operations................... "'k ............. "'k 
5. Civil-military Operations.......... "'k 
6. Joint Training ................................................................. "'k ............. "'k ............ "'k 
7. Combat ID ....................................................................... "'k ............. "'k 
8.GCCS ............................................................................. "'k ............. * 
9. Modeling and Simulation ..................................................................... "'k 
10. Strategic Deterrence ............. "'k ...................................................... "'k ............ "'k 
11. Mil Ops & Media ................... "'k ....................................................... "'k ............ "'k 
12. Mine Warfare ............................................ "'k .................................. "'k ............ "'k 
13. JRCC/JWCA ................................................................. "'k ............. * 
14. Employment of Reserves ................................................................... "'k 
15. Information Ops ............................................................. "'k ............. "'k 
16. Medical Hazards - not covered 
17. JV-2010 ............................... * .................................. * ............ "'k 
Rationale for course sequencing: While NPS operates year-
round on a quarter system, with potential entries into 
curricula at four different points in the academic year, 
PJE course sequencing is a requirement. All US NPS 
students take NS 3252;"Joint and Maritime Strategy", 
regardless of his/her curriculum. Students who decide to 
complete the four-course PJE series next take either NS 
3020, "Operational Level of War". or one of the two C4ISR 
course choices, NS 3154,"Joint Intelligence and Military 
Command" (SECRET GENSER) or NS 3159,"Principles of Joint 
Operational Intelligence"(TS/SCI). An illustration of 
course sequencing follows. Generally, Joint core students 
are expected to complete all three of these "prerequisite" 
courses prior to enrolling in NS 3230,"Strategic Planning 
and the Military", which serves as the "capstone" course in 
the series. The building-block nature of this course 
sequencing ensures better-informed student participation in 
the Laboratory and capstone wargaming exercises. Due to 
the NPS quarter system, as well as to course scheduling and 
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individual student situations, in some cases concurrent 
course enrollments after completion of NS 3252 is 
permitted. Winter and Summer are the largest class inputs. 
Students starting the PJE in those quarters can complete 





Typical Course Sequencing 
NS 3252 NS 3020 NS 3154/9 NS3230 
(x)___ ~,, ~ .... ~@ // x ',~ 
x ', ,' x 
' , x ~00, x ~ 
Q----+- 1 year sequence 0- - _...,.. 1 + year sequence 
(2) Describe the student body composition (Service, grade, . 
and average time in Service, level of civilian and military 
schooling) . 
The following table represents the composition and grade of 
onboard active duty officers, as of 10 October 1997. 
Grade Grade Grade Grade Grade TOTALS 
01 02 03 04 05 
- - - - -
Army 0 0 120 11 0 131 
Navy 0 28 567 162 18 775 
Marine 1 7 110 60 0 178 
Corps 
Air 
Force 0 6 24 5 1 36 
Coast 
Guard 0 3 11 2 0 16 
TOTAL 1 44 832 240 19 1136 
As you can see the bulk of the student body is at the 0-3 
level. Although these are usually senior 0-3's, this 
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"earlyn exposure to intermediate level PME and JPME is not 
readily accepted and recognized by all services. 
Every year NPS draws officer students from over forty 
countries around the world, whose presence makes the 
School's student ·body genuinely multinational. This 
feature enriches the NPS experience in many ways, most 
notably by enhancing the classroom discussion of 
international topics. The number of internationals studying 
at NPS exceeded 200 as of January 1998. 
A graphic showing the average student composition for 
academic year 1997 and the international student body 
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41 COUNTRIES, 218 STUDENTS 
(3) List any major changes p1anned for the current 











There are no major changes planned for the current courses, 
which are the product of significant revisions made to the 
PJE program within the past year. There are, however, two 
areas where we are in the process of making improvements in 
the current courses: 
1) We have identified limitations in the program's coverage 
of the operational art of war. In response, we have been 
working to strengthen this component in NS 3020, 
"Operational Level of War." These improvements are now 
reflected in the revised syllabus for that course, which 
will be offered for the first time in this enhanced format 
in spring 1998. 
2) Our PJE "capstone" course, NS 3230, "Strategic Planning 
and the Military," includes a wargame that might be 
expanded to take full advantage of the School's war-gaming 
capability. We are exploring ways to accomplish this. 
Ongoing PME/PJE discussions with other services may soon 
lead to the offering of additional courses via some 
combination of Distance Learning, new NPS courses, or 
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Directed Studies courses that cover non-resident portions 
of ILC programs and subjects beyond those in the four-
course PJE series. Since 1995 much effort has been 
expended toward this goal, and despite both bureaucratic 
and funding setbacks, significant progress can be reported, 
particularly with the Marine Corps Command and Staff 
College and the Army Command and General Staff College. 
Further use of laboratory and simulation capabilities at 
NPS is planned in order to continue upgrading the 
practical, "hands-on" experiential component of the PJE at 
NPS. 
(4) Identify the process used to ensure that changes in 
joint doctrine, joint tactics, techniques, and procedures 
are incorporated into the curriculum. 
There are several processes used to ensure that changes in 
joint doctrine, joint tactics, techniques, and procedures 
are incorporated into the curriculum. PJE Course 
Coordinators update their courses as required. NPS attends 
the Joint Curricula Coordi~ating Conference and is active 
in the Military Education Coordinating·committee. The NPS 
PME/PJE Coordination Committee monitors these somewhat 
decentralized approaches to the same goal. 
a. Obtaining the Documents and other Materials 
1. NPS and its Library, including the Restricted 
Resources Division (classified reports), are on 
distribution for service and joint publications, including 
CD ROMs. The JPME Coordinator, supported by the Government 
Resource Librarian, actively tracks and retrieves new and 
revised publications and brings them to the attention of 
the PJE faculty. The Coordinator is also on line for 
Internet, E-Mail, and DoD message traffic. A PME/PJE 
Resource room is used to store bulk publications for 
seminar distribution to faculty and students. 
2. The faculty averages two trips each to Washington, 
D.C., per year. During these trips they meet with 
curricular and research sponsors, and take full advantage 
of the opportunity to collect documents, including those 
dealing with joint doctrine, procedures, and operations. 
NPS PJE faculty were active participants in the Summer 1996 




3. The School hosts hundreds of visitors per year 
through its various departments, notably National Security 
Affairs and the Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis. Many 
of these visitors are from the Joint and Service Staffs and 
they frequently provide new briefings and documents. (See 
item 4. a. (6) beiow.) 
4. The NPS Dudley Knox Library is very active in 
obtaining specific materials, including joint publications, 
has a focus group to support PME, JPME, and PJE 
instruction, and has established separate homepages to 
cover specific SAE material such as Counter-Terrorism and 
Force Protection. (See item 5. a. (1) d) below.) 
b. Incorporating Documents and Materials in Courses 
1. NPS uses the quarter system, with four full 
quarters per year. The faculty continually revises their 
courses, adding new materials on a routine basis. In this 
department staff and the print shop support them. 
2. Since the inception of the first PME course in 
Fall 1989, the instructors of NS 3252, "Joint and Maritime 
Strategy," have held periodic meetings to ensure a degree 
of standardization and to discuss new materials to include 
in that course. Following the 1995 PAJE Team visit, the 
PJE faculty agreed to a revision process which assigned 
each of them specific responsibilities for ensuring joint 
doctrine was covered throughout the four-course PJE series, 
in accordance with the recommendations of the PAJE Team. 
This process was further advanced in 1996 and 1997, when 
the NS 3252 course became fully standardized and subject to 
continual refinement in a series of weekly meetings among 
PJE faculty chaired by the course coordinator. 
3. When it was decided to seek Phase One PJE 
certification, the School created a PJE Coordination 
Subcommittee, which was co-chaired by the Associate Provost 
for Instruction. Since then several similar groups have 
been part of the revision process for PME and the PJE. 
Each group addressed the matter of incorporation of 
applicable joint and service doctrine in the PJE at NPS. 
With the re-organization in December 1997, the sub-
committee was expanded and renamed to include PME. 
4. PJE course syllabi include: as required readings, 
relevant joint and service doctrine publications, which are 
made available through a combination of handout hard 
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copies, purchase at the bookstore, and via the JEL and 
other sites on the Internet. While copies of the relevant 
publications are presently sufficient for instructional 
purposes, lack of funding precludes providing each student 
with a full set of hard copy documents to retain following 
program completion. 
5. The JPME Coordinator meets with individual faculty 
to discuss documents and other materials dealing with joint 
doctrine, joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
(5) Identify the criteria used for student mixes within 
seminars. Identify the military student mix by Service, 
grade and specialty code. 
The criteria used for student mixes within the seminars are 
those set by the OPMEP guidelines. 
Multi-Service and multi-warfare specialty diversity is a 
primary goal for all PJE seminars, but is by no means 
limited to those seminars. In fact, coverage of joint 
topics at NPS routinely occurs in non-PJE courses. While, 
the actual student service composition at the Naval 
Postgraduate School varies by quarter, at the end of 
Academic Year 97 the average was 37% non-Navy students and 
13.5% from non-host military departments. In the National 
Security Affairs Department, which contributes most heavily 
to the NPS PJE, the number of FY 97 inputs was 52% non-
Naval and 36% from non-host military departments. 
While such impressive numbers argue that NPS is well-
positioned to meet the full OPMEP standards, in fact since 
the other services do not currently grant PME/PJE to their 
officers enrolled in the NPS PJE, some PJE seminars are 
deficient in non-host military department representation. 
Despite this obvious disadvantage, however, of 42 seminars 
conducted, over 60% had three or more services represented. 
Each quarter the JPME Coordinator closely manages class 
size and mix to ensure minimum size and maximum diversity 
for each seminar. The aim is to limit PJE seminar size to 
20 students, and in no case can it exceed 25. During AY 
97, the actual result was fewer than 20 students per 
seminar (including the school-wide required NS 3252 class), 
and the goal for AY 98 is to reduce that to 15 or fewer, 
and to improve the mix as much as possible. 
- 30 -
04/22/98 
NPS is engaged in an ongoing effort to increase the number 
of students and faculty from the Army and Air Force 
participating in all its programs. At the same time, the 
School seeks to reach understandings with the other 
services so that their officers are eligible to receive 
PME/PJE Phase I credit through NPS. Once these 
arrangements are in place, the student mixes within the PJE 
seminars will become representative of the overall 
jointness of the NPS student body. 
(6) Provide a 1ist of guest speakers and lecturers, and 
identify subject areas for their presentations. Explain 
how their presentations support PJE learning objectives. 
There are a variety of programs, which bring guest speakers 
and lecturers to the School. In Appendix 6.c. there are 
lists of visiting speakers sponsored the Superintendent's 
Guest Lectures, the NSA Department, the SOLIC program, and 
the Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis for the past two 
years. Occasionally there is an overlap from one speaker 
series to another, as we ~eek to expose the visitors to the 
maximum number of students. Approximately one-half of the 
visitors also meet faculty and students in one-on-one 
meetings, address a class or a brown bag lunch, and at 
times go to dinner with students and faculty. 
In accordance with School policy, the US officer students 
are invited to almost all of the conferences, seminars, and 
lectures held at NPS. Faculty and staff encourage students 
to take advantage of such opportunities. The US students 
are obligated to attend the Superintendent's Guest Lecturer 
series. 
The presentations in the vast majority of cases are not 
integrated into courses, including the PJE core courses, 
and are not specifically intended to support PJE learning 
objectives. Rather, they are a supplementary activity that 
enriches the overall academic program and environment. 
They do, however, support the PJE in the sense that many 
discuss joint topics and are presented by senior officers 
and civilians from all the services. In some cases 
individual speakers do make presentations in PJE classes 
and meet with individual students, often in support of 
thesis research. Occasionally, contact continues well 
after the visit with the speakers agency providing a wealth 




(7) Identify noteworthy academic strengths or 1imitations 
that affect the PJE. 
The Naval Postgraduate School is a fully accredited 
institution with 88 years' experience in educating students 
and awarding graduate degrees. The School's reputation is 
built on the integrity of its academic program and 
standards. The same academic rigor that is applied to 
every curriculum at NPS is brought to bear on the PJE. 
An integral part of the educational experience at NPS is 
student research. The School requires most of its students 
to write a thesis in order to obtain a Masters degree. The 
purpose of the thesis is to encourage students to acquire a 
deeper understanding of a selected topic through extensive 
research, critical analysis, and thoughtful writing. Many 
theses are devoted to topics that are relevant to the joint 
arena. The results are often impressive, with some of the 
best works approximating Ph.D. dissertations in volume and 
scope. 
Over the last six years, The NSA Department, in which the 
PJE faculty is concentrated, implemented a thorough review 
process to ensure that students produce the highest quality 
theses possible. The Department recently issued a revised 
thesis policy further defining the ~oles of the faculty in 
quality control. 
Establishing such rigorous guidelines is especially 
important in light of the fact that many NPS theses receive 
wide distribution and, because they often address policy-
relevant and joint topics, are scrutinized by members of 
the government and academia. 
A limitation in our civilian faculty is that some lack real 
exposure to the military environment and to the joint 
experience. While many are active researchers in joint 
programs, there could be a better military inculcation 
process. We do not as yet have a uniform orientation and 
professional development program to rectify this situation, 
but the School is working to put one in place. In the 
meantime, we have instituted a series of faculty 
orientation trips, to the San Diego Naval Complex and to 
Washington, D.C. NPS has recently revised its mentoring 
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program in order to make it more focused and supportive of 






b. Academic Evaluation and Quality Control 
(1) Exp1ain how the schoo1 eva1uates students' success in 
attaining the goa1s and objectives of the PJE as specified 
in Enc1osure C. Describe the tota1 eva1uation program 
(inc1uding grading procedures and assessment of 
instructiona1 qua1ity) . 
Virtually all courses at NPS are graded on a scale of A to 
X. (The NPS Catalog, which will be available for the PAJE 
Team, includes a description of grading.) A very few 
courses are graded pass (P) or fail (F), and students in a 
degree program may choose to take courses outside their 
normal program in the P/F mode (but these courses may not 
then apply to the hours accumulating toward a degree or 
curriculum requirement in any program) . All PJE courses 
are taken for letter grades. Grades are given by the 
course instructor based upon student performance as 
measured by examinations, projects, presentations, seminar 
papers, participation, etc., as appropriate to the course. 
The faculty in turn are evaluated by the students. Student 
Opinion Forms (SOF) are distributed to each student at the 
end of a course and the quantifiable data are tabulated by 
the School. (A SOF form follows this page.) The tabulated 
results are returned to the faculty members along with the 
anonymously written comments and criticisms. The tabulated 
SOF data are used by the Chairmen to monitor progress of 
faculty, and by the School in tenure and promotion 
decisions. In addition, the Curricular Officer is readily 
available to students. If there is a problem with a course 
or a faculty member, the Curricular Officer meets with the 
Department Chairman to deal with the problem. 
Regarding student evaluation of PJE courses, for every 
quarter since Fall 1995 the SOF forms for these courses 
have included four supplemental questions. One positive 
result of the 1995 PAJE Certification Team visit is that 
NPS has since put in place a system to capture data asked 
in these questions for all PJE courses. A copy of the 
supplemental questions and results of the survey with 
regards to NS3252 follow this section. 
Beginning with Winter Quarter 1998, a PME/PJE pre-test is 
given to all students in NS 3252, the first course of the 
PJE sequence. At the end of NS 3230, the final course of 
the sequence, a PME/PJE post-test is given. The results of 
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both tests will be analyzed to assess the learning that has 
occurred. This process has just started and no data is yet 
available. A copy of the PME/PJE pre-test is provided 
following the NS 3252 SOF an?lysis. On occasion, some 
professors have asked their classes for feedback with 
regards to the education they have received at NPS. One 
such response in the winter of 1997 to the question, "Has 
your education and training been adequate to meet the 
demands of the future?" yielded some insight into NPS's PME 
and PJE efforts. The student wrote, 
"I feel the training that I received here at NPS 
has prepared me well for this shift in military 
doctrine. I gained an incredible understanding 
of how the other services operate. The NS 3252 
class brought out many of the strengths and 
weaknesses of "jointness." However, I feel that 
the greatest training I received was in working 
on projects with members of other services. 
During discussions and problem solving, they 
brought up a whole new gamut of ideas that I 
would never of thought of due to the military 
culture that I was raised in. I don't know [how] 
other officers (those that have not attended NPS) 
will cope with such a tremendous shift. I have a 
feeling that many will make poor decisions that 
will cost us a great deal in readiness." 
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-1. The course was well organized ............................................................... @ © @ © 0 @ 
-
-2. Time in class was spent effectively ................•... ·.: ..•...•....•....•.••...........•...... @ © @ © © @ 
-... 
-3. The instructor seemed to know when students didn't understand the material •...................• @ © @ © 0 @ 
-
-4. Difficult concepts were made understandable .......••.....••.. , ............................... ® © ~ © CD © 
-
-5. I had confidence in the instructor"s knowledge of the subject ..•...........•..................... ® © ® © 0 @ 
-
-6. I felt free to ask questions ........ , .......•..•........•.. , .•••.......•......................... @ @ ·@ @ © @ 
-
-7. The instructor was prepared for class . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • • . • • • • • . • . . . . . . . . . • . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . @ © @ © <D © 
-
-8. The instructor's objectives for the course have been made clear ............•..... , .. , ............ @} © @ © 0 @ 
-. . 
-9. The instructor made this course a worthwhile learning experience ...•..••...•....•.........•...• @ © ® © .<D © 
-
-10. The instructor stimulated my interest in the subject area ..•.•.....•.. : . .. , ........•............. ® © @ © 0 © 
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-14. Overall, I would rate the textbook(s) .................. .' ........................................ @ @ @ @ 0 @ -
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-
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Supplemental SOF questions for NS 3252: 
"Although NS 3252 is required for all U.S. officer graduates, it 
is also intended to provide an overview of the National Security 
strategy and Joint/Maritime Strategy Process as part of the NPS 
Program for Joint Education (PJE) . Please answer the four 
optional questions, 17-20, of the SOF. We continue to implement, 
and improve, our_ joint education program, and your responses will 
be useful in our efforts. You are also encouraged to write 
comments on the reverse side of this form regarding the PJE. 
17. The stated joint learning objectives were achieved in the 
course. 
18. The course made me aware of DOD-wide requirements as well as 
individual service capabilities .... 
19. The instructor demonstrated in-depth knowledge of joint 
issues. 
20. overall, the course helped prepare me to operate in a joint 
environment. " 
Supplemental SOF questions for all other PJE course: 
"While students may take this course for several reasons, it is 
also intended to address various learning objectives embedded in 
the CJCS Phase One Program for Joint Education as part of the NPS 
Program for Joint Education (PJE) . Please answer the four 
optional questions, 17-20, of the SOF. We continue to implement, 
and improve, our joint education program, and your responses will 
be.useful in our efforts. You are also encouraged to write 
comments on the reverse side of this form regarding the PJE. 
17. The stated joint learning objectives were achieved in the 
course. 
18. The course made me aware of DOD-wide requirements as well as 
individual service capabilities .... 
19. The instructor demonstrated in-depth knowledge of joint 
issues. 
20. Overall, the course helped prepare me to ,operate in a joint 
environment . " 

NS3252 STUDENT OPINIONS 
-<>-General course 
satisfaction 
-a- Instructor rating 
-<>-Course rating 
-)K- Joint LO achievement 
-o- DoD awareness and 
other svc capabilities 
~ Instructors joint 
knowledge 
-x- Prep for joint 
environment 
f 
----------- --------- ----------- ------··--- ·----------------~-· _i_ 
I 
I 
6. List titles of each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS}: 
7. List titles of u. S. Unified Commanders (okay to abbreviate)·: · 
8. List the titles of members of the US National Security Council: 
9. List the titles of the Two Major NATO Commanders (military): 
10. What is the approximate number of federal budget dollars 
requested for defense this fiscal year (FY-98}? 




12. How many active divisions are in the QDR-level U.S. Army? 
13. How many active MEFs are in the QDR-level US Marine Corps? 
14. How many active Aircraft Carriers are in the QDR-level USN? 
15. How many active Fighter Wings are in the QDR-level USAF? 

















(2) Exp1ain the procedures used to ensure instruction 
standardization and evaluation among seminars. Provide an 
examp1e of a typica1 1esson p1an or adviser's guide used by 
seminar advisers. 
Standardization among the joint seminars is the 
responsibility of the PJE faculty working in concert and in 
conjunction with the JPME coordinator. Since the visit of 
the 1995 PAJE Team, the PJE faculty have worked to 
strengthen instruction standardization and evaluation of 
the Joint courses. The attached syllabi of PJE courses 
(Appendix 6.b.) is the best evidence of the success of this 
effort. NS 3252 is now team-taught, ensuring that all 
students work from the same syllabus, attend the same 
weekly lectures, and take the same examinations, while the 
other four courses in the PJE sequence are taught by the 
same faculty members from one quarter to the next. All PJE 
courses have standardized course cards. A copy of a 
typical course card and lecture graphics, from NS 3252, can 
be found at the end of section 4.b. (6). 
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(3) List the remedial programs or assistance provided for 
students experiencing difficulty completing course work 
satisfactorily. 
The School does everything possible to avoid a situation 
where students have difficulty completing their course work 
satisfactorily. Officer students are often transitioning 
from one undergraduate major discipline to another (often-
unrelated) discipline for graduate work. Also, the 
students have been seven or eight years away from 
undergraduate work while engaged in training or operational 
tours. In the technical curricula the School provides 
refresher courses in Mathematics and Physics, as well as 
core courses in Engineering, Computer Science, and 
Operations Research. In the NSA curricula the Department 
offers introductory courses in Quantitative Methodology, 
Comparative Politics, International Relations, and 
Economics. If there is a total mismatch in the student's 
background and graduate program, the.student may elect to 
transfer to another more suitable program with approval of 
the student's sponsor, Curricular Officer, and Academic 
Associate. 
The team of the Curricular Officer and Academic Associate 
provide ongoing academic, professional, and administrative 
counsel as requested and required. Student class schedule 
matrices can be modified to adapt to a student's weaknesses 
and problems. Courses can be given an "Incomplete" grade 
to allow the student more time to complete the work. 
Students with < 3.00 GPA are put on probation and given 
special attention in order to become academically healthy. 
Students have also been allowed to de-enroll for a quarter 
to deal with major problems; this requires working with 
detailers and extension requirements. If these actions are 
insufficient, then the inter-curricular transfer noted 
~bove can normally be arranged. Overall, the School 
provides maximum flexibility to deal with all student 
issues. 
(4) Describe how program deficiencies are identified and 
required instructional or curriculum modifications are 
coordinated. Explain how this affects the PJE. 
The course coordinators and the faculty are responsible for 
ensuring that all courses and course materials are up-to-
date. Specifically with regard to joint education, the PJE 
faculty are in continual liaison with the Joint Staff and 
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the Joint Doctrine offices. By going directly to the 
source and by maintaining these contacts on a regular 
basis, the faculty are able to keep the PJE seminars 
current and accurate. 
School-wide, the more routine modifications take place on 
an ongoing basis in two main ways: First, by students 
indicating to the faculty, Academic Associate, Department 
Chair, or Curricular Officer that it would be useful to 
include some material to eliminate a perceived deficiency. 
Second, by frequent contacts between the Academic 
Associate, Department Chair, or Curricular Officer and the 
curricular sponsor in which the latter indicates that it 
would be useful to include some materials. In these two 
approaches the coordination is done through the PME/PJE 
Coordinating Committee. 
The School has established a unique and rigorous curriculum 
review process, which includes an internal review, 
executive overview, murder board, and full curriculum 
review with the participation of the curriculum sponsor(s). 
At most stages of the process the senior leadership of the 
School is involved, and at the curriculum review itself, a 
flag rank officer from the sponsoring organization as well 
as the School's Superintendent play an active role. The 
curriculum review is a biennial requirement for the School 
and the sponsor. The curriculum review process is highly 
structured and very thorough. The results include action 
items, which are reviewed at the latest by the time of the 
next curriculum review. 
(5) Provide a copy of instruments used to conduct follow-up 
surveys of graduates and their supervisors. Identify any 
established procedure ensuring data obtained is used to 
modify the curriculum in relation to graduates' performance 
in the field. 
NPS is participating in the Armed Forces Staff College 
(AFSC) initiative to coordinate and automate the follow-on 
assessments required by the OPMEP. Efforts are underway to 
produce a manual survey of both graduates and supervisors 
in the interim. The procedure will be to present the data 
to the PME/PJE Coordination Committee, and if necessary, 
create a working group to address any issues that arise. 
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(6) Identify any noteworthy strengths or 1imitations in 
eva1uation and qua1ity contro1 systems. 
The School has a thorough set of procedures in place for 
the evaluation of courses and their faculty, chiefly 
through the SOF and the Curricular Officer/Academic 
Associate system. Our students, being commissioned 
officers, are responsible and highly motivated, and take 
the evaluation process very seriously. The results of the 
students' evaluations are a central part of the total 
faculty reward system, including pay, promotion, and 
tenure. 
The principal improvement in the area of JPME evaluation 
and quality control has been the incorporation into the SOF 
process of supplemental questions specific to PJE courses, 
as discussed above, in 4.b. (1). 
A limitation in this area is that, as we have been 
including the supplemental, PJE-related student evaluation 
questions for only two years, we have but a limited pool of 
data from which to assess the quality of the program or to 
identify any longer-term trends. A further limitation is 
that the supplemental SOF questions do not ask students to 
evaluate the performance of each course in meeting specific 
Learning Objectives set out in the syllabus. However, 
students often provide written comments to course 
instructors who address specific strengths and weaknesses, 
as they perceive them. 
-39-
NS 3252 Joint and Maritime Strategy 8 
WEEK 3 {Lessons 5 and 6) 
THE PURSUIT OF VICTORY: 
THE SCIENCE AND ART OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 
Objectives: 
Lesson (hour) 5: Principles of War The idea that Principles of War exist 
is an intrinsic part of military strategy. This lectures surveys several 
Principles (objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity 
of command, security, surprise and simplicity). It explores how 
sometimes this principles are in harmony (simplify + economy of force) 
and how sometimes tensions exist between any effort to incorporate 
these principles into military planning (offense versus Security, Mass 
versus Maneuver, etc~) Historical illustrations are used to explore several 
of these principles. 
Lesson (hour) 6: The Operational Level of War This lecture surveys the. 
difference between tactics and strategy .. It also surveys definitions, 
drawn from Joint Pub 1-02 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
of such important terms as "tactical level of war," "strategic level of 
war," "operations" vs. "operational level of war," "campaign," "theater," 
"theater of war," "Theater of Operation," etc. A discussion of the 
"notational" relationship between "commands" and "Levels of war" and 
. strategic, operational and tactical maneuver tasks and levels of war 
(drawn from the Universal Joint Task List) also is presented. This 
material is illustrated with a discussion of allied operations in Normandy 
in 1944. 
PME Learning Objectives: 
2a. Comprehend current joint doctrine. 
3b. Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level 
of war. 
3d: Review wars, campaigns, and operations and explain the link between 
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importance of defined conflict termination. 
3e. Summarize the relationship between the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels of war. 
Special Area of Emphasis: Force Protection 
Required Reading: 
John Shy, Jomini, in Makers of Modern Strategy, 143-85. 
Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level," from Strategy: The Logic of 
War and Peace (1987), 91-112. 
JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Chapters 2-3, "Fundamentals of 
Joint Operations," "Planning for Joint Operations," and Appendix A, 
"Principles of War." 
CJCS, Joint Vision 2010. 
Supplementary Reading: 
AFM 1-1 /2, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 
Essay F, "Three Levels of War." 
Carl H. Builder, "Keeping the Strategic Flame," Joint Forces Quarterly 
(Winter, 1996-97), 76-84. 
Recommended Reading: 
Alger, .John. The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War 
(1982). 
Bellamy, Christopher. The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare (1990). 
House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare (1984). 
Leonhard, Robert. The Art of Maneuver (1991 ). 
Lind, William. Maneuver Warfare Handbook (1985} .. 
Newell, Clayton R. The Framework of Operational Warfare (1991 ). 
Simpkin, Richard. Race to t~e Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century 
Warfare (1985). 
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Issues for Discussion: 
1 . What difference does it make whether there are principles of 
war? How would the planning and conduct of military 
operations change if we knew there were no such principles? 
2. What is meant by decisiveness in war? How does this concept 
manifest itself at the three levels of war described by current 
doctrine? Whose responsibility is it to see to it that decisive 
military results get translated into decisive political results? 
3. Are the nine principles of war currently accepted by the 
American armed forces coequal concepts? or is · there a logical 
hierarchy among them? Are they internally consistent, or is 
there tension· among them? Does their relative weight vary 
among· the service branches? 
. 4. Should jointness be a principle of war? What kind of evidence 
should decide such a question? 
5. Does maneuver warfare have the same significance for navies 
as it does for land and air forces? 
6. Are operational simultaneity and synchronicity more or less 
easily achieved by joint forces? by coalition forces? If less, 
is the sacri.fice worth the results? 
7. Is the idea that there are principles of war compatible with 
the idea that there are also periodic revolutions in military 
affairs? Or should we expect the principles of war to change 
as technology or other aspects of the operating environment 
change? 
Seminar Week 3. 
A. Students should be introduced to JV2010 in class this week and 
told that it is imperative to read it as soon as possible if they are not 
already familiar with it. If JP-1 provides the fundamental ·justification 
for joint doctrine and operations, then JV2010 provides the summary of 
the Joint Staff's "game plan." More often than not,· any discussion of Joint 
or. even Service doctrine will be prefaced by a reference to JV2010. Any 
discussion of how the military intends to achieve national objectives ends 
with a reference to JV2010. Students should also be encouraged to read 
Concepts for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Visions 201 O (May 
1997) .for an elaboration of concepts and ideas found in JV2010; 
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8. Seminar leaders should ftiake sure they introduce the "new 
operational concepts" contained in JV201~ (Dominant Maneuver, 
Precision Engagement, Full-Dimensional Protection, and focused 
logistics). Students should compare these new operational concepts to 
the principles of war presented in the lecture. 
C. The 1997 SAE list defines force protection ad a "security 
program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family 
members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations, 
accomplished through planned and integrated applications of combating 
terrorism, physical security, operations security, counterintelligence, and 
other security programs." Compare concept of force protection with 
principle of war "security" and the new operational concept "Full-
Dimensional Protection" supplied by JV2010. Does force protection 
represent an extension of the battlefield? Do you think that JV201 O 






The Operational Leve[ of War 
Danie[ Moran 
NS 3252 
Between Strategy and T accics 
• "Strategy/' from striltefiOo/ ="the office [OT art] of the commander-
in-chief ." 
• ''Tactics/' from t:ilkti~ :="matters pertaining to arrangements." 
§ 
• ''Tactics refers to actions within the range of the enemy s guns1 
strategy to actions outside their range." 
- tf einrich von Bulow {1798) 
• ''Tactics teaches the U$e of anned forces in the enga5ement; 
strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war." 
- Carl von Clausewitz {1831) 
Moran: The Opeta6onal Level of!Mlr Slide2 
1 
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Tactics and Strategy 
Tactical level of war • The level of war at which battles and engagements are 
planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical 
units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered 
arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and 
to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. 
Strategic level of war . The level of war at which a nation or sroup of nations 
detennines national or alliance security objectives and develops and uses 
national resources to accomplish those objectives. Activities at this level 
establish national and alliance military objectives; sequence initiativesj 
define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments 
of powerj develop global or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; 
and provide anned forces and other capabilities in accordance with the 
strategic plan. 
from Joint Pub I-oi,. DiccioTldf'Y of M;litary and Associated Terms 
Moran: The Opetationa/ Level of\llfclr Slide3 
"Operations" versus the "Operational Leve[ of War" 
Operation. A m;litary action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, 
train ins- or administrative military missionj the process of carrying on 
combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense and maneuvers 
needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. 
Operational level of war • The level of war at which campaigns and major 
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic 
objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link 
tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to 
accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the 
operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resoun:es to bring 
about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension 
of time or space than do tacticsj they ensure the logistic and administrative 
support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical 
successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. 
from Joint Pub I-oi,. DiaioTldf'Y of Military and Associated Terms 
Moran: The Operational Lewlof\llfclr Slide4 
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Campaigns and Theaters 
Campaisn. A series of Te lated military opeTations aimed at accomplishing a 
strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. 
Theater. The geographical area outside the continental United Scates foT 
which a commander of a combatant command bas been assigned 
responsibility. 
Theater of WaT. Defined by the National Command Authorities or the 
geogTaphic combatant commandeT1 the aTea of aiT1 land, and water that is1 
or may become, diTectly involved in the conduct of the waT. A theater of waT 
does not normally encompass the geogTapbic combatant commander's entiTe 
aTea of Tesponsibility and ma;y contain moTe that one theater of operations. 
Theater of Operations. A subarea within a theater of war defined by the 
geogTaphic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific 
combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theateT 
of war will normally be geogTapbically separate and focused on different 
enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size1 
allowing for operations over extended periods of time. 
Moran: The Operational Level of \¥cir Slide5 
The Operational Level <;>f War, continued 
• 
11 
• •• conduct having as its aim an objective lying at one remove, and one 
remove only, from an objective that cquld be couched in political or 
economic language, that is, from a strategic objective." 
- Richard Simpkin 
11 
••• mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY {the invasion of Sicily) 
as are best calculated to eliminate l taly from the war and to contain 
the maximum number of German forces." 
• 
11 
• •• the struggle of the directing minds, as expressed in conceptual methods 
of action (blitzkries. defense in depth, "strategic" aiT bombardment, layered 
naval air defense}, in the ongoing command of all the forces involved, and in 
the aauaJ adventures and misadventures of those forces." 
• The level where generals fight. 
Moran: The Operational Level ofW<ilr 
- Edward luttwak 
-Col~el WayneA. Possehl 




The Operational Art and the Modernization of Land Warfare 
Drivers 
• The Nation in Arms 
• The industrialization of War 
Economic and demosraphic 
srowch 
lncreasin5 lethality of hi-tech 
weapons 
- Pacifism and social fra5ility 
of the /1 rear'' 
• Command and control of 
dispeTSed1 independent, and 
"stealthy'' forces 
• Military professionalism 
- Triumph of strategic studies 
and military staffs 
Moran: The Operational Level of !Mtr 
Goal 
• Maintain war's utility as an 
instrument of decision 
Control. escalation 
• Small, professional forces 
• Shore, decisive warfare 
Control social consequences 
of military action 
Challenges 
• Persistence of attrition 
• Unconventional warfare 
• . Weapons of mass destruction 
Slide7 
"Notional" Relationship between Commands and Levels of War 
Levels of War=> Strategic Operational Tactical levels of Command U 
Unified Command x x (Geosraphical) 
Unified Command x I Functional) 
Sub-Unified Command x x 
Joint Task Force Command x x 
Functional Component x x Command 
SeTVice Component x x Command 
from the UniverSd! Joint: Task List: {13 September xgg6) 
Moran: The Operational Levelof!Mtr Slides 
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Some additional "notional" distinctions ... 
Stratesic l..&wl Operational Lewi Ta<:dcalliwl 
Servic£ Focus AlWZ)IS joint N<wfya.lway.; joint SinsfeseM.z 
clominated 
Focusof l'aivity Win the war Win thec:ampaisn Wmthebmle 
l<e.yto.success l.lndemDne_,,,yswill Datioy thecncny's Datioythecncny's 
fi~ins: )X>Wl!i- ...f9i<zs_;_ bold terram 
1-llectuaf Focus NanonaJ cijecthia; Enemy E-:uDon 
~ 
wnttmsuidanc:e Policy Plans Oictrineand Ciders 
Drs-ofstnx:ture Mhcc Fbible P1escribed 
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(1) List £acuity seiection criteria and procedures. 
a) seiection of Civiiian Facuity 
The job of selecting civilian faculty largely belongs to 
the individual academic departments, which recruit faculty 
based on their disciplinary expertise and proven record of 
teaching. The basic procedures are generally the same 
across the departments. The recruitment process is less 
elaborate for lecturers (year-to-year contract) than it is 
for tenure-track faculty, which involves the following 
steps: 
1. At a department meeting of tenured, 
adjunct faculty, the hiring priorities 
academic year are discussed and agreed 
faculty can participate but not vote. 
the appropriate division dean agree on 
recruitment effort, so that a position 
developed. 
tenure-track, and 
for the upcoming 
upon. The adjunct 
The department and 
the criteria for the 
description can be 
2. At a subsequent meeting the chairman designates a 
faculty member to lead each of the search committees for 
each position identified. The other members of the 
committees are suggested and agreed upon in the meeting by 
the tenured and tenure-track faculty. 
3. The search committees are informed about EEO 
requirements and guidelines. They meet with the department 
chairman to discuss how to identify possible candidates for 
the position through national searches. The mechanisms for 
the search include placing advertisements in newsletters 
and professional journals, contacting key individuals, and 
informing the appropriate organizations. 
4. The search committee then formulates draft letters and 
advertisements for the position(s), discusses these with 
other.faculty members and the chairman, and clears them 
with the Affirmative Employment and Community Outreach 
section of the Human Resources Office. Advertisements are 
then placed in national publications and letters sent to 
relevant individuals and organizations, informing them of 
the search. Members of the search committee and the 
chairman also make inquiries by telephone, fax, and e-mail 
with academic, government, and business organizations to 
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identify possible candidates. In other words, the net is 
thrown as widely as possible. The NSA Department, for 
example, normally has about fifty candidates for each 
position advertised. 
5. Allowing sufficient time for possible candidates to 
become aware of the search, the search committee reviews 
applications for the position and determines a short list 
of the most promising candidates. Due attention is given 
to equal opportunity considerations in these deliberations. 
The candidates on the short list (at minimum, two; on 
average, three) are invited to visit NPS for a day or more, 
during which time they meet with members of the faculty, 
with senior administrators, and with students, and give at 
least one lecture or seminar. 
6. The search committee deliberates, often with the 
involvement of the chairman~ and agrees upon a prioritized 
list of the candidates. This is presented to the tenured 
and tenure-track faculty for discussion and decision in a 
general meeting. The decision from that meeting is 
advisory to the departmental chairman. 
7. The chairman formulates the request for hiring action to 
the Division Dean. 
b) Se1ection of Mi1itary Facu1ty 
The process for selecting military faculty is very 
different from the recruitment of civilian faculty and 
varies considerably by Department. Following the 1995 PAJE 
Report, greater emphasis has been placed on obtaining and 
assigning military faculty w_hose PME and JSO qualifications 
conform to OPMEP standards for appropriate PJE-related 
billets. Thus, the new NPS PME/PJE Organization is 
comprised of a Director for PME who is a Navy 0-6/JSO, with 
two Navy 0-5s (a JSO and a PME grad) as JPME and PME 
Coordinators respectively. The Curricular Officer is also 
a PME graduate, as are the Navy, Marine, Army and Air Force 
military faculty who are teaching either PME subjects 
and/or the PJE. This group currently includes the Director 
of Naval Intelligence (N-2) liaison officer, the CNO (N-
3/5) Chair of Strategic Planning, and in the near future, 
the Chair of Information Warfare/Operations and TAC D&E. 
These billets currently are filled respectively by two Navy 
0-6s, two Navy 0-5s, one Marine Corps 0-5, one Air Force 0-
5, and two Army 0-Ss with the recent addition of a second 
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Marine 0-5 and the potential for a second Air Force 0-5 to 
replace a Navy 0-5 as the JPME Coordinator. Five retired-
military PJE adjunct faculty at NPS, who are considered as 
civilians by OPMEP standards, also are either PME 
graduates, JSOs, or both. Selection of military (or former 
military) faculty for these assignments involves both 
internal discussions between the Departmental Chairman, 
relevant Academic Associates, and possibly the 
Superintendent and external discussions with program 
sponsors and service personnel branches to agree on 
appropriate military faculty candidates. 
c) Faculty Promotion and Tenure 
All lecturers and tenure-track faculty are evaluated 
annually. If the lecturers are not performing adequately, 
they are so informed; if their work does not improve, their 
contracts are not renewed. If tenure~track faculty are not 
performing up to standard, they are advised that they must 
start doing so if they hope to receive tenure. If they 
fail to improve at all, they are not even brought up for a 
tenure decision. The School follows a six-year up-or-out 
policy. NPS adheres to very rigorous guidelines and 
procedures governing promotion and tenure. 
(2) Describe the military faculty mix by Service. 
The military faculty at NPS is small relative to most other 
PME institutions - 93% of the faculty at NPS are civilians, 
of which 98% have doctorates, so by definition the school 
appears different from most other institutions, which teach 
the PJE. However, for valid reasons centering on 
continuity, this apparent "deviation" could also b~ viewed 
as a strength, which avoids the frequent turnover problem 
associated with a larger military faculty and can provide a 
valuable longer term perspective in teaching of the PJE, 
which also capitalizes on PJE-related research efforts that 
constitute one of the NPS faculty's unique strengths. 
The OPMEP requirement for military faculty in programs that 
offer intermediate level PJE states 5% must be from non-
host military departments. The OPMEP standard also 
requires 75% of the military faculty involved in teaching 
the PJE be graduates of intermediate or senior level PME 
institutions, or JSOs. 
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PJE MILITARY FACULTY QUALIFICATIONS 
Service no. (%) ILC/SLC/JSO 
USN 6 (46%) 6 (100%) 
USMC 2 (15%) 2 (100%) 
Host Mi1itary Dept 61% 
USA 3 (23%) 3 (100%) 
USAF 2 (15%) 2 (100%) 
Non-host Mi1itary Dept - 38% 
% of PJE Mi1itary Facu1ty with ILC/SLC/JSO: 100% 
The military faculty involved in teaching and administering 
the PJE at NPS meet both of these OPMEP Standards. 
Additionally, the Civilian DoD faculty that teaches the PJE 












(3) Identify the facu1ty qualifications and determine if 
they have appropriate credentials and experience. Provide 
a 1isting of facu1ty members with any invo1vement with the 
PJE, inc1uding their area of expertise, degree 1eve1, 
military education, and operationa1 background. 
The following NPS faculty have been involved with the PJE 
at NPS since the 1995 PAJE Certification Team visit: 
Donald Abenheim - Ph.D., Stanford University; Prof. Edward 
Teller National Fellow and Visiting Scholar, the Hoover 
Institution. 
Mi1itary Background: CINCUSAREUR staff (FRG) 1982-84, CNO 
(N-87) Strategic Deterrence JMA Seminar War-game 
participant, 1993. 
Expertise: Military History and Strategy; FRG/German 
Military Institutions. Consultant for the OSD/Director of 
Net Assessment and the Bundeswehr. Present research on the 
transformation of German military institutions and the face 
of war. Member of U.S. Mission to NATO in 1992; NPS Center 
for Civil-Military Relations. 
Research: Recent publications include Reforging of the Iron 
Cross (Princeton, 1988), "United Germany, Nationalism, 
Militarism." Currently preparing a monograph on the role 
of German defense policy. 
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CAPT Pau1 B1och, USN (Ret) - MS, (Operations Research), 
Naval Postgraduate School; MA (International relations) 
Salve Regina. 
Mi1itary Education: USNA, NPS, College of Naval Command and 
Staff 
Mi1itary Background: Joint Specialty Officer (JSO); 
Strategy and Policy faculty at the Naval War College; two 
combat deployments to Vietnam; various department head 
positions aboard USS Midway; Executive Officer of Fleet 
Replacement Squadron; Executive and Commanding Officer of 
VA-165 "Boomers"; Air Warfare Plans Officer US 7th Fleet 
aboard USS Blueridge and primary staff li~ison to 
COMNAVFORJAPAN, Fifth Air Force, and IX Corps US Army; 
former NPS Chair of Tactical Analysis. 
Expertise: Strategy, Operations Research, and Joint Warfare 
Analysis. Following retirement, worked as research analyst 
and editor for the COS USAF-sponsored Gulf War Air Power 
Survey. 
Jan S. Breemer - Ph.D., University of Southern California. 
Mi1itary Background: Frequent Pentagon liaison activities 
with Joint Staff and Navy Staff; worked with USCINC and 
NATO staffs; at sea experience aboard USS Nimitz (CV 68); 
first NPS SECNAV fellow at Naval War College, taught the 
(PJE) National Security and Decision-making course at 
Newport. 
Expertise: Naval Strategy, West European Security, 
International Navies; Co-founder, Joint Center for 
International Security Studies (JCISS) between NPS and UC 
Davis. 
Research: Numerous books and articles in professional 
journals; primary interest in naval power and joint 
warfare, including navy support for the land battle. 
CDR R. Mitche11 Brown, III, USN (Ret) - MBA (Strategic 
Planning), Wharton, University of Pennsylvania; MS, Naval 
Postgraduate School 
NPS PJE/PME Coordinator; NPS representative to CJCS (J-7) 
MECCWG. 
Mi1itary Education: USNA, NPS, Aviation Professional 
Courses. 
Mi1itary Background: Joint Specialty Officer(JSO); 
designated Naval Aviator, extensive combat experience in 
Vietnam; Carrier Airwing Helicopter Antisubmarine 
experience - East/West coasts. Staff tours include 
COMNAVAIRPAC, as Helicopter Training and Readiness Officer; 
CINCUSNAVEUR, as Head of Strategic Analysis Branch; Office 
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of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO Strategic Concepts 
Branch, 1st Navy Special Technical Operations Planner) . 
First Navy (N-3/5) Chair of Strategic Planning at NPS; 
initiated ADM Cooke (CINC Planning) Conference series; 
JWAC liaison. 
Expertise: Strategic Planning, Intelligence & C4I, 
InfoWarfare. 
NPS 
Research: Current research supports the SECNAV POM 
Strategy War-game and CNO Joint Mission Assessment Seminar 
War-game Series. 
Thomas Bruneau - Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley. 
Chairman of NSA Department 1989-1995; Co-chairman, NPS PJE 
Coordination Subcommittee; co-author, NPS PAJE Self-Study. 
Military Background: Frequent Pentagon liaison activities; 
visited five USCINC staffs and CINCIBERLANT; graduate of 
FSI and Bowdoin Security Studies seminars - 1991, 1992; 
experience at sea aboard USS Independence (CV 62) and USS 
Chancellorsville. 
Expertise: U.S. - Latin American Defense Relations, 
Iberian Security; NPS Center for Civil-Military Relations. 
Research: Iberian defense policies and U.S. interests. 
Recent publications include "Defense Modernization and the 
Armed Forces in Portugal." 
CAPT R. Norman Channell, USN (Ret) - MA, (International 
Relations) Boston University, MS, Naval Postgraduate School 
(Intelligence) . 
Military Education: USNA, NPS (Naval Intel), Defense 
Language Institute, Army Institute for Advance Soviet 
Studies, and National War College. 
Military Background: ACOS/DCOS Intel (NAVEUR, COM3RDFLT, 
COMCARGRU 3), ANA Moscow, Joint war-games at Naval.War 
College Staff, Joint tours with DIA and USMACV. Since 
retirement, frequent liaison with Office of Naval 
Intelligence, JICPAC, AICLANT, and NMJIC. 
Expertise: Joint Intelligence, International Relations, 
Computer Systems Engineering, NPS PJE C4I Liaison. 
Research: Joint Operational Intelligence, Joint 
Intelligence Systems, and Systems Connectivity. 
CAPT George Conner, USN (Ret) - MS, (Operations Research) 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
Military Background: Chair for Tactical Analysis and 
Assistant Dean of Military Faculty at NPS. First military 
lecturer to receive Instructional Recognition award. 
Special Assistant for POM and Budget to ~he Assistant 
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Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Staff 
Director/Director for Manpower Analysis for the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower), CNO (OP-91) as 
Reserved and Sustainability Analyst. Executive Officer and 
Officer-in-Charge of VP-69. 
Expertise: Search and detection theory. 
Research: Theater Missile Defense 
Counter-force/Counter-proliferation for the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Office. 
Dana Eyre - Ph.D., Stanford University. 
Military Education: Combined Arms and Services Staff 
·School, USA Infantry Officer Advanced School, USA Civil 
Affairs School. 
Military Background: LTC, USA Reserve; former Infantry 
Officer; currently Civil Affairs Officer with 351st Civil 
Affairs Command; 11 years active duty, 15 years total. 
Taught USMA at West Point for 4 and one half years. Recent 
contributor to Army FM 100-23. 
Expertise: Research methodologies, war-gaming, peace 
operations. 
Research: Various publications on peace operations. 
LtCol John Gibson, USAF - MS (Systems Technology, Joint 
C3), Naval Postgraduate School. 
Military Education: Air Command and Staff College (1993 and 
1986), Marine Command and Staff College (1985) 
Military Background: strategic communications staff officer 
(joint duty), US Strategic Command, fulfilling program 
management, system acquisition, and mobile command center 
operational duties; strategic communications program 
analyst, supporting Strategic Air Command PPBS submissions 
and C4I system capabilities trade-off assessments; system 
control operations officer, AF Space Command, Cheyenne 
Mountain Complex, controlling real-time configuration of 
communications and computer systems in support of 
USCINCSPACE and CINCNORAD; communications requirements 
analyst, developing system performance specifications and 
executing performance assessments. 
Expertise: command and control, and strategic 
communications 
LTC Richard J. Hoffman, USA (ret) - MA (European History), 
MA (Political Science), Stanford University; Executive 
Director, Center for Civil-Military Relations, NPS. 
Military Education: USMA, Armed Forces Staff College. 
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Military Background: Joint Specialty Officer (JSO); 
Strategic Planner, U.S. Mission to NATO; Assistant Deputy 
Chief of Operations, Sixth U.S. Army; Deputy G-3, 91st 
Division (Exercise); M+lO Planner, U.S. Army Europe; 
Associate Professor of Military History, USMA; Armor 
Commander and Operations Officer in CONUS and Europe. 
Expertise: Strategic Planning, MOOTW, Civil Military 
Relations, and Operational Art. 
Research: MOOTW, Crisis Management, and Operational Art. 
LTC Terry D. Johnson, USA (Ret) - MA, Georgetown 
University. 
Military Education: Graduate of DIA Career Intelligence 
Course; Army Mid-Level Career Course, Command and General 
Staff Course; DIA Attache Course (Joint); Army FAO Course; 
Foreign Service Middle East Area Studies Program (Joint). 
Military Background: Joint Duty--Military Advisory Group, 
Turkey; Military Advisory Group (CORDS), Vietnam; Office of 
the Chairman, JCS; Joint Secretariat, Joint Strategic 
Target Planning Staff; Army Attache (DIA) Israel; 
Combined/International--LANDSOUTHEAST, NATO; United 
Nations, NATO; Army 24th Infantry Division (member of Rapid 
Deployment Force); 7th Corps, Desert Storm; served as a JSO 
for a number of years to include critical billets. 
Expertise: Middle Eastern and Russian Studies, Military 
Doctrine. 
Research: Prior to retirement, wrote a number of reports 
concerning Israeli Armed Forces and those of Lebanon, 
Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. Also wrote a small area handbook 
in support of Somalia. Drafted 20 area studies programs 
for the Defense Language Institute. 
CAPT Frank B. Kelly, USN - MA, National Security Affairs 
(Intelligence), Naval Postgraduate School. 
Military Education: NPS, various professional courses in 
intelligence and C4I systems, and PAJE Team training. 
Military Background: Joint Specialty Officer (JSO), four 
operational sea tours as squadron and carrier intelligence 
officer, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence 
(N2) for both COMCARGRU 3 and COMTHIRDFLT (USCINCPAC's 
Alternate CJTF). Served as CJTF J2 for PACOM's first Joint 
Exercise TANDEM THRUST. Shore tours include one overseas 
assignment at FOSIF Rota, Spain and four Washington D.C. 
area assignments at Defense Intelligence Agency (Joint 
tour) and CNO Staff (3 assignments: N2(DNI), N6, and 
N3/N5). As the Intelligence Officer for N3/N5, supported 
Navy planners, OPSDEP and DEPOPSDEP, and conducted daily 
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liaison on various Joint actions with counterparts on the 
Joint Staff. Most recent shore duty prior to NPS, was as 
C.O. Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific and 
Director, Joint Intelligence Training Activity, Pacific. 
Stood up PACOM's first Regional Joint Intelligence Training 
Facility (RJITF) and developed the first Joint Intelligence 
Training program in PACOM. 
Expertise: Intelligence, Joint Training/Education, C4ISR 
Systems, and Imagery Analysis. 
Research: Joint Operational Intelligence, ISR Systems, and 
Joint C4ISR Doctrine. 
CDR Mark Machin, USN - MA, (Intelligence) Naval 
Postgraduate School; MA, (National Security and Strategy 
Studies) Naval War College; NSA Dept Curricular Officer 
(Code 38). 
Mi1itary Education: NPS; College of Naval Warfare, Newport. 
Mi1itary Backqround: Designated Naval Flight Officer; 
Patrol Squadron Nine (North Atlantic) ; Tactical Action 
Officer, USS Kitty Hawk; multiple Western Pacific 
deployments and around-the.-world deployments; Operations 
Officer, Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Center (Spain); 
Student Flight Refresher, Patrol Squadron Thirty; 
Maintenance Officer, Patrol Squadron Eleven. 
Expertise: Scientific and Technical Intelligence, 
Strategic Planning (as curricular officer) . 
Rodney Kennedy-Minott - U.S. Ambassador; Ph.D., Stanford 
University 
Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution of War and Peace Studies. 
Mi1itary backqround: U.S. Army, served in combat in Korea; 
three experience tours to Washington (1992, 1994, and 
1995); Nordic security matters; Environmental Security. 
Expertise: U.S. Diplomatic History and Military Affairs 
Research: NATO's Northern Flank--three monographs, 
including one on the Maritime strategy. 
Danie1 Moran - Ph.D., Stanford University. 
Mi1itary Backqround: Taught the (PJE) Strategy and Policy 
course at Naval War College; served as Professor of 
Strategy at the Naval War College and has taught and 
lectured on military subjects to official and civilian 
audiences on many occasions. 
Expertise: Political. and Military History of Europe. 
Research: Special strategic and political characteristics 
of limited war; origins and significance of the idea of the 
"nation in arms." Publications include a volume of 
-48 -
04/22/98 
Clausewitz's writings and half a dozen essays on military 
subjects. 
Maria Jose Moyano Rasmussen - Ph.D., Yale University 
Military Background: John M. Olin Postdoctoral Fellow in 
Military History· and Strategy (1990-91). 
Expertise: Terrorism, political violence, and civil-
military relations. 
Research: Research has focussed on individual motivation 
and group dynamics within terrorist organizations, and on 
the impact of government policy on terrorist strategy and 
tactics. Has substantial experience interviewing 
terrorists from Argentina, Ireland, and Spain, as well as 
members of political parties, advocacy groups, and other 
legal organizations that act in support of terrorists. Has 
also studied attempts to impose civilian control over the 
military in the Latin American southern cone. Author of 
Argentina's Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969-1979. 
CDR Mike Palatas, USN - MA (National Security and Strategic 
Studies), Naval War College; MPA (US-Japan Security 
Studies), Harvard University; OPNAV N3/N5 Strategic Studies 
Chair. 
Military Education: Nuclear Power Training, Surface Warfare. 
Officer Professional Courses, JPME I. 
Military Background: Operational positions as Commanding 
Officer, USS HEWITT (DD 966); Executive Officer, USS 
ANTIETAM (CG 54); Engineer Officer, USS ARKANSAS (CGN 41); 
Reactor Training Assistant, USS LONG BEACH (CGN 9). Staff 
positions as Disaster Preparedness Officer, COMNAVFORJAPAN; 
Board Member, CINCLANTFLT NPEB; Surveillance Section Head, 
OP-940; DIG Prototype Leading EOOW and Overhaul Planning 
Officer, Nuclear Power Training Unit, Ballston Spa, NY. 
Expertise: US-Japan Security Relations, Disaster 
Preparedness, C4I Wargaming, and Surface Warfare. 
Research: Strategic Planning Issues. 
Bertrand M. Patenaude - Ph.D., Stanford University. 
Military Background: Taught (PJE) NS 3252, Joint and 
Maritime Strategy, at NPS; assisted in the preparation of 
the NPS PAJE accreditation self-study. 
Expertise: European and Russian history and politics; 
international relations. 
Research: Author of a half-dozen articles and editor of 
four books on Russian and Soviet history, including Soviet 
Scholarship under Gorbachev, The Russian Revolution, and 
Stalin and Stalinism. 
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LtCol Timothy L. Pnillips, USMC - MBA (Information 
Systems), San Diego State University. 
Military Education: Advanced Degree Program, USMC Command 
and Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College. 
Military Background: Joint Service Officer (JSO); infantry 
and Headquarters & Service command. Data Systems Officer 
with computer facility database, operations, and Director 
tours. 
Strategic reaction team leader experience. Combat tour in 
Southwest Asia with Defense Intelligence Agency/USCENTCOM. 
Extensive Joint interoperability experience with NATO and 
Partnership for Peace ·nations. Peacekeeping tour in 
Bosnia. 
Expertise: Data systems, Joint intelligence, C4I 
interoperability, and Marine Professional Military 
Education. 
Douglas Porch - Ph.D., Cambridge University. 
Military Background: Held the Mark Clark Chair of History 
at The Citadel, served as Professor of Strategy at the 
Naval War College, and has been a frequent lecturer at the 
United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College and at 
the U.S. Army War College. 
Expertise: French military history. 
Research: Author of numerous works on military history; 
books include The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus 
Affair to Desert Storm (1995), The French Foreign Legion 
(1991), The Conquest of the Sahara, The Conquest of 
Morocco, The March to the Marne: The French Army, 1871-
1914, The Portugese Armed Forces and the Revolution, and 
Army and Revolution: France, 1815-1848. 
Paul Stockton - Ph.D., Harvard University; Associate 
Director, Center for Civil-Military Relations, NPS. 
Military background: Congress; U.S. defense policymaking 
process; Military strategy; Civil-Military Relations. 
Expertise: Military Strategy; Joint Command Structure; 
PPBS 
Research: "When the Bear Leaves the Woods: Department of 
Defense Reorganization in the Post-Cold War Era; "Beyond 
Micromanagement: Congressional Budgeting for a Post-Cold 
War Military;" and ''Congress and U.S. Military Policy 
Beyond the Cold War." 
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Frank M. Teti - Ph.D., Syracuse University, Former 
Chairman, NSA Department. 
Military Background: Served in USA Reserves, task analysis 
of Naval Intelligence, program development for USAF 
Attaches 
Expertise: Political Science, Social Thought and American 
Studies. Has second doctoral program focusing on Defense 
Administration. Thirty years of teaching experience to all 
services. 
Research: Deterrence, Military Sociology. 
Scott D. Tollefson - Ph.D., The Johns Hopkins University, 
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies 
(SAIS), Washington, D.C. 
Military Background: Submission of various reports to the 
Pentagon; frequent interaction with program sponsors in the 
Pentagon; participation in CNO-sponsored project on 
"Enhanced Strategic Cooperation with Latin America"; 
participation as member of NPS group on "Overseas 
Presence," sponsored by th~ NPS Institute for Joint Warfare 
Analysis (JWA); lectured to numerous military audiences; 
participated as an observer in the XXXII UNITAS maritime 
exercises between the United States and Brazil (Phase 8), 
from Rio de Janeiro to Salvador, Bahia, 3-8 November 1991. 
Expertise: U.S.-Latin American Security Relations; 
Civil-Military Relations; Security in the Southern Cone of 
Latin America. 
Research: Civil-Military Relations in the Southern Cone of 
Latin America; Brazilian National Security. Recent 
publications include the "National Security" chapters in 
the Country Handbooks for Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. 
Mikhail Tsypkin - Ph.D., Harvard University. 
Military Background: Conducted research (since 1979) on 
Soviet/Russian military affairs for DoD/DoN and other U.S. 
government agencies; lectured at the Naval War College, the 
John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, PsyOp 
Batallion, 82nd Airborn Division. 
Expertise: Military strategy, civil-military relations, 
natidnal security policy with special application to Russia 
and the Newly-Independent States of Eurasia. 
Research: Russia's defense policy and military strategy; 
civil-military relations in Russia; U.S.-Russian security 
relations. Recent publications include: "Military Power in 
Russian National Security Policy" and "The Politics of 
Russian Security Policy." Also edited the proceedings of 
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the 1995 NPS conference, "War in Chechnya: Implications for 
Russian Security Policy." 
James J. Wirtz - Ph.D., Columbia University. 
Mi1itary background: Observed flight operations at sea 
aboard USS Nimitz (CV 68); observed/participated in 
. training at National Training Center, Ft. Irwin; observed 
submarine ops, NavSub Base, Bangor; frequent visits to 
USSTRATCOM, frequent Pentagon liaison 
activities; support to TBMD office. 
Expertise: development of Joint Doctrine/Joint Theory. Was · 
Olin Fellow at Center for Science and International 
Affairs, Harvard University. 
Research: Publications include: "Counterforce and Theater 
Missile Defense: An ASW Approach to the SCUD Hunt;" "Allied 
and Theater Missile Defense;" "A Joint Idea: An ASW 
Approach to Theater Missile Defense." 
David Yost - Ph.D., University of Southern California. 
Mi1itary Background: Frequent Pentagon liaison activities 
with OSD, the joint and Navy staffs; worked with NATO and 
USCINC staffs; Recording Secretary, US Defense Policy 
Board; first U.S. fellow at the French Institute for Higher 
Study of Armaments. 
Expertise: West European security; nuclear weapons policy 
Research: OSD/NET Assessment, NIWA--Revolution in Military 
Affairs, especially European assessments of informational 
warfare, theater missile defense, long-range non-nuclear 
precision strike systems; OASD/ISP, theater missile defense 
in Europe, nuclear planning issues; OASD/ISA, Forward 
Presence JWCA support to J-5, authored recent article in 
JFQ. Visits NATO, Paris, London, Rome and Bonn at least 
once a year for research. Recent publications include: 
"France," in The Defense· Policies of Nations. 
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(4) Identify facu1ty and student ratios for the institution 
and exp1ain how these figures were computed. 
The student/facu1ty ratio at NPS was computed by taking the 
on-board counts in the fall of 1997. 
AUTHORIZED ASSIGNED TOTAL 
Student data 
Army 122 122 
Air Force 30 30 
Navy 859 859 
Marine Corps 154 154 
Coast Guard 17 17 
Non-DoD Civilian 1 1 
DoD Civilian 17 17 
International 172 172 
Tota1 1372 1372 
Faculty data Primary Primary/Other 
Army 0 4 
Air Force 2 3 
Navy 29 25 
Marine Corps 0 3 
Coast Guard 0 0 
Non-DoD Civilian 0 0 
DoD Civilian 387 387 
International 0 2 
Tota1 418 424 
Student/Facu1ty 3.28:1 3.24:1 
Ratio 
The OPMEP standard for this ratio is 4:1 or better. 
The PJE student/PJE facu1ty (US only) ratio is 1.83:1 for 
AY 1997 and is projected to be 1.95:1 for AY 1998. 
The NPS Joint Education Electives Program was expected to 
teach the PJE to "about 70" in AY 1995, supported by the 22 
faculty listed in the response to question 3.C. (3) above. 
In AY 1995 there were "about 30" students in the NSA 
Department who completed the PJE four-course sequence; well 
within the 4:1 ratio guidelines. In AY 1998 that number may 
reach between 70 and 90, which would still meet the 
standard. Any potential for growth beyond that level will 
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be closely monitored due to the faculty resource 
implications, which would ensue. 
(5) Identify orientation, training, and updating procedures 
established for faculty and staff members involved in the 
administration and teaching of the PJE elements of the 
curriculum. 
a) School-wide Procedures 
NPS commits substantial energy and resources to faculty 
orientation, development, and updating programs. The 
School offers an annual Faculty Instructional Workshop. 
This one-day workshop is presented by senior faculty and 
introduces new faculty to the special/unique instructional 
needs at NPS, covering topics such as: course syllabi, 
objectives, and journals; grading issues; and student 
research papers and examinations. During the following 
week, a 15-minute lecture taping session for each 
participant is done, played back, and critiqued. If a 
faculty member encounters difficulties in a course, he or 
she is encouraged to work with experienced and accomplished 
instructors. In addition, ad-hoc support groups are 
routinely established in the departments to mentor new 
faculty members or those encountering problems. 
b) Joint Issues 
In FY-94 the School received $1.5 million to promote 
instruction and research in the general area of Joint 
Warfare Analysis. These and additional funds made it 
possible to create the Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis 
(IJWA), whose mission is to address the problems of the 
joint defense arena with the academic disciplines resident 
at NPS. IJWA sponsors a wide-ranging research program, 
faculty and curriculum development focused on joint 
warfare, and interaction with numerous services and DoD 
organizations. Among the beneficiaries of these resources 
are the faculty involved in the administration and teaching 
of the School's PJE seminars. During the past two years, 
PJE faculty members have received support to develop new, 
or modify already existing, courses on joint issues, which 
have been integrated into the PJE curriculum. For example, 
in FY 97 Prof. Daniel Moran received course development 
support from IJWA to develop NS 3020, "Operational Level of 
War," which is now part of the PJE course sequenc~. 
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Currently, Professor Norm Channell is updating the two 
Joint C4ISR courses, NS 3154 "Joint Intelligence and 
Military Command" (Secret level) and NS 3159 "Principles of 
Joint Operational Intelligence" (TS/SCI level) . 
IJWA funding has also supported travel by faculty to J-7 
PJE update seminars. These faculty have included, within 
the past year, James Wirtz, Norm Channel, Terry Johnson, 
and Charles Shaw. Finally, every year IJWA coordinates and 
participates in numerous joint war games, and makes funds 
available to support the participation of PJE faculty in 
these activities. A list of IJWA-related joint war games 
is provided as Appendix 6.d. 
(6) Identify faculty development programs available for 
improving instructional skills and increasing subject 
matter mastery as specified in Appendix B to Enclosure D. 
See item 5, above. 
(7) List any noteworthy faculty strengths or limitations. 
Identify problems, if any, in obtaining the desired quality 
faculty members. 
NPS civilian faculty: 
The main strength of the program is the high quality of NPS 
faculty in terms of their graduate education backgrounds 
and experience. The School has been very successful at 
recruiting and.retaining high-quality civilian faculty from 
top-ranked academic institutions. The NPS faculty are 
leaders in their respective academic fields, as attested to 
by their outstanding research and publication records, 
editorships of major journals, and service in high office 
in academic societies. 
Educational Background of NPS Faculty 
Doctorate Masters Baccalaureate Total 
Tenure Track- 176 1 177 
Tenured 
Tenure Track- 68 2 70 
Untenured 
Not Tenure Track 79 62 8 149 
Totals 323 65 8 396 
- 55 -
04/22/98 
TENURE TRACK FACULTY WITH PhD'S* 
*list includes only Universities providing NPS with three or more PhD faculty members 
--········~ • 16 Stanford • 4 Penn State 
• 14 UCLA • 4 UC Davis 
• 13 UC Berkeley • 4 UC San Diego 
• 9MIT • 3 Cornell U 
• 8 Purdue • 3 Georgia Tech 
• 7 U of Washington • 3 Harvard 
• 6 USC • 3 Ohio State U 
• 5 Case Western • 3 U Colorado 
• 5 Princeton • 3 U Illinois 
• 5 Northwestern U • 3 U Minnesota 
• 5 UC Santa Barbara • 3 U Texas/ Austin 
• 4 Johns Hopkins • 3 U Wisconsin 
• 4 Oregon State U • 3 Yale 
• 4 Syracuse 12 
This first-rate faculty brings much more than prestige to 
NPS. Each year faculty members are awarded nearly $30 
million in reimbursable research funds, an impressively 
large total for a relatively small institution. As the 
record shows, NPS faculty go out and compete for research 
dollars--and win. 
REIMBURSABLE PROGRAM SPONSORS 
(RESEARCH & ACADEMIC) 
NSF 





- $30 MILLION IN FY97 EXECUTION 
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NPS mi1itary facu1ty: 
In order to supplement the active duty officers on the NPS 
faculty, we have hired three retired officers who were 





d. Instructional Climate 
(1) Explain how the institution ensures academic freedom, 
faculty and student inquiry, and open exploration of ideas. 
As paradoxical as it may appear, many of us at NPS think 
that we enjoy more academic freedom teaching at this School 
than we would at numerous other leading civilian academic 
institutions. In the NSA Department, at least, there has 
been no problem concerning academic freedom in recent 
memory. Political correctness is not fashionable at NPS, 
and the officer students are here for education and not for 
either indoctrination ·or training. 
NPS adheres to the tenets of academic freedom as put forth 
by the American Association of University Professors. 
Faculty are free to select textual materials/readings of 
their choice, produce and distribute classroom notes, 
engage students in free and open discussion of all relevant 
topics, and publish in line with their research results. 
There is an active Faculty Council that acts as a voice for 
the faculty with the School's administration, and which has 
two relevant committees: The Faculty Instruction Committee 
and Faculty Professional Practices Committee. Both of 
these committees can address questions or violations 
concerning academic freedom and other faculty issues 
related to instruction and research. 
Recruitment of new faculty, recommendations on promotions 
and tenure, and visits by curricular sponsors and review 
committees all involve a high degree of faculty 
participation. Academic freedom and open exploration of 
ideas is encouraged by these essentially open forums. 
NPS follows a tenure policy, which is similar to that at 
other leading academic institutions. Once a faculty member 
has tenure it is very difficult to remove him or her, 
including for issues that embody academic freedom. 
NPS's environment of academic freedom, open inquiry, and 
exchange of ideas, so valued by faculty, also pertains to 
students. If a student has a problem, he or she can take 
the grievance to the Curricular Officer, the Department 
Chairman, or to the Superintendent via Officer Student 
Advisory Committee (OSAC). 
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(2) List active and passive 1earning methods used by the 
institution and the percentage of time students are 
invo1ved in each. 
The emphasis at NPS is predominantly weighted toward active 
learning methods. This is a function of the fact that PJE 
is conducted at NPS in a graduate education environment. 
For every four hours in class, at least eight hours of 
outside reading, writing, and research is expected, which 
is all active in nature. Class emphasis is on 
seminar-style discussions, with active participation a 
graded component. Students must do research and write 
seminar papers, engage in class projects, which are 
presented in class, lead discussions on selected topics, 
and take examinations. Even in the guest lecture series, a 
question-and-answer period is included. In all classrooms 
there are overhead projectors for presentation purposes, 
and other types of audiovisual aids are available as 
needed. All students make use of computer laboratories for 
word processing, as well as Internet-based research and 
discussion. 
(3) Describe how the institution approaches the PJE goa1s 
of joint awareness and joint perspective. Exp1ain what 
activities are used and describe how progress in this area 
is assessed. 
The PJE goals of joint awareness and joint perspective, far 
from serving merely as the guiding principles of the five 
joint seminars, inform the entire ethos of the Naval 






Technological innovation; key to future military capabilities 
~---- 0 IJoINT VISION 20101 <:::::i 
0 C0 
"Education and training must prepare joint warriors to 
meet the challenges of the future battlespace. They 
must emphasize employing new technologies ... " 
Joint Vision 2010 
As seen in the above slide, "The Need," taken from the 
command brief, "Joint Vision 2010// is central to the 
School's perception of its purpose. Among the activities 
used to increase joint awareness and joint perspective at 
NPS are the various initiatives and objectives set out in 
the yearly NPS Strategic Plan. Progress in achieving PJE 
and other goals is regularly assessed by the NPS Executive 
Board, which monitors the advancement of each initiative 
and objective, as well as the effectiveness of the 
strategies used to accomplish them. 
(4) Identify student counse1ing and academic advisory 
services avai1ab1e to the students. 
In academic and professional matters the students have open 
access to the Curricular Officer/Academic Associate team. 
In consultation with each student, and after a review of 
his/her academic background and records, the team develops 
a program of study within the framework of the established 
standard curricula. The team monitors the academic 
progress of each student and implements program changes 
when appropriate and in accordance with sponsor 
requirements and academic feasibility. Both members of the 
team are responsible for the overall quality of a student's 
program. The Academic Associate holds primary 
responsibility for evaluating the student's academic 
qualifications, based on academic department standards, for 
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pursuing a specific sequence of study. The Curricular 
Officer is responsible for ensuring that the program 
selections are consistent with sponsor policies and needs. 
In counseling students, the Academic Associate holds 
primary responsibility for academic counseling, while the 
Curricular Officer is responsible for professional 
development counseling. The Curricular Officer exercises 
military supervision and direction of all students assigned 
to him, including periodic evaluation of their performance 
through fitness reports. 
For matters concerning thesis research and writing there is 
a faculty advisor and either a co-advisor or second reader. 
In many departments there are, in addition to the 
Curricular Officer, active duty officers at the 0-5 or 0-6 
level who provide liaison with the sponsors. The students 








5. Academic Support 
a. Library 
(1) List 1ibrary resources avai1ab1e to students and 
provide examp1es of types of materia1s direct1y supporting 
PJE course requirements. Comment on avai1abi1ity and 
comp1eteness of joint pub1ications 1ibrary, Joint 
E1ectronics Library System, and Joint Universal Lessons 
Learned System. 
a) Background 
The Dudley Knox Library (DKL) supports the mission of the 
Naval Postgraduate School by providing professionally 
directed academic reference and information services to the 
faculty, staff and students of the School, its tenant 
organizations, other military installations, and military 
scholars and researchers throughout the world. Services 
include in-depth reference assistance, research materials, 
bibliographies, computer literature searches, classroom 
instruction and Interlibrary Loan and Document Delivery 
(ILL/DD) service in support of the school's educational and 
research programs. 
b) Holdings 
The library's collection includes over 400,000 books, 
500,000 micro-format materials and 1,200 current periodical 
subscriptions. 
DKL houses well-balanced collections particularly strong in 
the fields of computer science, military and naval history, 
engineering (especially electrical, mechanical and 
aeronautical), national security affairs, operations 
research and systems management. The DKL also has a very 
strong technical report collection and participates in the 
Government Printing Office's Federal Depository Library 
Program. The Restricted Reports and Services (RRS) area, 
also housed in the Library, contains over 35,000 hard copy 
reports and 300,000 microforms, which are restricted or 
classified up to the Secret level. In the past all 
technical reports including those at the 
unclassified/unlimited level were housed in that area. In 
an effort to make them more accessible, the 
unclassified/unlimited reports are slowly being pulled out 




A staff of 32 well-trained personnel provide a variety of 
services to ensure efficient use of library resources. 
Nearly half hold Master of Library Science (MLS) degrees. 
Collection development specialists have been assigned to 
each curricular area to assist NPS faculty and students and 
to keep abreast of all curricula and research needs. To 
help maintain continuity a librarian has collection 
responsibilities for National Security Affairs and 
Intelligence as well as being assigned to oversee the 
development of the "joint warfare" collection and all JPME 
related topics. 
Feedback on the effectiveness of current collections and 
services and the development of future ones is received 
through several avenues. These include: comments from the 
Library Council, which meets periodically and provides 
liaison representation from all curricular areas, from 
individual faculty and from the students, especially those 
working on subject specific theses. Faculty are consulted 
regarding areas of interest and research and the Library 
encourages the use the faculty's expertise for collection 
development. Several mechanisms are employed to encourage 
suggestions of specific book purchases. Faculty and 
students can place book suggestions by submitting "green 
order cards" or by sending suggestions electronically 
either from the Suggestion Module of BOSUN, our on-line 
catalog, or via the Internet to the appropriate collection 
development specialist or via the Library's suggestion 
page. The ILL office also notifies the collection 
development specialist of specific titles being requested 
through the interlibrary loan process. 
The Dudley Knox Library offers group and individual 
orientation tours and training to all faculty and students 
to acquaint them with the facilities, procedures, and 
resources readily available to them. To help further 
facilitate research and study, distribution of additional 
information is done through the Library's World Wide Web 
Home Page, the School's Bu11etin 0£ Computing and 
In£ormation Services, the School's electronic Tackboard, 
specialized bibliographies and Collection Development 





Students receive voluntary orientation tours shortly after 
they report to the school. All new faculty are offered 
opportunities for tours and briefings and individual 
orientations or in-depth assistance is available by 
contacting a reference librarian. 
The Library's on-line catalog (BOSUN) is networked allowing 
students and faculty access from their homes and offices 
via the Library's Home Page on the Internet 
[http://web.nps.navy.mi1/-1ibrary]. Public access 
terminals are also strategically located throughout the 
library for in-house uBers. Public terminals for Internet 
searching also provide access to other military and 
academic libraries as well as many other resources. The 
Restricted Reports and Services area (classified library) 
is automated on a stand-alone system available only within 
that area. 
Access to various on-line databases is provided through the 
Internet or with assistance from the Information Services 
librarians. The reference librarians can provide mediated 
searching in over 400 specialized remote databases through 
Dialog and students can access thousands of resources 
through databases such as Lexis/Nexis and Uncover. 
The Library's Electronic Resources area currently provides 
13 terminals for student and faculty use. A growing number 
of on-line full-text databases and CD-ROM indexes are 
available and reference assistance is provided by 
Information Services librarians. Access to the World Wide 
Web on the Internet is also made available on most of these 
terminals. 
In-house accesS, to full-text databases available either 
through the Internet or on CD-ROM currently includes IEEE, 
Lexis/Nexis, Early Bird, Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS), Global News Bank, Department of State's 
Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN), National Trade Data Bank 
(NTDB), Computer Select, ABI Inform, General Periodicals 
Research II and the Joint Electronic Library (JEL). The 
Library is in the process of purchasing electronic access 
to the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Forces Times. 
In-house access to a number of CD-ROM based indexes is also 
available. These include: National Technical Information 
Service (NTIS), Air University Library Index to Military 
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Periodicals, GPO CAT/PAC Plus (an index to the Monthly 
Catalog of U.S. Government Publications -- the Library will 
have web access to another version of this in the near 
future), Congressional Masterfile 2, Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) Reports, Declassified Documents Reference 
System and Applied Science and Technology. 
As the utility of the Internet grows and as more 
information vendors make their resources available via the 
Web, the Library is changing its access to include these 
electronic resources. Site license agreements make it 
possible for multiple users to access those databases 
simultaneously and from the convenience of their offices, 
labs or homes. The Library is also developing its web 
pages to provide users with hot links to major defense 
related publications and web sites as well as putting up 
recently produced in-house bibliographies (e.g. Seamines & 
Countermeasures, 1970-1996; Land Mines and Demining, 
1970-1996 and Chemical, Biological and Nuclear 
Terrorism/Warfare). The Library's Terrorism Group Profi1es 
page was recently honored with the prestigious Lycos Top 5 
Percent award. 
DKL has access to materials from other libraries through 
its Interlibrary Loan/Document Delivery (ILL/DD) service 
and from other outside agencies such as the National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and the Defense Technical Information Center 
(DTIC). The library is also an active participant in 
MOBAC (Monterey Bay Area Cooperative Library System), a 
local cooperative program which links 21 public and 
academic libraries within the Monterey, San Benito and 
Santa Cruz counties. A number of deposit accounts are 
maintained (including with NTIS, GPO, Dialog, EbscoDoc and 
Uncover) to facilitate fast and easy acquisition of reports 
on a timely basis. 
Current awareness of newly acquired materials is promoted 
by placing newly received materials on display and through 
a weekly listing of new titles which displays from BOSUN 
(the'Library's on-line catalog). Staff also notify faculty 
when titles pertinent to their interests, curriculum or 
areas of research are received. 
Lobby area display cases are used to help highlight special 
library services and materials as well as promoting the 
- 65 -
04/22/98 
Library's ability to support campus programs, special 
events and research needs. 
The Library provides a large number of unassigned carrels 
for general use as well as 19 study rooms for quiet study 
areas or small group study sessions. Equipment for 
individual video viewing is also available. 
e) PJE Support 
The Library's support for Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME) and the Program of Joint Education (PJE) 
is diverse and growing and is seen in the following areas: 
-- The Library is participating with the other Military 
Education Coordinating Committee (MECC) libraries in 
pursuing consortia opportunities to expand access to all 
MECC collections and to other useful databases. 
-- A list of all Joint Pubs and Joint-related materials has 
been posted to the Library's Home Page and will be updated 
as necessary. The list can be viewed at the following 
World Wide Web address: 
http://web.nps.navy.mi1/-1ibrary/jointpubs. 
-- Our Joint Issues web page provides hot links to many 
important Joint sites (e.g. JEL, JCS Link, JFQ, Joint Staff 
Officer's Guide and more). This site is currently being 
accessed an average of three times a day. A link to it is 
also provided from the School's JPME page. It can be 
viewed at http://web.nps.navy.mi1/-1ibrary/jointch:f. htzn. 
-- Obtaining copies of all books on the "Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Professional Military Reading List" as well 
as the various sister service reading lists. 
-- Obtaining copies of all the final versions of the Joint 
Pub series and all other publications put out by the JCS. 
-- Actively soliciting materials published by other 
agencies which have "joint" ramifications. These include 
materials published by the various service Doctrine 
Commands, the Joint Warfighting Center, the Air-Land-Sea 
Applications Center and others. 
-- Providing access to the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) 
both on CD-ROM and via the web. 
-- Providing access to the Joint Universal Lesson Learned 
System (JULLS) to authorized users in the Restricted 
Reports and Services area. 
-- Providing access to the Naval Tactical Information 
Center (NTIC) CD-ROM to authorized users in the Restricted 
Reports and Services area. This database includes the 
Lessons Learned from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast 
Guard and the Air Force as well as the JULLS. 
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-- The Library regularly receives all appropriate research 
materials and other publications issued by the JCS, sister 
services, the service schools and the joint schools from 
the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). 
-- The Library has acquired both the NTIS and DTIC 
databases on CD-ROM. This allows all students and faculty 
to access the complete database of unclassified materials 
and those authorized users access to the complete database 
of all classified materials. Search strategies can be 
tailored to suit their individual needs and they can locate 
all records contained in the database of nearly 2 million 
records pertaining to the JCS or any aspect of jointness. 
A hot link to DTIC's web version of their database is also 
provided. 
-- The Library holds many useful bibliographies, indexes, 
CD-ROMS and databases such as: Air University Index to 
Mi1itary Periodica1s, DIALOG, JEL, the Joint Electronic 
Library's Peace Operations CD-ROM, the Army War College's 
two bibliographies on Jointness, the Army Military History 
Institute's A Bib1iography on U.S. Joint and Combined 
War£are in Historica1 Perspective , the Armed Forces Staff 
College various jointness bibliographies and others. 
-- Via the DKL web page, access it provided to the various 
military bibliographies now being made available. 
-- The Library subscribes to, or is on distribution for 
numerous periodicals from the other services which provide 
information on joint matters or specifically target 
jointness and JPME (e.g. JFQ: Joint Forces Quarter1y and A 
Common Perspective: the Joint War£ighting Center's 
News1etter) . 
-- The Library has appointed a reference librarian to serve 
as coordinator and liaison for the development of the 
Library's joint collection to ensure it meets and exceeds 
the needs and expectations of the students and faculty. 
(2) Identify any noteworthy strengths and 1imitations in 
1ibrary services. 
a) Strengths 
The Dudley Knox Library is part of the MECC Library Working 
Group and has been actively involved in the Military 
Education Research Library Network (MERLIN) project. 
Also high among the Library's list of strengths is the 
quality of its staff. The DKL staff is service oriented, 
well-trained, motivated and professional in the execution 
of their duties and functions. Many have worked in the DKL 
for many years and have extensive knowledge of the 
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Library's collections. Many also have strong subject area 
backgrounds which help in collection development and in 
providing very specific and user-focused assistance. 
Previously implemented changes in collection development 
procedures and the establishment of departmental liaison 
relationships have helped foster better communication and 
rapport between the Library and the various faculty. The 
Library intends to continue this close coordination between 
faculty and Library liaisons to keep abreast of changes, 
new publications, and the dynamic research and educational 
needs of the school. 
b) Limitations 
With the increasing pressure to become more automated, the 
Library staff is hard pressed, due to lack of adequate 
staffing, training on new sources, equipment, and building 
wiring, to handle the increased demands from the faculty 
and students. While automation and redefining of work-flow 
has eliminated many labor-intensive functions, it has also 
greatly increased patron use and expectations. A 
commitment to provide and maintain adequate staffing levels 
and funding to continue to purchase new automated 
databases, computers and networks equipment to mount and 
run these resources as well as to provide training for the 
staff is essential. 
The Library has experienced a number of problems getting 
complete and timely distribution of joint and sister 
service publications. In order to ensure we had a complete 
collection of all Joint Pubs many had to be downloaded and 
printed from the JEL web site. This issue has been 
addressed several times and it is hoped the most recent 
discussions have rectified the problem. We still do not 
seem to be on regular distribution to receive other 
publications produced through the Joint Chiefs of Staff or 
the doctrinal publications of each service branch. 
The current mechanism for ordering maps from NIMA is very 







b. Physical Resources 
(1) Describe the adequacy of the institution's physical 
facilities for the number of students, course offerings, 
faculty space, and other academic requirements. 
The institution's physical facilities are fully adequate. 
The School is able to accommodate, at maximum capacity, 
2200 students, well above the nearly 1400 currently on 
board. NPS utilizes nearly 100 non-laboratory classrooms 
and some 40 centrally scheduled laboratories for regularly 
scheduled courses. 
There are 16 tenant commands residing on campus, ranging 
from the Army's TRADOC Research and Analysis Center (TRAC) 
to the OSD-sponsored Defense Resources Management Institute 
( DRMI) . A number of tenant commands. exist off-campus, 
including the Navy Research Laboratory and the Navy 
Telecommunications Center. 
(2) Describe the accessibility of technology and course 
material development resources. 
Technology resources and resources for development are very 
accessible. There are nearly 200 labs used for research 
and applied instruction. The new Mechanical Engineering 
building also added a number of new labs. NPS has recently 
installed three video-conferencing (distance learning) 
facilities. Current communications, through Integrated 
Service Digital Network (ISDN) lines, enable NPS to conduct 
two-way-video teleconferencing with all DoD shore 
activities. NPS demonstrated a satellite up-link 
capability, which enables the school to reach the fleet for 
two-way video teleconferencing. NPS also utilizes a great 
deal of military equipment and software in its instruction 
and research. 
(3) Identify any noteworthy strengths or limitations in 
physical facilities 
The most fundamental strength of the Naval Postgraduate 
School's physical facilities is the campus's relative 
isolation from the centers of political power. Situated on 
the lovely grounds of the old Del Monte Hotel on the 
Monterey peninsula, NPS offers students and faculty an 
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ideal environment in which to devote themselves to 
intensive study. 
The physical beauty of the campus and its surroundings 
helps NPS to att~act a continuous stream of visiting 
dignitaries, military officers, scholars, and government 
officials from across the U.S. and from around the world. 
Their presence and input serve to enrich our overall 
program for both students and faculty. 
Many visitors come to Monterey to take part in the 40-50 
academic and military conferences and symposia hosted by 
NPS every year. Many of these events are devoted to Joint 
topics and some are joint-sponsored. A list of NPS-hosted 
conferences from FY96 and 97 can be found in Appendix 6.e. 
The officer students benefit most directly from the 
supportive environment of NPS. As all facilities are in 
close proximity to one other, virtually no time is wasted 
in commuting. The BRAC-91 decision to close Fort Ord but 
to retain some buildings and housing units allowed NPS to 
obtain assignment rights to 600 housing units, which, in 
addition to the La Mesa housing complex, has reduced the 
backlog of personnel awaiting government quarters. 
Moreover, foreign national students are now able to rent 
government quarters, enhancing the Naval Postgraduate 
School's ability to attract additional international 
students. At both La Mesa and the Presidio of Monterey 
(POM) Annex, as the former Fort Ord is known, the officer 
students and their families interact with officers from 
other services and countries. It makes for an excellent 
joint and multinational environment for living and 
studying. 
The School_ also profits from its proximity to other higher 
educational institutions, including Stanford University, 
the Hoover Institution, the University of California at 
Santa Cruz, the California State University at Monterey 
Bay, the Hopkins Marine Laboratory of Stanford University, 
the Monterey Institute of International Studies, and the 
Defense Language Institute. NPS has entered into mutually 
beneficial arrangements via Memoranda of Understanding with 
the University of California at Santa Cruz, the University 
of California at Davis, and California Institute of 
Technology. An agreement with the newly formed California 





c. Financial Resources 
(1) Identify sources of financia1 support to the 
institution. Describe the adequacy of these resources to 
support PJE curricu1um deve1opment and course execution. 
Source 
Dept. of Navy Appropriated 
Various Research Sponsors 
FY-97 
Other U.S. Services Student Tuition 
International Student Tuition 
Amount 
Resources are adequate to support PJE curriculum 
development and course execution. 
(2) Identify resource shortfa11s affecting academic 





There are no resource shortfalls that affect these academic 
programs and therefor the PJE. 
(3) List any projected changes in resource a11ocations 
affecting the PJE. 
Resources are stable through Fiscal Year 2001. 
The changes in resource allocation that will affect the PJE 






6 . Appendices 
a. Po1icy 
a-1. SECNAV Instruction 1524.2A 
a-2. CNO ltr Ser 00/4U500182 of 27 July 94 
b. Program for Joint Education Courses 
b-1. NS 3252 Joint and Maritime Strategy 
b-2. NS 3020 The Operational Level of War 
b-3. NS 3154 Joint Intelligence and Military Command 
b-4. NS 3159 Principals of Joint Operational 
Intelligence 
b-5. NS 3230 Strategic Planning and the Military 
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
OFFICE: Of l ltE SECllE l ARY 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 203!50·1000 
SECNAV INSTRUCTION 1524.2A 
From: Secretary of the Navy 
SECNAVINST 1524a2A 
DASN(M} 
04 APRIL 1989 
Subj: POLICIES CONCERNING THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
1. Purpose. To update and clarify policies concerning the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
2. Cancellation. SECNAVINST 1524.2 • 
... 
3. Background. Title 10 u.s.c., Section 7041-7047, .establishes 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and empowers the Secretary of 
the Navy to _J?r~scribe NPS. academic policies. 1.-ro]perform ·• • . ~.ef£e7t;ively..:.in peac~-and. in w':'-r, i::avy and.Marine,.Corps. o~f~cers / 
· •must understand·the·technologies.inherent to the capabilities of 
{.their weapons systems and ships, the way in which such 
capabilities are synergistically·integrated and operated .within 
tactical organizations, ·the manner in which such tactical 
organizations contribute to the fulfillment of a coherent 
national strategy, and the way in which resources may be used 
most efficiently to meet the requirements· of such a national 
strategy. iTpe-professional:- development and •. education,.. of ·Navy and 
Marine·corps: officers must," therefore,· give:·them both ·the ··. 
fknowledger.~o·~perate'in an increasingly sophisticateq· 
l.technological envi;-onment and an appreciation of our nation's 
~defense.objectives to include the suppo~ting maritime strategy. 
Accordingly, the Department of the Navy (DoN) offers a number of 
professional development and education programs designed to 
PFepare Navy and Marine Corps officers for their ·challenging 
leadership roles. 
· 4. Rationale for NPS. ... The· NPS exists . for ··the sole purpose _of · · , 
increasing ·the combat effectiveness of the Navy and Marine· Corps.··. 
It accomplishes this by providing.post-baccalaureate degree and 
nondegree programs in a variety of sub-specialty areas not 
available through other educational institutions; The NPS also 
supports the DoN through continuing programs of naval and 
maritime research and through the maintenance of an expert 
faculty capable of working in, or as advisors to, operational 
commands, laboratories, systems commands, and headquarters 
activities of the Navy and Marine Corps. · 
The contributions of the NPS to the combat effectiveness of the 
Navy and t.he Marine Corps r~flect: 
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a. Its ability to develop and of fer unique curricula --
e.g., ASH, C3I, etc. -- which are unavailable elsewhere because 
of lack of civilian interest, uneconomically small classes, 
constraints on classi£ied research, and the absence 1of relevant 
expertise and experience. 
b. Its flexibility in tailoring general educational . 
subjects to the particu1ar needs and interests of the mil.itary 
e.g., organization, space technology, and manpower management. 
· c. Its a~ility to_ meet DoN requirements, rapidly and 
effectively, by creating and adapting relevant programs and 
terminating obsolete progr~~· 
. ~ 
d. The encouragement of a professional dialogue among 
officer students and faculty engaged in related efforts to solve 
significant military prob1ems. 
e. The cultivation of a unique pool of specialized faculty 
whose expertise is particularly relevant and useful to the 
Department of Defense. · 
····:·. 
·s ." General Program Guidance. The programs of education at the 
NPS must be uniformly excellent and must meet the requirements of 
the Naval Services: 
a. The NPS shall strive to benefit the Naval.Services 
through the education of Navy and Marine Corps officers. tz:NPS 
programs .. must··proyide··officers the ·1atest technological knowledge.,. 
relevant!:'~to~VJ;heir ·future duty assignments as--well as an ·· ~ ·· . · 
_appreciation'of the fundamentals of the maritime strategy and I 
!concepts• of nava1 warfare. Sucli programs must enhance the 
ability of student officers to effectively use the knowledge 
gained at the NPS in their future mi1itary careers. 
b. The NPS must support the Navy and Marine Corps with 
faculty research, faculty advice to DoN officials, and work by 
faculty (both military and civilian) in operational units, 
laboratories, systems commands, and.headquarters of the Navy·and 
Marine Corps. To that end~ programs- will be instituted by DoN 
and the NPS to assure continuing interaction between NPS faculty 
and DoN organizations. 
6. Faculty. Faculty at the NPS shall be fully competent in 
their areas of academic expertise, and th·ey shall also be able to 
apply their expertise in support of the Naval Services.· DoN and 
NPS policies shall support the selection and the development of 
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programs shall emphasize and reward teaching excellence: 
consulting expertise"with operational commands and other DoN 
.organizations; contributions to the work of DoN laboratories, 
systems commands, and headquarters staffs; and other faculty . 
efforts which enhance the. effectiveness and prestige of the· Naval 
Services. The NPS faculty evaluation system for pay, promotion, 
and tenure shall reflect an equal emphasis on: 
a.. The quality of t~aching; 
b •. Faculty contribut~ons to know~edge (e.g., publications 
and research); and 
c. The active application of that knowledge to the missions 
of the Navy and Marine Corps. 
7. Academic Curricula 
a. Objectives. . .. The obj·ectives of graduate degree programs 
at the NPS are to prepare officers to fill sub-specialty 
positions and to reinforce the self-discipline, integrity, and 
intellectua·l standards of the officer corps of the Naval 
Services. 
b. Guidance. The following direction is provided for 
implementation by the Chief 9f Nav.al Operations (CNO) and the 
Superintendent of the NPS. 
. /~. /.•. 
(1) The focus of all curricula at the NPS shall be on 
increasing the combat effectivenes~ of the Navy and Marine Corps. 
Similarity with programs at other educational institutions or 
adherence to criteria for academic accreditation shall be con-
sidered only when congruent with the specific needs of the DoN. 
{2) Programs of education shali not be offered at the 
NPS if programs of comparable cost, ·quality, and focus are ... 
readily available at other institutions. 
(3) Graduate degree and non-degree (short courses) 
programs in technical and nontechnical fields shall be 
established by the Superintendent of the· NPS in response to Navy 
and Marine Corps requirements. Hybrid programs combining 
technical and nontechnical academic coursework also shall be 
established as required to meet DoN needs. The Superintendent 
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(4) l\.t least a total of £our credit hours of course 
work in maritime strategy and developments in naval warfare 
shall be required of all DoN students who are in residence for 
three or more academic quarters. Instruction in maritime 
strategy will include a review of the historical,.current, and 
~volving elements of maritime strategy. Instruction in. 
develo~ments in naval warfare will include an analysis and 
compar1son of present and emerging tactical and strategic naval 
doctrine as well as an analysis of emerging technical . 
developments and their potential effect upon the prosecution of 
tactical and strategic naval warfare by the United States, our 
allies and our potential adversaries. 
-(5) The Superintendent shall conduct an active 
professional lecture series for Navy and Marine students at the 
School. Lectures by high-level authorities shall be scheduled at 
regular intervals during the academic year, with the objective of 
helping students and faculty link their study, teaching, and 
research efforts to the defense needs of the Nation. 
(6) Each curriculum leading to an academic ~egree 
shall be reviewed at least once every two years by the curriculum 
sponsor. The guidance in this instruction shall be used as a 
touchstone by each curriculum review committee during its 
meeting~ and deliberations~ 
8. Support of the Naval Postgraduate School 
a. Navy and Marine Corps organizations shall work with the 
NPS to ensure that the School's educa~ional offerings satisfy 
their requirements. To achieve this objective, DoN leaders 
shall, where possible and appropriate, attempt to involve NPS 
fa~ulty and students in their organizations' operations, 
activities, and research. DoN organizations shall cooperate with 
the Superintendent of the NPS to provide experience tours in 
their organizations for NPS faculty and students. 
b. The development and maintenance of educational excellence 
requires stable resource support. Superior faculty and 
facilities require relatively constant funding.levels for 
development, maintenance, and growth. The CNO.is responsible· for 
ensuring the NPS receives adequate, stable fiscal suppor~ within 
the DoN budget. 
9. Action. The Superin.tendent shall review this instruction 
with members of the Board of Advisors {BOJ\) at each meeting of 
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specifically addresses implementation of this ~nstruction. In 
addition, the BOA shall include in each of its reports a 















William L. Dall, III 
Secretary of the Navy 
(Immediate Office of the Secretary) 
(Comptroller J>f the Navy, Chief of Naval Research, 
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(Commandant of the Marine Corps) 
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(20 copies) 
CO, NAVPUBFORMCEN •· 
·5801 Tabor Avenue 






























CNO ltr Ser 00/4U500182 · 
of 27 Jul1994 
' ! 
.· 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
OFFICIO OF TliE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 
WASHINGTON. OC 20350·2000 
From: Chief o:f Naval Opara_tions 
Subj: GRADUATE EDUCATION POLICY 
Ref: (a) CNO ltr Ser 00/1U500294 of 16 Sep 91 
(b) OPNAVINST 1000.16H 
Encl: (1) Graduate Education Policy 
IN llEPLY llEFift TQ 
Ser 00/4050018~ 
27 Jul. 94 
1 •. This letter establishes Navy•s Graduate Edu041:J.o~ Policy, 
supersedes reference {a) and~supplements r~~rence (b), 
2. I rearfirm the investment in graduate ~duc~tio~ of selected 
officers to be a strategic requiremen1: forhlayy, Witll to~r•i:t 
technological, l1Uinageria1, po1itical and eoonODio ccmplexit es, 
the need for graduate level expertise b~s neva~ been gre~ter! 
Educating ot~icers in speci£ic subapecialties greatly increases 
operational readiness and, as a corollary bene£it, develop~ the 
intellectuAl diveraity and c4pacity that enhances the total. 
professional p~rfcl:lllanca of our officar corps. our investment in 
graduate education must·be pursued as a priority aven in tha face 
of competing demands and declining resources. 
3. Warfare sponsors and subspeaialty priliaary consultants must be 
involved in the oversight of qraduata edumition·witbin their 
communities if we are to derive maximum return on investment. To 
rea·lize the ful.l potential. of gradu~te education requires 
concerted ef~orta in the following a~&Aa; Ashore and af1oat, we 
must properly identify subspecialty bi~lets which requ:l.re 
graduAte education curricul.a; we lllUst·anccurzigo our most 
promising junior officers ta take on the Challenge of advanced 
education1 finally, we must assiqn these officers to valiq 
subspecialty billets. 
. 
4. Enclosure (1) provides a general trimlework to ~ra Navy 
gains the greatest leveraqe ~m this easentia.i invaatmenty I: 
wiil personaily chair an annual. review ~~ our graduate education 
·program. 
Distribution: 
See next page 
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GRADUATE EDUCATION PDLICY· 
.The invast.Jnent we make in our persannai coincides with 
Navy•s success. As' Desert Storm and other operatiQns have 
proved, there is no greater force multiplier thall aotivatedr 
well-educated and professionally trained Officers and Sai1ors. 
Future Naval o~ticers will face increased cbal.lenqea: The 
growing techno1ogica1 complexity in weapons, communications and 
electronics system; the increased imporbu\ca ot joint an4 
coalition operations1 heightened public and ccngressionAl 
scrutiny ot procurement and WUU1gement pr~cticeaf pantinuin~ 
threats to u.s. interestsf pol.itical a.nq economic ins1:ability in 
regions important ta the o.s. and allies1 and ~ewer -;-eaourcas 
with which to meet these ch~llenqes. rnnovatiQn is the kel' to 
the future wel1-being of tomorrow•s •il.it;ary ~orc:a. our 21st 
century Nava1 leaders must be readied now through prafes~ional 
experience and forJRal qraduate education. Ynve&tment in·9raduata 
education provides the Naval Service with ~ comparative advantage 
over potential adversaries. 
Navy•s requirement for fully-funded graduate education 
programs is based upon documented billets coded with suhspecialty 
requirements. These hil1et subspacialty requirements w.U.l be 
thoroughly reviewed and v~lidatBd in the Subspeciplty Rt:sq».U:-ement 
Review process. The review process should be balanced, looking 
for billets that should no longer be subspecialty code~ and 
identi:tyinq billets that shoul.d ba coded. Specifical1y, tor m~ny 
billets on the Joint Duty A&signment List, specific ~duate 
education is required or highly dasirab.lo z.nd ahoul.d ba 
subspecialty coded. . 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS}'wi11 re111ain Navy•s 
primary source of fully-funded graduate education, UPS wil1 
remain committed to the development of curricula that mee~ the 
·nighest standards of excel1ence and the unique prateasian~l needs 
of Navy and tbe Departlllent ot Defense (DoD). SUbspec:iAltias that 
do not require military-unique education will. use civilian 
universities to provide graduate educ:Aticn to their o~ticai:s. 
The superintendent, MPS will administer Navy•s ~ul.1y-funded 
·graduate education curric::ul.a at o.thar DoD graduate institutions 
and at civilian universities. H8 iUld H09B will. an&ura !JPS baa 
the resourqes needed to a£fer excel1ent curricu1a, 
Graduate education wi11 be pr~vided ta se1ected o£~1cars who 
have demon5trated superior professional per~ormanca and who 
possess the academic capabi1ity to C011lpiete.graduata studies 
succe5sfully. To ensura the proper f1ow of top perfoPDers into 
graduate education, each community must encourage its best 
Encl. (1) 
~ .... -a.i.~ 
orricars to attend graduate school. Promotion boards will be 
directed to consider graduate aducation as a positive influence 
on a Naval career during their daliberations, .lUln~al inputs wi1l 
ensure an adequate inventory of subspecialists witn aavanced 
degrees to support billet require~enta. 
The goal. ior .. utilizinq subspecialists is 100 percent. 
Officers who have comp1atad graduate education programs will be 
apsigned to subspecialty billets as soon as practical, but not 
later than tbe second tour fol1cwinq graduation, Maltipla tours 
in a subspecialty are desirable. successful coaplatian of a 
subspecialty tour will be viewed as An import~nt indi~ator of 


























National Security Affairs 
372 Glasgow Hall 
NS 3252 
Office phone: 656-2286 
mbrown@nps.navy.mil 
JOINT AND MARITIME STRATEGY 
Course Description: This course provides students with a 
graduate-level understanding of defense strategy in general, 
and joint and maritime strategy in particular. Major themes 
include: the development of strategic theory in modern times 
and its influence on contemporary military organization, 
force planning, and operations; the roles and missions of 
land, sea, aerospace, and special forces; joint organization 
and doctrine; the interaction between military strategy, 
foreign policy, and alliance systems; the impact of 
technological developments on warfare; domestic policy-
making processes affecting the armed forces of the United 
States; joint planning for acquisitions (PPBS) and 
operations; current defense reform and reorganization 
issues. Primary strategic planning documents are introduced 
and discussed. 
Program for Joint Education: This course is part of the 
Program for Joint Education (PJE) . In addition to its other 
goals, described above, it covers various learning 
objectives specified by CJCS Phase One Joint Professional 
Military Education (JPME) criteria. It is primarily 
concerned with objectives identified under Learning Area 1: 
National Military Capabilities and Command Structure, as 
follows: 
Students will learn the capabilities and limitations 
of U.S. military forces across the range of military 
operations. Command relationships, force development 
and organization, and the concepts of deployment, 
employment, sustainment, and redeployment are 
examined. The following learning objectives further 
define JPME efforts in this area: 
Learning objective la - Comprehend the capabilities 
and limitations of U.S. military forces. 
Learning objective lb - Explain the organizational 
framework within which joint forces are employed. 
Learning objective le - Explain the purpose, roles, 
1 
functions, and relationships of the National Command 
Authorities (NCA), National Security Council (NSC), 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant 
commanders, Service Chiefs, and Joint Force Commanders 
(JFCs). 
Learning objective le - Comprehend how the U.S. 
military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and 
train for joint and multinational operations. 
Course Structure: Instruction in this course is provided by 
three means: a syllabus of required and supplementary 
readings; a series of lectures by faculty from the 
Department of National Security Affairs, plus occasional 
guests; and weekly discussion groups led by faculty 
moderators. There will normally be two lectures per week, 
each lasting one hour. Discussion groups will meet once per 
week for two hours. Readings, lectures, and discussion are 
intended to support and reinforce, rather than duplicate, 
each other. The "Study Questions" included in the Schedule 
of Classes, below, are provided as an aid to understanding 
the assigned reading, and to help focus the weekly 
discussion. 
Facu1ty Roster: All the faculty involved in NS 3252 welcome 
the opportunity for further consultation with students, and 
you should not hesitate to seek them out for assistance or 
additional discussion. The following point-of-contact 
information is provided to assist you. 
Dona1d Abenheim [Ph.D., Stanford University; contemporary 
security studies, coalitions a'nd alliances, civil-
military relations] Office: Glasgow 315, x 2208 Home: 
415-323-7416 
R. Mitche11 Brown [CDR, USN (Ret); MBA, Wharton, 
University of Pennsylvania; MS, NPS; strategic planning, 
Naval intelligence, PME/PJE) Office: Glasgow 372, x 
2286, E-mail: mbrown@nps.navy.mil 
Richard Hoffman [LTC, USA (Ret.); MA, Stanford 
University; peace operations; operational art; strategic 
planning] Office: He-E531, x 3497 Home: 408-384-8128 E-
mail: rhoffman@nps.navy.mil 
Rodney Kennedy-Minott [Ph.D., Stanford University; 
Ambassador (Ret); US Foreign policy, Scandanavian 
security and politics] Office: Glasgow 391, x 2904 
Danie1 Moran [Ph.D., Stanford University; military and 
international history, strategic theory] Office: Glasgow 
2 
397; x2059 Horne: 408-384-2631 E-mail: 
djmoran@nps.navy.mil 
Maria Moyano Rasmussen [Ph.D., Yale University; 
terrorism, political violence, democratization] Office: 
Glasgow 379, x 3673 Home: 408-649-4832 E-mail: 
mmoyano@nps.navy.mil 
Patrick J. Parker [MA, University of Chicago; defense 
mobilization, manpower, deception] Office: Root 223, x 
2097, E-Mail: pparker@stl.nps.navy.mil 
Bertrand M. Patenaude [Ph.D., Stanford University; 
European history and politics, international relations] 
Office: Glasgow 302, x5088 Horne: 415-323-6312 E-mail: 
patenaude@hoover.stanford.edu 
Doug1as Porch [Ph.D., Cambridge University; European and 
military history, low-intensity conflict, intelligence] 
Office: Glasgow 312, x 1038 Home: 408-626-4392 E-mail: 
dporch@nps.navy.mil 
Mikhai1 Tsypkin [Ph.D., Harvard University; Russian 
politics and institutions, military affairs] Office: 
Glasgow 313, x 2218 E-mail: rntsypkin@nps.navy.mil 
Pau1 Stockton [Ph.D., Harvard University; American 
politics and government, civil-military relations] 
Office: Glasgow 310; x 3038 Horne: 408-649-4181, E-mail: 
pstockton@nps.navy.mil 
James Wirtz (Ph.D., Columbia University; international 
relations, strategic planning, intelligence) Office: 
Glasgow 308, x 3483 Horne: 408-375-5609 E-mail: 
jwirtz@nps.navy.mil 
Course Reading: The following books are required: 
Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: From 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton 
University Press, 1986. 
The Constitution of the United States. 
Additional readings are detailed in the $chedule of Classes. 
Official publications are available on-line via the Joint 
Electronic Library, access to which is described below. 
Other assigned material will be distributed at the start of 
the term. Assigned readings are divided into two groups. 
Required readings should be read by everyone, and together 
with the lectures will provide a common foundation for class 
discussion. Supplementary readings may be assigned to 
individuals for in-class reports, but everyone should try to 
3 
read at least some of the supplementary reading for each 
class. Finally, Recommended readings are provided for the 
information of those who wish to learn more about specific 
topics covered by the course. All assigned reading should 
be done in advance of the class in which it will be 
discussed. 
Joint and Service Pub1ications On1ine. Joint Publications 
are available online via the Joint Electronic Library. This 
site links to an array of related materials, including 
Service, Unified Command, and DoD sites, the Unified Joint 
Task List, Joint Vision 2010, Joint Forces Quarterly, The 
National Security and National Military Strategies, etc. 
All these can be downloaded and read with the Adobe Acrobat? 
reader, available for free as a download from the Joint 
Doctrine Home Page: 
Most of the official material assigned in this course is 
included in the Joint Electronic Library and its immediate 
links. URLs are provided for those that are not. On-line 
assignments are marked with a computer symbol ((}. Several 
hard-copy sets are also on reserve in the library. The 
following chart illustrates basic relationships within the 
Joint Electronic Library. Note that the Joint Electronic 
Library does not currently include a link to the Army 
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Course Requirements and Grading Po1icy: This course requires 
4 
two take-home examinations, plus active and informed 
participation in class. The mid-term examination accounts 
for 30% of your grade; the final examination for 45%. Class 
participation accounts for 25%. All work is assigned a 
letter grade from A to F. For purposes of determining your 
course grade, letter grades are averaged, using the 
weightings just described, after being converted to the 
following numerical values: 
A= 4.0 A-= 3.6 B+ = 3.3 B = 3.0 B-
2.6 c+ = 2.3, and so on. 
Your final average will be rounded up or down to the nearest 
letter grade. Exams and class participation are graded by 
the moderator of each discussion group. The standards used 
to evaluate examinations are described at the end of this 
syllabus. 
5 
Schedule of Classes 
Part I: The Organization of Violence 
I. War and The International System 
Ad.min/Pre-test/Introduction (Brown) 
The Illusions of Strategy (Porch) 
Required Reading: 
Michael Howard, "The Causes of Wars" (1983). 
Quincy Wright, A Study of War (1966), selections. 
Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State, and War (1960), 
selections. 
Raymond Aron, Peace and War (1966), selections. 
Martin Wight, Power Politics (1979), selections. 
Seyom Brown, The Causes and Prevention of War (1987), 
selections. 
Michael W. Doyle, from "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and 
Foreign Affairs" (1983), selections. 
James Turner Johnson, "The Broken Tradition," The 
National Interest (Fall, 1996), 27-36. 
Recommended Reading: 
Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War (1987). 
Blanning, T.C.W. "The Origins of Great Wars," in The 
Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (1986) . 
Hinsley, F. H. Power and the Pursuit of Peace (1963) 
Howard, Michael, George Andreopoulos, and Mark Shulman, 
eds. The Laws of War (1994). 
Howard, Michael. War and the Liberal Conscience (1977). 
Ikle, Fred Charles. Every War Must End (rev. ed. 1991). 
Johnson, James Turner. Just War Tradition and the 
Restraint of War (1981). 
Kagan, Donald. On the Origins of War (1995). 
Study Questions: 
Perhaps the oldest explanation for war 
expresses mankind's violent nature. 
evidence argue for or against such a 
Michael Howard stresses the calculation 
is that it 
What kinds of 
view? 
that underlies 
decisions for war. Is this the same as arguing that 
international conduct is governed by "rational 
choices"? Can war be a rational course of action 
6 
today? 
Michael Howard and Martin Wight both discuss Thucydides' 
explanation for the Peloponnesian War -- "What made 
war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power, and 
the fear this caused in Sparta" -- as a ·paradigmatic 
explanation for how wars in general begin. If so, 
what would be the attributes of sound Athenian foreign 
policy (assuming that Athens wished to avoid war)? 
Wight classifies wars into three types: wars of gain, 
fear, and doctrine. Does this exhaust the 
possibilities? How well does this scheme explain 
decisions for war by the United States? 
What is meant by the expression "balance of power"? How 
useful is this concept as an explanation for war? 
Several readings suggest that democratic states are less 
warlike than others. What are the strategic 
implications of this idea, if true? 
Several readings also suggest that the international 
system can have structural characteristic that make 
war more or less likely. What kinds of relationships 
lend stability to the international order? What does 
this mean for the conduct of peace-loving states? 
II. The Pursuit of Po1itics: C1ausewitz and The Foundations 
of Modern Strategy 
"War is never an isolated act . .. " (Moran) 
"The only means in war is combat ... " (Moran) 
Required Reading: 
Carl von Clausewitz, On War (1831), 75-123. 
Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in Makers of Modern Strategy, 
186-216. 
Sun-Tzu, The Art of Warfare, selections. 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
Michael Howard, "The Influence of Clausewitz," in 
Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. and trans., On 
War, 27-44. 
FMFM 1, Warfighting, Chapters 1 and 2, "The Nature of 
War," and "The Theory of War." 
AFM 1-1/2, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States 
Air Force, Essays A and E, "War, An Instrument of 
7 
Policy," and "Characteristics of War." 
Recommended Reading: 
Aron, Raymond. Clausewitz: Philosopher of War (1976). 
Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics (1973) . 
Buchan, Alastair, ed. Problems of Modern Strategy 
(1970). 
Clausewitz, Carl von. Historical and Political 
Writings, ed. and trans. by Peter Paret and Daniel 
Moran (1992). 
Murray, Williamson, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, 
eds. The Making of Strategy (1994). 
Paret, Peter. Clausewitz and the State (1976). 
Sun-Tzu. The Art of Warfare, ed. and trans. by Roger 
Ames , ( 19 9 3 ) . 
Study Questions: 
One puzzling aspect of On War is that some of its most 
prominent arguments seem to be little more than 
truisms. Clausewitz goes to some lengths, for 
instance to argue that: 
War is merely the pursuit of policy by other means; 
The essence of war is violence, which knows no 
logical limit; 
War does not consist in a single blow; 
War is dominated by chance and "friction"; 
War can aim to overthrow the enemy, or for more 
limited objectives; 
Success in war requires special intellectual 
qualities, or "genius." 
Are these propositions worth asserting? Are there 
alternatives that make sense? 
Clausewitz analyses war as a political instrument with 
unique characteristics. This has led some to argue 
that it should be possible to draw a firm line where 
the concerns of politics end and those of war per se 
begin. Is it? 
Clausewitz clearly regards friction and chance as 
timeless realities of war. This leaves open questions 
of degree: can we conduct war today with less friction 
than in the past, for instance? Should we expect to 
in the future? 
Sun-Tzu declares that the acme of strategic skill is to 
"win without fighting." This too seems to be a truism. 
Is it also a significant guide to action in war? How 
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would Clausewitz respond? 
III. The Pursuit of Victory: The Science and Art of 
Mi1itary Operations 
Principles of War (Moran) 
The Operational Level of War (Moran) 
Required Reading: 
John Shy, "Jomini," in Makers of Modern Strategy, 143-
85. 
Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level," from 
Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (1987), 91-112. 
JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Chapters 2-3, 
"Fundamentals of Joint Operations," "Planning for 
Joint Operations," and Appendix A, "Principles of 
War." 
CJCS, Joint Vision 2010. 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
AFM 1-1/2, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States 
Air Force, Essay F, "Three Levels of War." 
Carl H. Builder, "Keeping the Strategic Flame," Joint 
Forces Quarterly (Winter, 1996-97), 76-84. 
Recommended Reading: 
Alger, John. The Quest for Victory: The History of the 
Principles of War (1982). 
Bellamy, Christopher. The Evolution of Modern Land 
Warfare (1990). 
House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare (1984). 
Leonhard, Robert. The Art of Maneuver (1991). 
Lind, William. Maneuver Warfare Handbook (1985). 
Newell, Clayton R. The Framework of Operational Warfare 
(1991). 
Simpkin, Richard. Race to the Swift: Thoughts on 
Twenty-First Century Warfare (1985). 
Study Questions: 
What difference does it make whether there are 
"principles of war"? How would the planning and 
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conduct of military operations change if we knew there 
were no such principles? 
What is meant by "decisiveness" in war? How does this 
concept manifest itself at the three "levels of war" 
described by current doctrine? Whose responsibility 
is it to see to it that decisive military results get 
translated into decisive political results? 
Are the nine "principles of war" currently accepted by 
the American armed forces coequal concepts? or is 
there a logical hierarchy among them? Are they 
internally consistent, or is there tension among them? 
Does their relative weight vary among the service 
branches? 
Should "jointness" be a "principle of war"? What kind 
of evidence should decide such a question? 
Does "maneuver warfare" have the same significance for 
navies as it does for land and air forces? 
Are operational "simultaneity" and "synchronicity" more 
or less easily achieved by joint forces? by coalition 
forces? If less, is the sacrifice worth the results? 
Is the idea that there are principles of war compatible 
with the idea that there are also periodic 
"revolutions in military affairs~? Or should we 
expect the principles of war to change as technology 
or other aspects of the operating environment change? 
IV. Outf1anking the Land: Theorists of Sea and Air Power 
From the Sea: Sea Power (Guest Lecturer: CAPT Kenneth 
Hagan, USN [Ret.]) 
From the Air: Strategic Air Power (Wirtz) 
Required Reading: 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy Compared and 
Contrasted with the Principles and Practices of 
Military Operations on Land (1911), selections. 
Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy 
(1911), selections. 
Philip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan," in Makers of 
Modern Strategy, 444-77. 
Department of the Navy, "The Maritime Strategy" (1986). 
David Macisaac, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air 
Power Theorists," in Makers of Modern Strategy, 624-
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47. 
AFM 1-1/1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States 
Air Force, Chapters 2-3, "The Nature of Aerospace 
Power," and, "Employing Aerospace Forces." 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
Colin S. Gray, "The Nature and Uses of Sea Power," from 
The Leverage of Sea Power (1992), 1-30. 
Robert A. Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," 
International Security 15/2 (1990) . 
AFM 1-1/2, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States· 
Air Force, Essays H-J, "Aerospace Environment," 
"Aerospace Power," and "Aerospace Power Capabilities." 
Recommended Reading: 
Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power (1994). 
Brodie, Bernard. Sea Power in the Machine Age (1943). 
Gorschkov, S.G. The Sea Power of the State (1976). 
Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win (1996). 
Sherry, Michael. The Rise of American Air Power (1987). 
Study Questions: 
Mahan claimed that his aim was to do for naval warfare 
what he thought Jomini had done for war on land: 
establish it upon a base of scientific principles. 
Did he succeed? What are the basic characteristics 
and goals of a Mahanian navy? Have they survived the 
test of time? 
What is meant by "command of the sea"? In what ways can 
it be obtained? How do Corbett and Mahan differ in 
their approach to this question? 
Suppose your country possesses such modest naval forces 
that "command of the sea" is not a possibility. Do 
Corbett and Mahan have anything useful to say to you? 
The most common objection to "sea power" as an 
independent form of military strength is that it is 
indecisive at the strategic level. What is the basis 
for this complaint? How just is it? 
On what basis did early theorists of air power claim 
that their new way of fighting would transform (or 
·supersede) traditional forms of land and sea combat? 
To what degree has their original vision been 
vindicated by historical experience? 
Does the concept of "strategic" air power still have 
11 
meaning in the joint enviro.nment? Is "strategic" air 
power the same as "coercive" air power, as Pape 
employs this term? 
Why was it regarded as so important that the Air Force 
be a separate branch of service, rather than an 
organic component of land and sea services? Have the 
merits of the arguments for a separate Air Force 
gained or lost weight with the passage of time? 
The most intense inter-service rivalry at present is 
probably between the Air Force and the Navy. Why is 
this, and what can be done about it? 
Part II: Nationa1 Mi1itary Capabi1ities and 
Command Structure 
V. American Nationa1 Strategy 
National Security Strategy (Tsypkin) 
National Military Strategy (Abenheim) 
Required Reading: 
The National Security Strategy. 
National Military Strategy of the United States. 
Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," The Washington 
Quarterly 16/4 (1993). 
Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It 
Resemble the Past?" International Security 16/3 
(1991). 
Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming 
Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs (March/April 
1997)' 18-32. 
Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," 
Foreign Affairs (March/April 1997), 33-44. 
Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign 
Affairs 72/3 (1993), 22-49; and responses by Fouad 
Ajami, Kishore Mahbubani, and Robert L. Bartley in 
Foreign Affairs 72/5 (1993), 2-7, 10-14, 15-18. 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order 
(1991), xiii-xv, 3-35. 
Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions 
for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security 21/3 
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(Winter 1996/97), 5-53. 
Recommended Reading: 
Art, Robert J. "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand 
Strategy After the Cold War," International Security 
15/4 (Spring 1991). 
Friedberg, Aaron L. "Is the United States Capable of 
Acting Strategically?" The Washington Quarterly 
(Winter, 1991). 
Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the End of 
the Cold War (1992). 
Study Questions: 
What is meant by the term "national security"? How can 
nations know when they are secure? Under what 
circumstances are they likely to change their minds? 
To what extent are the sources of conflict in world 
politics in the 21st century likely to resemble those 
of the 20th? 
Do you agree with Robert Jervis that peace is "over-
determined" in the developed world? Does American 
strategy go too far in discounting the possibility of 
war between industrial societies? 
Jervis believes older patterns of conflict are most 
likely to reemerge in the developing world. If true, 
this would seem to be a great help for strategic 
planners. Is it? 
How well does Joint Vision 2010 respond to Paul 
Bracken's proposal that we begin thinking now about 
the "military after next"? 
How might "the military after next" perform in a war in 
which weapons of mass destruction are employed? in a 
low-intensity conflict? 
China is often portrayed as a future "peer competitor" 
of the United States. What does this term imply, and 
what strategic problems would arise if China were to 
play this role? 
Samuel Huntington contends that the fault lines of world 
politics are not simply economic, and also that non-
economic factors may become more important with time. 
What are the strategic implications of this analysis, 
if true? 
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VI. Structure, Roles, and Missions 
Organizing for Defense: Goldwater-Nichols, the White 
Commission, and Beyond (Stockton) 




The Constitution of the United States. 
The Unified Command Plan* 
AFSC 1 (Organization Chart)* 
Quadrennial Defense Review, "The Secretary's Message," 
(May, 19 9 7 ) . 
CJCS, Directions for Defense: Roles, Missions, and 
Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States 
["White Commission Report"] (May, 1995) . 
JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces. 
James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-
Nichols," Joint Forces Quarterly 13 (Autumn 1996). 
Comment on the Quadrennial Defense Review, from the 
Washington Post and the New York Times (May 1997). 
Supplementary Reading: 
Charles S. Robb, "Examining Alternative UCP Structures," 
Joint Forces Quarterly (Winter 1996-97), 85-93. 
Recommended Reading: 
Cole, Ronald H., et al., The History of the Unified 
Command Plan (1995). 
Davis, Paul K., ed. New Challenges for Defense 
1 The mid-term examination will be distributed at the end of the second 
lecture. Answers will be collected at the start of the first lecture 
next week. 
2
*Readings marked with an asterix are not in the Course Reader, but will 
be distributed separately. 
3 Available via DefenseLink at http://www.dtic.mil/defenselink/pubs/qdr/ 
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Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough (1994). 
Stockton, Paul. "Department of Defense Reorganization 
in the Post-Cold War Era," in Randall Ripley and James 
Lindsay, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War 
(1997). 
Study Questions: 
How did the framers of the Constitution divide control 
over defense between Congress and the President, and 
why did they do so? How has this division evolved 
over time, and what are the consequences for U.S. 
policy-making. 
What problems did Congress hope to solve by enacting 
Goldwater-Nichols? How successful has the legislation 
been? 
How does the structure of the Unified Command Plan shape 
the way the United States plans and conducts military 
operations? How, if at all, might this structure be 
improved? 
How did the White Commission Report deal with the 
question of reallocating service roles and missions? 
Are the report's recommendations adequate, given the 
evolution of the post-Cold War security environment 
and the budgetary constraints on the U.S. military? 
How is the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
(PPBS) designed to operate? How do "real world" 
difficulties and political pressures affect actual 
budget decisions? How can you (as a future defense 
planner) deal with such pressures? 
Given the present security environment and national 
military strategy, how might the defense establishment 
be restructured to better meet U.S. security needs? 
Is there too much "jointness" in the U.S. military 
today? Not enough? About right? Do you get 
different answers when you think about this with 
respect to (a) defense planning (b) budgeting, (c) 
education and training and (d) military operations. 
VII. Projecting Power 
Maritime Strategy to Littoral Warfare (Brown) 
Air Land Battle and Beyond (Hoffman) 
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Required Reading: 
JP 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, Chapters 
1-3, "American Military Power," "Values in Joint 
Warfare," and "Fundamentals of Joint Warfare." 
AFM 1-1/2, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United 
States, Essays M-N, "The Tenets of Aerospace Power," 
and "Employing Aerospace Forces: The Operational Art." 
Department of the Navy, "From the Sea" (1992) and 
"Forward ... From the Sea." (1994). 
NDP-1, Naval Warfare, Chapter 3, "How We Fight B Naval 
Warfare." 
FM 100-5, Operations, Chapters 1-6. 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Air Land Battle 
(1984)' 23-73. 
Frederick Kagan, "Army Doctrine and Modern War: Notes 
Toward a New Edition of FM 100-5," Parameters (Spring, 
1997), 134-51. 
Recommended Reading: 
Brant, Melrose. Air Support of the Close-In Battle 
(1987). 
Cooling, B. Franklin, ed. Case Studies in Close Air 
Support (1990). 
English, John. On Infantry (1984). 
FM 100-7. Decisive Force: The Army in Theater 
Operations. 
FMFM 1-1. Campaigning. 
Friedman, Norman. The U.S. Maritime Strategy (1988). 
JP 3-09.3. JTTP for Close Air Support. 
Palmer, Michael. The Origins of the Maritime Strategy, 
1945-1955 (1988). 
Study Questions: 
Is the Air Force's understanding of Air Land Battle the 
same as the Army's? Is its stake in mastering this 
form of combat equally high? 
What are the principal differences between the Maritime 
Strategy of the late Cold War and the littoral 
strategy of the present? Are some naval warfighting 
specialties more impacted than others by these 
differences? 
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Would it be wrong to conceive of littoral warfare as 
simply a special case of Air Land Battle? 
Naval and air forces are more "capital intensive" than 
land forces, hence slower to respond, in material 
terms, to rapidly changing operational requirements. 
How should·this be taken into account in the defense 
planning and procurement process? How would you 
expect the force structures of the Navy and Air Force 
to evolve over the next decade or so? 
William Odom (GEN, USA [Ret.]) recently declared the 
United States Marine Corps an "antique luxury" whose 
mission can be performed just as well by army 
helicopter assault and parachute units. Do you agree? 
Does the continued existence of a service branch 
dedicated to a particular tactical environment 
contradict the basic premises of jointness? 
FM 100-5 states that "an important strategic 
consideration for planning contingency operations that 
involve the potential for combat is to introduce 
credible, lethal forces early." Yet the Army's most 
credible and lethal forces are time-consuming and 
expensive to deploy and sustain. How does the Army 
address this issue? is its response adequate? 
Part III: The Contemporary Strategic 
Environment 
VIII. Unconventional Warfare and Political Violence 
Revolutionary Warfare and Low-Intensity Conflict (Porch) 
Terrorism (Moyano) 
Required Reading: 
John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in 
Makers of Modern Strategy, 815-62. 
Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism," in Walter 
Reich, ed, Origins of Terrorism (1992). 
Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," Foreign Affairs 
75/5 (1996)' 24-36. 
Bruce Hoffman, Responding to Terrorism Across the 
Technological Spectrum (1994). 
Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," Terrorism and 
Political Violence 3/1 (1991). 
JP 3-07.2, JTTP for Antiterrorism, Chapters 1-3. 
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FM 100-20 I AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low 
Intensity Conflict, Chapters 1-2, Appendices C and E. 
Supplementary Reading: 
John Baylis, "Revolutionary Warfare" in. Contemporary 
Strategy (1987), 1: 209-32. 
Ronald Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, "Western Responses 
to Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence 4/4 
(1992)' 307-40. 
Recommended Reading: 
Charters, David A. "Counterterrorism Intelligence," in 
Democratic Responses to International Terrorism 
(1991). 
Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996. 
Geraghty, Tony. Inside the SAS (1980). 
Laqueur, Walter. The Age of Terrorism (1987; rev. ed. 
1997). 
Study Questions: 
How does "revolutionary" war differ from "conventional" 
war? from "civil" war? Do these differences matter 
from the point of view of outside powers who may wish 
to intervene in such conflicts? 
Is the Clausewitzian framework for understanding war as 
a political instrument applicable to unconventional 
warfare? to terrorism? 
Insurgency is a difficult and demanding military 
strategy. What conditions are necessary for its 
success? 
John Shy and Thomas Collier emphasize the criticality of 
the choice between political and military action for 
revolutionaries. What considerations apply? Are 
these different from those that apply to a similar 
choice by an organized government? 
Contemporary joint doctrine identifies counter-
insurgency as an operation "other than war." Is it? 
How so? 
4 Available via the Army Training Digital Library at http://www.atsc-
army.org/cgi-win/$atdl.exe/download/FM/100-20. 
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Martha Crenshaw and Walter Lacqueur offer contrasting 
views of the relative rationality and unpredictability 
of terrorists. Which is more convincing? 
Crenshaw argues that terrorism is nearly impossible to 
prevent. True? Why? · 
Does Bruce Hoffman validate Samuel Huntington's claims 
about a "clash of civilizations"? What are the 
strategic implications of Hoffman's analysis? 
Does terrorism pose a military threat to the United 
States? What role do you envisage for U.S. armed 
forces in combating terrorism? 
If you were a member of the executive committee of a 
terrorist organization, would you attack U.S. 
citizens, property, or assets? Under what conditions? 
What would you expect to gain? 
IX. Strategic Nuc1ear Forces and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction 
Nuclear Deterrence and WMD Proliferation (TBA) 
Science, Technology and Policy (Parker) 
Required Reading: 
Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear 
Strategists," Makers of Modern Strategy, 735-78. 
"Statement on the Reduction of Nuclear Arsenals by 
Generals Butler and Goodpaster," 4 December 1996. 
"Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals 
and Admirals," 5 December 1996. 
JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological and 
Chemical (NBC) Defense. 
Brad Roberts, "The Politics and Economics of 
Proliferation," in Weapons Proliferation and World 
Order (1996), 113-87. 
Robert G. Joseph, "The Impact of NBC Proliferation on 
Doctrine and Operations," Joint Forces Quarterly 
(Autumn, 1996), 74-80. 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
Michael Mandelbaum, "Lessons of the Next Nuclear War," 
· Foreign Affairs 74/2 (1995). 
Leonard S. Spector, "Nee-Nonproliferation," Survival 
37/1 (1995). 
Peter R. Lavoy, "The Consequences of Nuclear 
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Proliferation," Security Studies 4/4 (Summer 1995). 
Recommended Reading: 
Blackwill, Robert, and Albert Carnesale. New Nuclear 
Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy (1993). 
Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy 
(1981). 
Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution 
(1989). 
Roberts, Brad. Weapons Proliferation and World Order 
(1996). 
Study Questions: 
Less than a year after Hiroshima, Bernard Brodie wrote: 
"Thus far the chief purpose of our military 
establishment has been to win wars. From now on its 
chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have 
almost no other useful purpose." Is Brodie's statement 
still valid today? 
Nuclear deterrence can be viewed as a condition, a 
policy, and a theory. Does the condition of 
deterrence exist? Is the policy sound? Is the theory 
valid? 
When and why was the concept of "escalation dominance" 
introduced into U.S. nuclear strategy? Have U.S. 
nuclear strategists ever devised a credible formula 
for using nuclear weapons if deterrence fails? 
A growing number of respected figures argue that the 
elimination of nuclear weapons would enhance the 
security of the U.S. and the rest of the world. What 
is the basis for this argument? Do you agree? What 
(if any) domestic or international conditions would 
have to change for nuclear abolition to become a 
realistic possibility? 
How dangerous is the spread of nuclear weapons? Is 
further proliferation inevitable, or can it be 
contained by the United States and other concerned 
governments? How useful are existing policy measures 
in preventing or slowing the spread of nuclear arms? 
How well prepared are U.S. forces to operate in theaters 
where weapons of mass destruction (WMD)may be used? 
What are the main political and military challenges 
involved in combating the spread and use of WMD. 
Suppose the U.S. and its major allies were to go to war 
against an adversary armed with nuclear weapons. What 
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impact would this have on American civil-military 
relations? on alliance cohesion? on military strategy? 
X. Forward Presence and Peace Operations 
Forward Presence (Wirtz) 
Peace Operations (Porch) 
Required Reading: 
JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Chapter 5, 
"Military Operations Other Than War." 
FM 100-23, Peace Operations, "Introduction" and Chapter 
1, "Fundamentals of Peace Operations." 
David Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 
Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer, 1995). 
James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991 (1994), 1-64, 
99-127. 
Brian Urquhart, "Needed: A U.N. Volunteer Military 
Force," New York Review of Books (10 June 1993), and 
related correspondence. 
Supplementary Reading: 
Jonathan T. Dworken, "What's So Special About 
Humanitarian Operations," Comparative Strategy 13 
(1994)' 391-99. 
Andrew S. Natsios, "The International Humanitarian 
Response System," Parameters 25/2 (Spring, 1995), 68-
81. 
Recommended Reading: 
JP 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other 
than War. 
Bellamy, Christopher. Knights in White Armor (1996). 
Crocker, Chester A., and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. 
Managing Global Chaos (1996). 
Dur, RADM Philip A. "Presence: Forward, Ready, Engaged," 
Proceedings of the Naval Institute (June, 1994). 
Haas, Richard N. Intervention (1994). 
Hirsch, John L. and Robert B. Oakley. Somalia and 
Operation Restore Hope (1995). 
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Study Questions: 
What are the costs and benefits of "forward presence" 
for the United States? Which elements of the National 
Security Strategy does this aspect of the National 
Military Strategy support? 
How would American strategy and force structure be 
different if we did not deploy significant forces 
overseas in peacetime? 
All the armed services claim a share of the "presence" 
mission today. What are the strengths and weaknesses 
of each in this regard? 
Is "gunboat diplomacy" an appropriate instrument of U.S. 
strategy today? Is it a form of MOOTW? What are the 
risks and benefits of such practices for the U.S. and 
its major allies today? 
Peacekeeping operations are supposed to serve U.S. 
interests by promoting democracy, regional security, 
and economic growth. Why should the United States 
care about promoting these things in places that 
neither threaten nor sustain our national life? 
What exactly do non-governmental relief organizations 
(NGOs) need from th~ armed forces with which they 
work? Is there a downside from their point of view to 
accepting such support? 
What is the proper C2 relationship between the military 
and NGOs in peace and humanitarian operations? How, 
in practice, can they "command and control" each other 
effectively? 
How do the "principles of military operations other than 
war" compare to the "principles of war"? Do they seem 
equally robust as guides to action? 
Would the creation of an independent military force for 
the UN be in the interest of the U.S.? Would such a 
force make the UN more or less effective as a pillar 
of international peace and stability? 
XI. The Profession of Arms 
Military Innovation and the "Revolution in Military 
Affairsn (Wirtz) 
C~vil-Military Relations and American Strategic Culture 
(Abenheim) 
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Fina1 Examination Distributed 
Required Reading: 
Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer," The 
National Interest (Fall, 1994). 
A. J. Bacevich, "Morality and High Technology," The 
National Interest (Fall, 1996), 37-47. 
Eliot Cohen, "Making Do With Less, or Coping with 
Upton's Ghost," United States Army War College 
Strategic Studies Institute (1995). 
ADM William Owen, "The Emerging System of Systems," 
Armed Forces Journal (January 1996) . 
A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's 
Military in a New Era," The National Interest (Summer, 
1997), 16-25. 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Melancholy Reunion," INSS 
Occasional Paper (Oct. 1996). 
Willamson Murray, "Clausewitz Out, Computer In," The 
National Interest (Summer, 1997), 57-64. 
Recommended Reading: 
Clarke, I. F., Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars, 
1763-3749 (1992). 
Huntington, Samuel. The Soldier and the State (1957). 
Rosen, Stephen. Winning the Next War (1991). 
Shukman, David. Tomorrow's War: The Threat of High 
Technology Weapons (1997). 
Shy, John. ~'The American Military Experience: History 
and Learning," in A People Numerous and Armed (1976). 
Study Questions: 
What are the key characteristics of the Revolution in 
Military Affairs? What is the difference between 
"revolutionary" change and merely "dramatic" change? 
How is it that the nation most advantaged by the 
5 The final examination will be distributed at the end of discussion 
sections this week. Answers are due at the offices of the section 
moderators by COB on Thursday of exam week. 
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military status quo should ·embrace the idea of a 
revolution in military affairs with such enthusiasm? 
Does the RMA threaten to reverse any important strategic 
relationships? How does the RMA address the two 
problems at each end of the threat spectrum: the 
emergence of a "peer competitor," and the endemic 
disorder of the underdeveloped world? 
William Owen believes that "the emerging system of 
systems" may make it possible to "dissipate the 'fog 
of war'." What exactly would this mean, if it were 
possible? 
What is meant by "strategic culture"? How is it created 
and sustained over time? 
What are the essential features of American strategic 
culture? Has the "American way of war" been altered 
by technological and social change? by recent military 
experiences? 
Eliot Cohen argues that something has gone wrong when 
the U.S. armed forces function as a political 
constituency or interest group. What kinds of actions 
or attitudes are at stake here? Do the proposed 
remedies make sense to you? 
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Grading Standards for Papers and 
Examinations 
1. "A" [Exce11ent] Paper 
An "A" paper is a superior effort, presenting a demanding 
argument with depth and clarity. It displays a firm, 
independent command of complex material, and most or all of 
the following characteristics: 
1.1 The introduction avoids flat, lifeless, or obvious 
statements, and presents the central idea or thesis in a 
way that engages the interest of the reader. 
1.2 The conclusion is revelatory or suggestive rather than 
simply repetitive. It goes beyond a summary of what has 
already been said to clarify or heighten its 
significance. 
1.3 Supporting evidence is specific, relevant, and 
sufficient to justify the conclusion. 
1.4 The argument is free of logical fallacies, and 
demonstrates a thorough grasp of the issues at stake. 
Judgments and conclusions are clearly stated, and include 
appropriate recognition of the degree of tentativeness 
they may involve. Counter-arguments and alternative 
interpretations are fully acknowledged and weighed 
fairly. 
1.5 The style is precise, idiomatic, and rhetorically 
effective, meaning that it is well-suited to persuade an 
intelligent reader. 
1.6 Paragraphs are tightly organized, and transitions 
between them are smooth and logical. 
1.7 Errors of grammar, spelling, and punctuation are few. 
Footnotes and other apparatus are formatted correctly 
and used appropriately. 
2. "A-" [Very Good] Paper 
A very good paper must possess some elements of a truly 
excellent paper, even if it falls short in others. Most 
such papers tend to be strong on content, but somewhat weak 
in presentation. This weakness typically manifests itself 
in one or more of the following ways: 
2.1 The introduction and conclusion may simply mirror each 
other. That is, while they may present the main argument 
of the paper clearly, they also leave the reader with the 
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impression that little has been learned in between. 
2.2 The supporting evidence may not always be relevant to 
the main argument. In a very good paper, however, such 
digressions must be of modest proportions. 
2.3 An A- paper may not demonstrate complete command of 
all the issues it raises, but it must be free of gross 
logical fallacies, and reasonably attentive to counter-
arguments and alternative interpretations. In contrast 
to an excellent paper, however, the reader may still feel 
that something more needs to be said. 
2.4 The language and style of a very good paper may 
occasionally be flat or repetitive. 
2.5 Transitions between paragraphs, although generally 
natural and logical, may sometimes be awkward or 
misleading. 
2.6 The mechanics of a very good paper may reflect a 
higher degree of carelessness than an excellent paper, or 
a faulty command of the details of paper preparation. 
The overall impression, however, must still be strictly 
professional. 
3. "B+/B" [Good to Average] Paper 
A grade of B+ or B is indicative of normal and acceptable 
graduate-level work, the difference between them being one 
of degree. Such a paper need not be especially striking or 
original, but it must still display workmanship, competence, 
and clarity. Its subject, although less complex or engaging 
than a very good paper, must be non-trivial, and it must be 
treated in a way that demonstrates an understanding of the 
basic facts. In addition: 
3.1 The central idea or argument must be reasonably 
specific, appropriate to the scale of the paper, and 
clearly stated in the introduction. This idea or 
argument must provide the main focus throughout. 
3.2 Assertions, judgments, and conclusions must be plainly 
stated. Supporting evidence may sometimes lack 
concreteness or relevance, but not to the point where the 
main argument is undermined. 
3.3 A good-to-average paper may contain some faulty 
reasoning, but it must not rely on faulty reasoning for 
its conclusions. Even if the argument is not entirely 
convincing, in other words, it must still be plausible 
and consistent with the evidence presented. If 
alternative points of view are not fully explored, 
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neither are they totally ignored. 
3.4 Paragraphs must be coherent, and transitions between 
them, while not invariably smooth, must not be 
disorienting. 
3.5 The language of a good-to-average paper must be free 
of slang and jargon, and generally idiomatic. Words must 
be used properly and consistently. 
3.6 The mechanics of a good-to-average paper may be faulty 
in various ways, but they must not present a barrier to 
understanding, or call the credibility of the author into 
question. Errors of spelling, punctuation, and grammar, 
even if numerous, must be incidental. A paper on the 
Cold War that repeatedly misspells Eisenhower's name 
cannot be considered average work. 
4. "B-" through "F" [Below Average] Papers 
In graduate courses, a grade below a B indicates that a 
paper lacks, in some degree, the basic attributes of average 
work. The subjects or contents of such papers may simply be 
too general or inconsequential to meet the demands of the 
assignment. In addition, "C" papers display at least one, 
and "D" or "F" papers more than one, of the following 
serious defects: 
4.1 The introduction may fail to establish the main point 
of the paper. Or, if a central idea is presented at the 
start, the rest of the text may wander off from it in 
confusing and unpredictable ways. 
4.2 The conclusion may introduce irrelevant issues or 
confounding information; or it may bear only marginally 
on the main argument of the paper. 
4.3 The supporting evidence may include a large proportion 
of cliches, generalities, or irrelevancies. 
Unsubstantiated assertions and faulty reasoning.may call 
the credibility of the whole paper into question. In 
contrast to an average paper, which may not be entirely 
convincing, a below-average paper will be quite 
unconvincing. Logical errors will not be incidental, but 
central. 
4.4 Paragraphs may lack internal unity, and transitions 
between them may be misleading or non-existent. 
4.5 The mechanics of below-average papers may be notably 
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THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR 
Course Description: This course provides a theoretical and 
historical introduction to the operational level of war, 
with emphasis on the conduct of joint and combined 
operations by American and other armed forces in the recent 
past. Topics include:· the application of military theory 
and "principles of war" at the operational level; campaign 
planning; the theoretical and practical relationship 
between operations, strategy, and tactics; the role of war 
aims and strategic objectives in shaping military 
operations; the interaction between military operations and 
war-time diplomacy; escalation, de-escalation, and war 
termination as operational problems; military operations 
"other than war." 
Program for Joint Education: This course is part of the 
Program for Joint Education (PJE). In addition to its 
other goals, described above, it covers various learning 
objectives specified by CJCS Phase One Joint Professional 
Military Education (JPME) criteria. It is primarily 
concerned with objectives identified under Learning Area 3: 
Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of 
War, as follows: 
Students will gain a basic knowledge of joint and 
multinational force employment at the operational level 
of war. This area introduces campaign planning and the 
linkage of campaign plans to attainment of national 
objectives. The following learning objectives further 
define JPME efforts in this area. 
Learning objective 3a - Summarize the considerations of 
employing joint and multinational forces at the 
operational level of war. 
Learning objective 3b - Explain how theory and principles 
of war apply at the operational level of war. 
Learning objective 3d - Review wars, campaigns, and 
operations and explain the link between national 
objectives to supporting military objectives, and the 
importance of defined conflict termination. 
Learning objective 3e - Summarize the relationship 
between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels 
of war. 
Course Reading: The Schedule of Classes includes three 
types of readings. Required readings are just that, and 
will provide a common basis for class discussion. 
Supplementary readings are specialized treatments or 
alternative interpretations of issues raised by the 
required readings, and will be used as subjects for 
in-class briefings by students. Even if you are not 
responsible for a briefing in a given class, however, you 
are strongly encouraged to read at least some of the 
supplementary readings for that day. Recommended readings 
are included for those who desire additional background, or 
who wish to pursue individual topics in more detail. 
Required and supplementary readings will be distributed to 
everyone by me. All reading should be done, as far as 
possible, in advance of the class for which it is listed in 
the Schedule. 
Course Requirements: This course requires two take-home 
examinations, plus active and informed participation in 
class. The mid-term examination accounts for 35% of your 
grade; the final examination for 45%. Class participation, 
including at least one presentation based on the 
supplementary readings, accounts for 20%. All work is 
assigned a letter grade from A to F. For purposes of 
determining you course grade, letter grades are averaged, 
using the weightings just described, after being converted 
to the following numerical values: 
A= 4.0 
2.6 
A- = 3.6 B+ = 3.3 
C+ = 2.3, and so on. 
B = 3.0 B- = 
Your final average will be rounded up or down to the 
nearest letter grade. The standards I use to evaluate 
papers and examinations (and, by extension, class 
presentations and life in general) are described at the end 
of this syllabus. 
Schedule of Classes 
Part :I. Theory 
The first four classes are intended to establish a set of 
working principles and a common vocabulary with which to 
discuss the case studies that follow. These classes 
introduce the general idea of "military theory," and 
examine the kinds of theoretical statements that are 
possible about war, as well as the value and limitations of 
such statements for the actual conduct of operations. 
1. Organizational Meeting: Defining the Operational Level of 
War 
Synopsis: This class introduces a number of basic 
concepts or terms that define the scope of the course as 
a whole, including the idea of "operations" as distinct 
from "strategy" and "tactics," and the nature of 
"campaigns" and "theaters" as distinct from battles and 
battlefields. 
2. From Theory to Practice: Principles of War 
Synopsis: This class explores the logical and practical 
links between the idea that there are "principles of war" 
and success at the operational level. Current doctrinal 
principles will be introduced and evaluated in light of 
differing service cultures and emphases. Alternative 
sets of principles, reflective of different strategic 
environments, will also be discussed. 
Required Reading: 
Carl Builder, "Five Faces of the Service Personalities," 
"The Service Identities and Behavior," and "Service 
Strategies," from The Masks of War (1988), 17-43, 
57-92. 
JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operation, Chapter 2, 
"Fundamentals of Joint Operations," and Appendix A, 
"Principles of War." 
FM 100-5, Operations, Chapter 2, "Fundamentals of Army 
Operations." 
AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States, 
Chapter 1, "War and the American Military." 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
I 
John Alger, "Chronological Compendium," from The Quest 
for Victory (1982), 195-269. 
AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States, 
Essay B, "Principles of War." 
Recommended Reading: 
John Alger, The Quest for Victory (1982). 
John Shy, "Jomini," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of 
Modern Strategy ,(2nd ed., 1986), 143-85. 
Philip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval 
Historian," ibid., 444-80. 
Clayton R. Newell, The Framework of Operational Warfare 
(1991). 
3. Key Concepts: Maneuver, Attrition, Decisiveness 
Synopsis: This class focuses on maneuver warfare as one 
of the governing ideals of the operational art, and on 
the relationship between maneuver and attrition, which 
are often conceived, incorrectly, as alternatives to each 
other. A number of important subordinate concepts, 
including "center of gravity," "culminating point," and 
"communications," will also be introduced. Finally, the 
links between "decisiveness" as a military and as a 
political goal will be discussed. 
Required Reading: 
Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level" and "Theater 
Strategy" [I and II], from Strategy: The Logic of War 
and Peace, 91-155. 
FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, Chapterl, "The Campaign," and 
Chapter 3, "Conducting the Campaign." 
FM 100-5 (May 1986), Operations, Appendix B, "Key 
Concepts of Operational Design." 
NDP-1, Naval Warfare, Chapter 3, "How We Fight - Naval 
Warfare." 
USAF, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States, 
Chapter 2, "The Nature of Aerospace Power," and Essay 
F, "Three Levels of War." 
Supplementary Reading: 
Wayne Hughes, "The Great Trends," and "The Great 
Constants," from Fleet Tactics (1986), 140-99. 
Martin van Creveld, "The Nature of the Beast," from Air 
Power and Maneuver Warfare (1994), 1-20. 
Robert Leonhard, "Construction of a Theory" from The Art 
of Maneuver (1991), 78-126. 
Recommended Reading: 
Shelford Bidwell, Modern Warfare: A Survey of Men, 
Weapons, and Theories (1973). 
Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare (1984). 
John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle 
(1984). 
William Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (1985). 
Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on 
Twenty-First Century Warfare (1985). 
FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations 
(May 1995). 
4. The Operationa1 Art: Command and P1anning 
Synopsis: The class extends the discussion begun in the 
last session from a different,,point of view, by examining 
the historical genesis of the operational level of war in 
the industrial era. The special, and especially 
pressing, problems of planning for and sustaining 
offensive operations under modern conditions are 
introduced, by way of preparing the ground for the case 
studies that follow. 
Required Reading: 
Christopher Bellamy, "Technics and Warfare," and "The 
Expansion of the Battlefield and the Operational Level 
of War, 1800-1918," from The Evolution of Modern Land 
Warfare, 30-7 9. 
Martin van Creveld, "The Wheel that Broke," from 
Supplying War (1977), 109-41. 
JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Chapter 3, 
"Planning Joint Operations," and Chapter 4, ."Joint 
Operations in War." 
Supplementary Reading: 
FM 100-5, Operations, Chapter 6, "Planning and Executing 
Operations." 
FM 100-5, Operations, Chapter 7, "Fundamentals of the 
Offense," and Chapter 8, "Planning and Conducting the 
Offense." 
FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, Chapter 2, "Designing the 
Campaign." 
Recommended Reading: 
Dennis E. Showalter, Railroads and Rifles (1975). 
Paul M. Kennedy, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers, 
1880-1914 (1979). 
Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War 
(1983). 
Martin van Creveld, Command in War (1985). 
Part II: Land Operations 
The modern understanding of the operational level of war 
has been dominated by the conduct of land warfare. The 
five case studies that follow highlight essential 
developments in this arena, beginning with what might be 
called the "base line" case of land combat on the Western 
Front in World.War I, and culminating in the coalition 
operation versus Iraq in Desert Storm. The degree to which 
technology has tended to create operational problems, and 
define operational solutions, is a dominant theme, as is 
the tension between "maneuver warfare" as an operational 
ideal, and the persistence of attrition as the 
characteristic reality of modern war. 
5. Fire and Movement: The Somme 
Synopsis: The British campaign on the Somme in the summer 
and fall of 1916 was an attempt to break into and through 
a well-prepared enemy position by means of a frontal 
assault - a kind of operation that has recurred 
repeatedly throughout the modern era, despite the fact 
that all modern armies have made great efforts to avoid 
them. The British attack reveals the difficulties these 
operations present, particularly in the area of planning, 
the chief means by which senior commanders could hope to 
influence the course of the battle in this period. 
Required Reading: 
Tim Travers, "A Case Study: The Somme, 1916," from The 
Killing Ground (1987), 127-90. 
Paddy Griffith, "The Final Eighteen Months," from Battle 
Tactics of the Western Front (1994), 84-100. 
Supplementary Reading: 
Paddy Griffith, "Artillery," from Battle Tactics of the 
Western Front, 135-58. 
Paddy Griffith, "Controlling the Mobile Battle," ibid., 
159-75. 
Recommended Reading: 
John Terraine, To Win a War (1978). 
Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Firepower: British 
Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945 (1982). 
John English, On Infantry (1984). 
Paul Kennedy, "Britain in the First World War," in Allan 
R. Millet and Williamson Murray, eds., Military 
Effectiveness, Vol. 1: The First World War (1988). 
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western 
Front (1992). 
6. Air-Land Battle (I): B1itzkrieg 
Synopsis: The assimilation of air power to warfare is the 
central operational problem of the twentieth century. On 
land the standard was set initially by the German army, 
whose coordinated use of air and armor restored the 
balance between fire and movement that had been obscured 
by the strength of the tactical defensive between 1915 
and early 1918. Blitzkrieg was a less revolutionary 
development than is sometimes imagined, being in its 
essentials an elaboration of the infiltration tactics 
that emerged in the last months of the Great War. It 
nevertheless produced some striking successes, less 
because of its novelty than because it afforded a means, 
for the first time in a generation, to employ the classic 
techniques of maneuver warfare: to concentrate strength 
against weakness, and to attack in unexpected places. 
Required Reading: 
Martin van Creveld, "Maneuver Warfare in Action - Early 
German Campaigns," and "Maneuver Warfare in Action -
The German 1941 Campaign in Russia," from Air Power 
and Maneuver Warfare, 21-101. 
Supplementary Reading: 
AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States, 
Essay M, "The Tenets of Aerospace Power," and Essay N, 
"Employing Aerospace Forces: The Operational Art." 
Williamson Murray, "The Luftwaffe: Origins and 
Preparation," in Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 
1933-1945 (1983), 1-27. 
Recommended Reading: 
L. H. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German 
General Staff, 1865-1941 (1971). 
Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US 
Military Performance, 1939~·1945 (1982). 
Michael Geyer, "Germany Strategy in the Age of Machine 
Warfare, 1914-1945," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of 
Modern Strategy (2nd ed., 1986), 527-97. 
G.D. Sheffield, "Blitzkrieg and Attrition: Land 
Operations in Europe, 1914-1945," in Collin Mcinnes 
and G. D. Sheffield, eds., Warfare in the Twentieth 
Century: Theory and Practice (1988). 
James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg (1992). 
7. Air-Land Battle (II): From Stalingrad to the OMG 
Synopsis: The conduct of air-land battle by the Soviet 
Union during the second half of World War II offers an 
instructive contrast to earlier German achievements, by 
testing the principles of Blitzkrieg against a very 
strong and well prepared opponent. Soviet practice 
placed great weight on the interaction between attrition 
and maneuver: for the Red Army, maneuver was an 
instrument of attrition, while attrition was the basic 
enabler of operational maneuver - an outlook that shaped 
Soviet planning throughout the Cold War, and will 
presumably make itself felt again in due course. 
Required Reading: 
Christopher Bellamy, "Case Study One: Corps volant to 
OMG," from The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare, 
121-90. 
Martin van Creveld, "Maneuver Warfare in Action - The 
Soviet Version," from Air Power and Maneuver Warfare, 
109-52. 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
Richard E. Simpkin, "From Broad Front to Deep Battle," 
"From Development Echelon to Operational Maneuver 
Group," and "The Lessons of Deep Operation Theory," 
from Deep Battle (1987), 32-77, 249-70. 
Recommended Reading: 
V. Novikov and F. Sverdlov, Manoeuvre in Modern Warfare 
(1972). 
David M. Glantz, Towards Deep Battle: The Soviet Concept 
of Operational Maneuver (1985) . 
Christopher Bellamy, Red God of War: Soviet Artillery and 
Rocket Forces (1986). 
Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military 
System in Peace and War (1988). 
8. Air-Land Battie (III): The 1967-73 Arab-Israe1i 
War {s) 
Synopsis: The conflict between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors produced two enormously influential campaigns 
in 1967 and 1973, which remain paradigms of modern 
maneuver warfare. They also provide an opportunity to 
discuss the special considerations that apply to the 
conduct of limited war at the operational level, 
specifically the difficulty of achieving "decisive" 
results against an adversary that cannot be occupied or 
defeated unconditionally. 
Required Reading: 
Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (1975), 
209-98, 336-97. 
Supplementary Reading: 
Martin van Creveld, "Israel: Maneuver Warfare, Air 
Power, and Logistics," from Air Power and Maneuver 
Warfare (1994), 153-92. 
Recommended Reading: 
Trevor Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli War, 
1947-1974 (1978). 
Michael Carver, "The Arab-Israeli Wars," War Since 1945 
(1980). 
Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (1982). 
Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, "Failure to Anticipate: 
Israel Defense Forces on the Suez Front and the Golan 
Heights, 1973," Military Misfortunes (1991), 95-132. 
9. Air-Land Battle (IV): DESERT STORM 
Synopsis: Until recently, the characteristic goal of 
large-scale land operations has been the achievement of 
air-assisted armored breakthrough, leading to a direct 
assault on enemy communications and command centers. 
Desert Storm, although in many respects an anomalously 
one-sided campaign, revealed the extent to which this 
logic might be reversible, so that breakthrough and 
envelopment are made possible by the destruction of the 
adversary's command and control systems, rather than the 
other way around. It also demonstrated the general 
saliency of advanced information technologies for 
observing and deceiving the enemy, and for harmonizing 
military action across space, time, and organizational 
boundaries. 
Required Reading: 
Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 
1990-1991 (1993)' 299-409. 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: 
Final Report to Congress (1992), Chapters 6-8 [on air, 
naval, and land operations, respectively] . 
Robert Leonhard, "Arguing with Success," and "The Course 
of Post-War Army Doctrine," from The Art of Maneuver 
(1991), 261-310. 
John Mueller, "The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf 
War," Security Studies 5/1 (Autumn 1995), 77-117. 
Recommended Reading: 
Sterling D. Sessions, Interoperability: A Desert Storm 
Case Study (1993). 
Robert Scales et al., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in 
the Gulf War (1993). 
Edward C. Mann, III, Thunder and Lightening: Desert 
Storm and the Airpower Debates (1995) . 
Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War 
(1995). 
James K. Matthews, So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast 
(1996). 
Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons 
of Modern War, Vol. 4: The Gulf War (1996). 
10 . Mid-Term Examination 
Part III: Maritime Operations 
Navies have historically been slower than land forces to 
emphasize the operational level of war, a reflection of the 
overwhelming significance that tactical outcomes have for 
combat on the high seas. By the turn of the twentieth 
century, however, the same factors that drove the 
development of operational art on land - increasing 
dispersal and diversity of forces, increasing technical 
complexity of weapons systems, increasing professionalism 
among naval officers, and increasing reliance on planning 
as an instrument of command and control - had given rise to 
a recognizably operational outlook whose subsequent 
evolution bears comparison to analogous developments among 
land forces. The five cases that follow have been chosen 
to invite such c'omparisons, while highlighting some of the 
distinctive features of maritime operations in this 
century. 
11. Blockade: Submarine Warfare, 1914-1918. 
Synopsis: Although underwater weapons have been used by 
navies since ancient times, the German submarine campaign 
during World War One marks an epoch in their employment 
at the operational and strategic levels of war, in 
pursuit of objectives far beyond those attainable by any 
single engagement. The British response in turn 
illustrates the difficulties that even the best military 
organizations can encounter in responding to unexpected 
(and in this instance basically unattractive) 
technological and operational innovations. 
Required Reading: 
V. E. Tarrant, The U-Boat Offensive, 1914-1945 (1989), 
6-72. 
Supplementary Reading: 
Paul G. Halpern, "The Submarine Crisis: 1917," from A 
Naval History of World War I (1994), 335-80. 
Recommended Reading: 
Patrick Beesly, "Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare," from Room 
40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914-1918 (1983). 
Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: 
The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (1961-69), 
esp. Vol. 4: 1917: The Year of Crisis. 
John Terraine, The U-Boat Wars, 1916-1945 (1989). 
Richard Compton-Hall, Submarines and the War at Sea, 
1914-1918 (1991) . 
C. A. Gemzell, Organization, Conflict and Innovation: A 
Study of German Naval Strategic Planning, 1880-1940 
(1973). 
12. Maritime Combined Arms Operations: War Plan ORANGE 
Synopsis: American planning for war against Japan 
represented a sustained and enormously influential effort 
to master the operational level of maritime warfare. In 
many respects, the problems posed by amphibious 
operations and the advent of naval aviation resemble 
those that drive the development of the air-land battle. 
The ORANGE plan was also distinguished by its success in 
taking account of significant political constraints 
within a sound and ultimately successful operational 
framework. 
Required Reading: 
Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to 
Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 (1991), 150-322. 
Supplementary Reading: 
Russell F. Weigley, "A Strategy of Pacific Ocean War: 
Naval Strategists in the 1920s and 1930s," from The 
American Way of War (1973), 242-65. 
JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 
Chapter 1, "The Concept of Amphibious Operations," and 
Chapter 3, "Approach to Planning and Basic Decisions." 
JP 3-04, Doctrine for Joint Maritime Operations (Air), 
Chapter 4, "Operations." 
Recommended Reading: 
Jeter Allen Isely and Phillip A. Crowl, The U.S. 
Marines and Amphibious War: Its Theory and Practice in 
the Pacific (1951). 
H. P. Wilmott, Empires in the Balance (1982). 
George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. 
Navy, 1890-1990 (1994). 
13. Fleet Action and Naval Aviation: The Coral Sea and 
Midway 
Synopsis: This class carries forward the discussion begun 
last time, with specific reference to the application of 
air power to battle fleet combat. The possibility and 
necessity for naval forces to engage each other beyond 
visual range marked a new departure in the conduct of war 
at sea, which, as on land, placed an increasing premium 
on good intelligence, operational planning, and c3. 
Coral Sea and Midway were the first practical tests of a 
weapons system whose generally revolutionary character 
was already apparent, but whose detailed employment in 
combat was still a mystery. 
Required Reading: 
John Costello, The Pacific War, 245-309. 
Supplementary Reading:. 
H. P. Willmott, "The Preliminaries to Battle," from The 
Barrier and the Javelin (1983), 203-24. 
H.P. Willmott, "Operation Magic and the American 
Deployment for the Battle of Midway," ibid., 291-343. 
Recommended Reading: 
D. Clayton James, "American and Japanese Strategies in 
the Pacific War," from Peter Paret, ed., Makers of 
Modern Strategy (2nd ed., 1986), 703-34. 
David Brown, Carrier Operations of World War II: The 
Pacific Navies ( 197 4) . 
S. E. Morrison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in 
World War Two, Vol. 4: Coral Sea, Midway, and 
Submarine Actions, May 1942-August 1942 (1967). 
14. Amphibious Operations: OVERLORD 
Synopsis: OVERLORD is the largest and most complex 
amphibious operation in history, and an unusual (though 
no longer unique) example of successful operational-level 
integration on the part of a coalition. Although based 
in part upon planning and principles worked out in the 
Pacific theater, OVERLORD's scale, and the continental 
nature of its target, imposed exceptionally demanding 
requirements in the areas of logistics, force 
sustainment, and tactical air power, and in the use of 
deception to buy time for the build-up of a defensible 
position in France. 
Required Reading: 
Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants (1981), 
32-187. 
Supplementary Reading: 
F. H. Hinsley, "Intelligence on German Appreciations and 
Preparations from February 1944 to D-Day," from 
British Intelligence in the Second World War (1993), 
442-67. 
Recommended Reading: 
John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy (1982). 
Max Hastings, Overlord (1984). 
Thomas Alexander Hughes, Overlord: General Pete Quesada 
and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II 
(1995). 
15. Expeditionary Warfare: The Falklands 
Synopsis: The British campaign to recapture the Falkland 
Islands affords an opportunity to study maritime power 
projection over great distances, without benefit of 
near-by land bases. It incorporates many of the 
characteristic features of joint operations in a littoral 
environment, including the disproportionate impact of 
underwater weapons, the use of carrier-based aircraft to 
support ground operations, and the difficulty of 
defending surface combatants against land-based aircraft 
and missiles. Like all operations of limited war, it 
also reveals the impact of political considerations on 
operational planning and execution, rules of engagement, 
and so forth. 
Required Reading: 
Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals 
of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 (1990), 247-71, 
323-99. 
Supplementary Reading: 
Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn, eds., Military 
Lessons of the Falkland Islands War (1984). 
Recommended Reading: 
Christopher Dobson, The Falklands Conflict (1982). 
Peter Calvert, The Falklands Crisis (1982). 
John Laffin, Fight for the Falklands! (1982). 
Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the 
Falklands (1983). 
Martin Middlebrook, Operation Corporate (1985) . 
David Brown, The Royal Navy and the Falklands War 
(1987). 
IV. "Low-Intensity" Conflict 
The next three classes focus on "low-intensity" or 
"unconventional" warfare, as conducted by the United States 
and its allies in Vietnam and Somalia. They raise the 
question of how far the advantages of excellence at the 
operational level of war can be preserved in the context of 
engagement with adversaries acting on fundamentally 
different military and political principles. 
16. Counter-Insurgency (I): Search and Destroy 
Synopsis: This class focuses on main-force operations by 
American and South Vietnamese troops during the Vietnam 
war, and specifically on the effort to adapt to 
principles of air-land battle to the demands of 
counter-insurgency. These campaigns also return us to 
the question of how political requirements influence the 
conduct of combined operations in limited war. 
Required Reading: 
Andrew Krepinevich, "Gearing Up for Counterinsurgency," 
"A Strategy of Tactics," and "Counterinsurgency 
American Style," from The Army in Vietnam (1986), 
100-27, 164-214. 
Thomas C. Thayer, "Part Two: The 'Main Force' War," from 
·War Without Fronts (1985), 43-98. 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
Eric M. Bergerud, , "Search and Destroy: The Big-Unit 
War, 1966-1967," from The Dynamics of Defeat: The 
Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (1991), 117-40. 
George C. Herring, "The 1st Cavalry and the Ia Orang 
Valley, 18 October-24 November, 1965," in C. E. Heller 
and W. A. Stofft, eds., America's First Battles, 
1776-1965 (1986). 
Recommended Reading: 
J. D. Coleman, Pleiku: The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in 
Vietnam (1989). 
Herman L. Gilster, The Air War in Southeast Asia: Case 
Studies of Selected Campaigns (1993). 
Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers 
Once ... and Young (1993). 
Ronald H. Spector, After Tet (1993). 
17. Counter-Insurgency (II): Pacification 
Synopsis: This class examines the other side of the 
American effort in Vietnam, the attempt to match the 
unconventional operational methods of the enemy and beat 
him at his own game. Topics include the Marine Corps' 
Combined Action Platoons (CAPs), the Civil Operations and 
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) agency, and the 
Phoenix program, which reflect the variety of American 
approaches to what would now be called "foreign internal 
defense." 
Required Reading: 
Thomas C. Thayer, "Part Four: Pacification, "The Other 
War," from War Without Fronts (1985), 137-2i7. 
Andrew Krepinevich, "The Other War," from The Army in 
Vietnam (1986), 215-33. 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
Eric M. Bergerud, "Sword and Shield: Pacification 
Efforts, 1966-67," from The Dynamics of Defeat (1991), 
141-80. 
Eric M. Bergerud, "The Pacification of Hau Nghia 
Province, 1969," ibid., 255-81. 
Richard A. Hunt, "The Phoenix Program: The Best-Laid 
Plans," from Pacification (1995), 234-51. 
Recommended Reading: 
Douglas Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. 
Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present (1977). 
John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in 
Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (2nd ed., 
1986), 815-62. 
Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of 
American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam 
War (1986). 
Michael E. Peterson, The Combined Action Platoons 
(1989). 
Dale Andrade, Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and 
the Vietnam War (1990). 
Douglas Valentine, The Phoenix Program (1990). 
18. Peace-Keeping: RESTORE HOPE 
Synopsis: The UN/US effort to relieve famine and restore 
stability in Somalia exemplifies the difficulties that 
can arise in translating the policy goals of peace-making 
and "nation-building" into effective operational plans 
and procedures. Prominent issues include the need to 
devise tactics, command arrangements, and rules of 
en,gagement that diverge from doctrinal norms; the control 
of escalation at the operational level; effective 
coordination between armed forces and non-military 
organizations; and the impact of exit strategies on 
operational planning and execution. 
Required Reading: 
Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu, 29-135. 
Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Restore Hope: 
Lessons Learned Report (Nov 1993), "Executive Summary." 
Supp1ementary Reading: 
Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operation Restore Hope: 
Lessons Learned Report (Nov 1993), Chapterl, 
"Contingency Planning for Operations Other Than War"; 
Chapter 2, "Deployment/Force Projection"; Chapter 3, 
"Humanitarian Assistance"; Chapter 4, "Command and 
Control"; and Chapter 14, "Special Subjects" 
[selections on Rules of Engagement and Fratricide] . 
Jonathan T. Dworken, "Restore Hope: Coordinating Relief 
Operations," Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer, 1995). 
Kevin Kennedy, "The Relationship between the Military 
and Humanitarian Organizations in Operation Restore 
Hope." [Typescript] (April, 1995). 
Recommended Reading: 
John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and 
Operation Restore Hope (1995) . 
C. Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations (1995). 
S. Walter Clarke, Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian 
Intervention (1995). 
Part V: The Contemporary Operationa1 Environment 
The last two class meetings focus on contemporary 
operational issues and visions of the future, emphasizing 
the development of an operational approach tailored to the 
requirements of operations "other than war," and the impact 
of new, information-based technologies on the conduct of 
conventional theater operations. 
19. "Other" Operations 
Synopsis: This class revisits a number of conceptual 
problems introduced during the first two weeks of the 
course. Particular attention will be paid to the problem 
of "decisiveness" as an aspect of peace operations, and 
to the adaptation (or wholesale reconstruction) of 
"principles of war" in light of the unique demands of 
MOOTW. 
Required Reading: 
JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operation, Chapter 5, 
"Military Operations Other Than War." 
JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other 
than War [complete]. 
David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Command 
Arrangements for Peace Operations (May, 1995) . 
Andrew S. Natsios, "Commander's Guidance: A Challenge 
for Complex Humanitarian Emergencies," Parameters 26/2 
(Summer, 1996), 50-66. 
Supplementary Reading: 
Andrew S. Natsios, "The International Humanitarian 
Response System," Parameters 25/2 {Spring, 1995), 
68-81. 
FM 100-23, Peace Operations, "Introduction"; Chapter 1, 
"Fundamentals of Peace Operations"; Chapter 2, 
"Command, Control, Coordination, and Liaison"; Chapter 
3, "Planning Considerations"; Appendix C, "Training"; 
and Appendix D, "Sample Rules of Engagement." 
Recommended Reading: 
United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (1940). 
Jonathan T. Dworken, "What's So Special About 
Humanitarian Operations," Comparative Strategy 13 
(1994). 
Ann E. Story and Aryea Gottlieb, "Beyond the Range of 
Military Operations," Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn, 
1995). 
20. Military Innovation and the Future of Joint Operations 
Synopsis: The final class surveys the prospects for 
continuing change in the theory and conduct of 
theater-level operations in the near term. Arguments for 
and against the existence of a contemporaneous 
"revolution in military affairs" will be considered, and 
the likely operational consequences of further advances 
in communications systems, and in the range, lethality, 
and precision of weaponry will be discussed. 
Reqtiired Reading: 
Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," The Washington 
Quarterly 16/4 (1993). 
Joint Warfighting Center, Concept for Future Joint 




William A. Owen, "The Emerging System of Systems," 
Proceedings of the US Naval Institute 121/5 (May 
1995). 
Michael G. Vickers, "Perspectives on the Revolution in 
Military Affairs," [Defense Budget Project] (April 
1995). 
Norman Davis, "An Information-Based Revolution in 
Military Affairs," Strategic Review 24/1 (1996). 
John W. Bodnar, "The Military Technical Revolution: From 
Hardware to Information." Naval War College Review 
46/3 (1993). 
Frank Kendall, "Exploiting the Military Technical 
Revolution: A Concept for Joint Warfare," Strategic 
Review (Spring 1992) . 
Final examination distributed. 
Grading Standards for Papers and Examinations 
1. "A" [Excellent] Paper 
An "A" paper is a superior effort, presenting a demanding 
argument with depth and clarity. It displays a firm, 
independent command of complex material, and most or all of 
the following characteristics: 
1.1 The introduction avoids flat, lifeless, or obvious 
statements, and presents the central idea or thesis in a 
way that engages the interest of the reader. 
1.2 The conclusion is revelatory or suggestive rather than 
simply repetitive. It goes beyond a summary of what has 
already been said to clarify or heighten its 
significance. 
1.3 Supporting evidence is specific, relevant, and 
sufficient to justify the conclusion. 
1.4 The argument is free of logical fallacies, and 
demonstrates a thorough grasp of the issues at stake. 
Judgments and conclusions are clearly stated, and include 
appropriate recognition of the degree of tentativeness 
they may involve. Counter-arguments and alternative 
interpretations are fully acknowledged and weighed 
fairly. 
1.5 The style is precise, idiomatic, and rhetorically 
effective, meaning that it is well-suited to persuade an 
intelligent reader. 
1.6 Paragraphs are tightly organized, and transitions 
between them are smooth and logical. 
1.7 Errors of grammar, spelling, and punctuation are few. 
Footnotes and other apparatus are formatted correctly 
and used appropriately. 
2. "A-" [Very Good] Paper 
A very good paper must possess some elements of a truly 
excellent paper, even if it falls short in others. Most 
such papers tend to be strong on content, but somewhat weak 
in presentation. This weakness typically manifests itself 
in one or more of the following ways: 
2.1 The introduction and conclusion may simply mirror each 
other. That is, while they may present the main argument 
of the paper clearly, they also leave the reader with the 
impression that little has been learned in between. 
2.2 The supporting evidence may not always be relevant to 
the main argument. In a very good paper, however, such 
digressions must be of modest proportions. 
2.3 An A- paper may not demonstrate complete command of 
all the issues it raises, but it must be free of gross 
logical fallacies, and reasonably attentive to 
counter-arguments and alternative interpretations. In 
contrast to an excellent paper, however, the reader may 
still feel that something more needs to be said. 
2.4 The language and style of a very good paper may 
occasionally be flat or repetitive. 
2.5 Transitions between paragraphs, although generally 
natural and logical, may sometimes be awkward or 
misleading. 
2.6 The mechanics of a very good paper may reflect a 
higher degree.of carelessness than an excellent paper, or 
a faulty command of the details of paper preparation. 
The overall impression, however, must still be strictly 
professional. 
3. "B+/B" [Good to Average] Paper 
A grade of B+ or B is indicative of normal and acceptable 
graduate-level work, the difference between them being one 
of degree. Such a paper need not be especially striking or 
original, but it must still display workmanship, 
competence, and clarity. Its subject, although less 
complex or engaging than a very good paper, must be 
non-trivial, and it must be treated in a way that 
demonstrates an understanding of the basic facts. In 
addition: 
3.1 The central idea or argument must be reasonably 
specific, appropriate to the scale of the paper, and 
clearly stated in the introduction. This idea or 
argument must provide the main focus throughout. 
3.2 Assertions, judgments, and conclusions must be plainly 
stated. Supporting evidence may sometimes lack 
concreteness or relevance, but not to the point where the 
main argument is undermined. 
3.3 A good-to-average paper may contain some faulty 
reasoning, but it must not rely on faulty reasoning for 
its conclusions. Even if the argument is not entirely 
convincing, in other words, it must still be plausible 
and consistent with the evidence presented. If 
alternative points of view are not fully explored, 
neither are they totally ignored. 
3.4 Paragraphs must be coherent, and transitions between 
them, while not invariably smooth, must not be 
disorienting. 
3.5 The language of a good-to-average paper must be free 
of slang and jargon, and generally idiomatic. Words must 
be used properly and consistently. 
3.6 The mechanics of a good-to-average paper may be faulty 
in various ways, but they must not present a barrier to 
understanding, or call the credibility of the author into 
question. Errors of spelling, punctuation, and grammar, 
even if numerous, must be incidental. A paper on the 
Cold War that repeatedly misspells Eisenhower's name 
cannot be considered average work. 
4. "B-" through "F" [Be1ow Average] Papers 
In graduate courses, a grade below a B indicates that a 
paper lacks, in some degree, the basic attributes of 
average work. The subjects or contents of such papers may 
simply be too general or inconsequential to meet the 
demands of the assignment. In addition, "C" papers display 
at least one, and "D" or "F" papers more than one, of the 
following serious defects: 
4.1 The introduction may fail to establish the main point 
of the paper. Or, if a central idea is presented at the 
start, the rest of the text may wander off from it in 
confusing and unpredictable ways. 
4.2 The conclusion may introduce irrelevant issues or 
confounding information; or it may bear only marginally 
on the main argument of the paper. 
4.3 The supporting evidence may include a large proportion 
of cliches, generalities, or irrelevancies. 
Unsubstantiated assertions and faulty reasoning may call 
the credibility of the whole paper into question. In 
contrast to an average paper, which may not be entirely 
convincing, a below-average paper will be quite 
unconvincing. Logical errors will not be incidental, but 
central. 
4.4 Paragraphs may lack internal unity, and transitions 
between them may be misleading or non-existent. 
4.5 The mechanics of below-average papers may be notably 
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JOINT INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY COMMAND 
Course Description: This Course provides an overview of 
intelligence and related C4I requirements and issues affecting the 
planning and conduct of joint and combined operations. The 
Intelligence Community and C4I structure is studied with emphasis 
on students knowing the process and application of intelligence 
and C4I capabilities to support military commands during joint and 
combined operations at all levels of war. The organization and 
functions of the various elements of the national level 
Intelligence Community are considered. The course includes an 
introduction to systems and organizations supporting the 
collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of 
intelligence to support decision makers. The course is intended 
for non-intelligence specialists to make them aware of national 
intelligence organizations and their capabilities in acquiring 
necessary intelligence support for joint commanders. This course 
covers various learning objectives specified by CJCS Phase One 
Professional Joint Education (PJE) criteria. PREREQUISITE: NS 3252 
(may be taken concurrently), SECRET NOFORN clearance. 
Course Objectives: This course is designed to meet certain 
learning objectives specified by CJCS for JPME, primarily in the 
areas of Joint Intelligence and Joint C4I Systems (C4IS) . Upon 
completion of this course, students"will have a basic 
understanding of the joint command structure and the functions of 
a joint staff, especially the Joint Intelligence and Joint C4I 
Systems structures and how they support command and the operating 
forces, with emphasis on selected methods of support to CINC's and 
JTF's. Students will know and understand the intelligence cycle, 
the various sources of intelligence, the problems in evaluating 
intelligence, and the methods of analysis and dissemination of 
joint intelligence. Students will know how to prepare and present 
staff studies, and will have a basic knowledge of Intelligence and 
C4I Systems functions supporting naval, ground, and air warfare. 
Students will become familiar with Intelligence and C4I Systems 
material to include SECRET. 
JPME Objectives (from CJCSI 1800 .. 01 of 1 Mar 1996): 
Learning objective lb - Joint force organizational framework. 
Learning objective le - Joint forces from the NCA to the JTF 
commander. 
Learning area 2 - Joint doctrine (for Intelligence and C4I 
Systems) . 
Learning area 3 - Joint and multinational forces at the 
operational level of war (for Intelligence and C4I Systems). 
Learning objective 4d - National Intelligence organization 
support to JFC's. 
Learning objective 4e - Campaign planning (for Intelligence 
and C4I Systems) . 
Learning objective Sb - C4ISR systems applications at all 
levels of war. 
Learning objective Sc - Integration of joint and service 
systems at the operational level of war (for Intelligence 
and C4I Systems) . 
Textbooks: 
M. I. Handel, Intelligence and Military Operations, Frank Cass 
& Co., 1990. 
James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive, Cornell University Press, 
1991. 
Classified Readings: 
"Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support 
to Joint Operations" (U), (for selected CINC's). 
Unclassified Readings (To be provided by instructor) : 
* "Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces" (Joint Pub 1) . 
* "Unified Action Armed Forces" (Joint Pub 0-2). 
"Joint Vision 2010" , CJCS, 1996. 
"The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993", AFSC Pub 1, USGPO 
(Extracts) . 
* "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations" 
(Joint Pub 2-0). 
* "Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer 
(C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations" (Joint Pub 6-0). 
* "Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical 
Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems" 
(Joint Pub 6-02). 
"How to Conduct an Analysis and Present the Results", Army 
Logistics Management College, Feb 1989. 
"Joint Intelligence is JIC/JAC/NMJIC Intelligence", R. N. 
Channell, NPS, Oct 1996. 
"The Contribution of the National Intelligence 
Organizations", R. N. Channell, NPS, Jan 1997. 
* "Naval Intelligence: Ready for Joint Operations", 199S. 
*"Naval Intelligence" (NDP 2), Sep 1994. 
* "Nayal Command and Control" (NDP 6), May 199S. 
"Conduct of the Persian Gulf War - Final Report", Appendix 
C, Intelligence. 
"Joint Intelligence and Uphold Democracy", RADM T.R. 
Wilson, USN, Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), Spring 199S. 
* "And I Was There", E.T. Layton, w. Morrow & Co., 198S 
(extracts) . 
"Afloat Intelligence and Related Systems", NMITC/NPS, Feb 
1997. 
"Commander's Guide to Intelligence", USMC FMFM 3-20, 6 Feb 
1991 (extracts). 
* "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield" US ARMY (FM 
34-130), May 1989 (extracts). 
"Intelligence Support to the JFACC", USAF Air Combat 
Command, Jul 1994 (extracts) . 
"Unity of Control: Joint Air Operations in the Gulf", M. 
Nelson & D. Katz, JFQ, Summer 1994. 
* Must be returned at end of course. 
Reading Assignments and Briefings: Reading assignments are as 
indicated. Please also read current political/military 
developments in a daily newspaper (e.g., The New York Times), and 
the current message traffic in the Classified Library. Joint staff 
officers are expected to be well informed on current events. We 
will have three students present a joint staff intelligence 
briefing once a week as noted in the schedule, followed by a 
discussion of the potential threat to the Commander and any 
appropriate redirection of collection/evaluation assets. Remember 
that this is a joint staff briefing - you will be expected to 
cover ground, maritime, and air warfare threats for your AOR. 
Also, please include your assessments. The briefing should be a 
team effort using resources as noted above. 
Point Papers and Staff Research Paper: I will also ask you to 
prepare two or three point papers on the reading material during 
the course. Format is in AFSC Pub 1. The point papers are intended 
as a study aid, and should be individual efforts. For your staff 
research paper, please select a topic that considers a problem 
regarding Intelligence or C4I Systems support to the JCS, a CINC, 
or a JTF. The paper should be on the order of 10 pages, will use 
the staff study format in AFSC Pub 1, and will include footnotes, 
a bibliography, and a one-page executive summary. Be sure to state 
the problem concisely, list your assumptions, and identify the 
facts bearing on the problem. Include a clear logical discussion, 
followed by conclusions and specific recommendations.· If time 
permits, the papers may be presented towards the latter part of 
the course as a staff briefing. The staff_ study is a graded paper 
and an individual effort. Students may discuss methodology, and 
exemplars will be circulated in class. You are expected to do some 
research to be noted with proper footnotes. The analysis should be 
your own, and footnoted if other sources are used. 
Exams: Exams are to be individual efforts, whether in class or 
take home. Students may study together, but the exam should 
reflect each student's level of knowledge. Exams with grades and 
comment will be provided to students, but must be returned at the 
end of the course. 
Grading: Weighting will be as follows: exam 30%, staff study 30%, 
briefing 20%, seminar point papers and discussions 20%. 
Guest Speakers: As time permits, we will have guest speakers from 
the Intelligence Community, usually via the JWICS in the SCIF. The 
following organizations have been helpful in the past: NRO/OSO -
Space systems, NIMA - Imagery systems, and NSA - SIGINT support. 
Schedule 
(Learning Areas and Objectives from CJCSI 1800.01 of 1 Mar 1996) 
I. Joint Force Organizational Framework (LO lb) 
1. Course Introduction and Presentations. 
Structure, joint staff papers and briefings, exams and grades. 
Readings: "How to Conduct an Analysis and Present the Results"; 
AFSC Pub 1, Chapt 3. 
2. Fundamentals of Joint Warfare and The Joint Campaign. 
The Joint Command Structure, Joint Staff, Planning Overview. 
Readings: Joint Pub 1, Chapt's III and IV; Joint Pub 0-2, 
Chapt's I and II. 
II. National Level to JTF Commander Roles (LO le) 
3. The NCA, NSC, CJCS, CINC's, Services, and JFC's. 
Select Current Intelligence Brie~ing dates. 
Visit classified library. 
Readings: Joint Pub 0-2, Chapt's III and IV; JCS/CINC 
Organizational Charts; "Joint Vision 2010". 
III. Joint and Service Intelligence Doctrine (LA 2) 
4. The Nature and Purpose of Intelligence, and the Intelligence 
Cycle. 
Readings: Joint Pub 2-0, Chapt's I, II, and III. 
5. Joint Intelligence Principles and Functions. 
Readings: Joint Pub 2-0, chapt's IV and VI. 
IV. Support from National Intelligence Organizations (LO 4d) 
6. Joint Intelligence at the National Level. 
Structure and functions of operational intelligence at the 
Washington level. Intelligence budget basics. 
Current Intelligence Briefing #1 
Readings:"The Contribution of the National Intelligence 
Organizations"; Joint Pub 2-0, chapt's V and VII. 
7. Joint Inte11iqence at the JCS and CINC 1eve1. 
Structure and functions of joint operational intelligence at 
the JCS, CINC, and JTF's, with emphasis on theJ2's, the NMJIC, 
and the JIC's. 
8. The Ro1e of Service Inte11iqence - ONI as a case study. 
Readings: "Joint Intelligence Is JIC/JAC/NMJIC Intelligence";. 
"Naval Intelligence: Ready for Joint Operations" 
V. App1ications of Intel1igence at the Operationa1 Leve1 of War 
(LA 3, LO 4e and Sb) 
9. Joint Inte11igence Analysis (I) 
Interrelationship between operations and intelligence (past 
successes and failures), supporting the decision makers, 
"feedback". 
Current Intelligence Briefing #2. 
Readings: Handel, Intelligence and Military Operations, pages 
1-87. 
Select joint staff study topic. 
10. Joint Inte11iqence Ana1ysis (II) 
Threat, capabilities, intentions. Surprise, warning and 
response. Time factors. "Intelligence to Please", "Cry Wolf", 
"Mirror Imaging", "Devil's Advocate". All source analysis and 
sanitization. 
Readings: Wirtz, The Tet Offensive, pages 1-13, 87-139. 
11. Joint Inte11iqence Analysis (III) 
Intelligence in Vietnam, the Tet Offensive. Guest speaker: 
Professor Jim Wirtz. 
Readings: Wirtz, The Tet Offensive, pages 180-223, 252-275. 
12. Joint Inte11iqence Ana1ysis (IV) 
The "enemy in camp", using your analysts, value and pitfalls in 
single source, dealing with intentions. Joint Intelligence in 
operations: MacArthur in the South Pacific. 
Readings: Layton, Chapt 30-32 (Midway); P. Beesly, "Convoy PQ 
17," in Handel, pages 292-322; Handel, pages 323-343. 
Current Intelligence Briefing #3. 
13. Inte11iqence in Joint Operations 
The Persian Gulf War, Haiti, etc. 
Readings: "Conduct of the Persian Gulf War" (Appendix C); 
"Intelligence Lessons Learned"; "Joint Intelligence and 
Uphold Democracy". 
VI. Joint and Service C4I Systems Doctrine (LA 2, LO Sb and Sc): 
14. C4I Systems Issues. Joint doctrine. 
Readings: Joint Pub 6-0. 
lS. Joint C4I Systems. 
Readings: Joint Pub 6-02. 
VII. App1ications of C4I Systems (LO Sb and Sc): 
16. GCCS Lab. 
JMCISS, JDISS, etc .. 
Readings: TBA. 
17. Service C4I Systems. 
Readings: NDP 6. 
18. GCCS Lab. 




VIII. Joint/Service Intelliqence and C4I Systems at the 
Operatiofial Level of War 
(LO 2d and Sc) : 
19. Air Warfare Intelliqence 
JFACC, targeting,· ATO, air component intelligence. 
Current Intelligence Briefing #4. 
Readings: "Intelligence Support to the JFACC" (extracts); 
"Unity of Control." 
20. Ground Warfare Intelliqence 
MI organization and functions, Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlefield (IPB). Guest speaker LCOL Terry Johnson, MI, U.S. 
Army (Ret). 
Readings: "IPB" (extracts); CEWI Organization Notes. 
21. Maritime Warfare Intelliqence 
Support to the Battle Group Commander, Ship, and Air Wing, and 
to Amphibious/Expeditionary Warfare. Marine Corps Intelligence. 
Readings: NDP 2; "Afloat Intelligence Systems" (extracts); 
"Commander's Guide to Intelligence" (extracts). 
Turn in staff studies. 
Turn in * marked pubs. 
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PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
Course Description: This course provides students with a 
graduate-level understanding of Corrunand, Control, Corrununications, 
Computers (C4), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) doctrine and strategy at the Operational Level of War. 
Major themes include: the President's priorities for 
intelligence; the nature and purpose of intelligence; JV2010 and 
"The System of Systems"; C4I For The Warrior (C4IFTW); 
intelligence in decision making; intelligence and strategic 
surprise; intelligence versus information at the tactical level 
of war; the roles and missions of national, joint and service 
intelligence agencies/ organizations; the impact of technological 
developments on C4ISR; and the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) versus the Military Technological Revolution (MTR). 
Students are required to prepare and present current intelligence 
briefings and staff studies emphasizing problems associated with 
the Joint or Service C4ISR arena. ·student labs present an 
opportunity to become familiar with and obtain hands on 
experience with current, operational C4I systems such as the 
Global Command Control System (GCCS), the Joint Worldwide 
Intelligence Communications System w-(JWICS), and the Joint 
Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) . Guest lecturers 
from the National Intelligence and Communications Communities are 
used when possible. C4ISR policy documents and relevant joint 
doctrine publications are introduced and discussed. Readings are 
primarily from unclassified sources. Some classified source 
material will be made available as suggested reading. The course 
is conducted at the TOP-SECRET SCI level. Prerequisite: Access to 
TOP SECRET SCI. 
Program for Joint Education: This course is part of the Program 
for Joint Education (PJE). In addition to its other goals, 
described above, it covers various learning objectives specified 
by CJCS Phase One Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
criteria. It is primarily concerned with objectives identified 
under Learning Areas 4 and 5. It is designed to meet learning 
objectives which address JV2010's "system of systems" and how 
Joint C4ISR Systems and National/Joint/Theater Intelligence 
Support to the Warfighter. 
1 
Students will have a good understanding of the joint 
intelligence and communications command and control 
structures and the functions of a related joint staff offices 
(J2 and J6). Students will understand how these structures 
support the Joint Force Commander and his operating forces. 
Students will know and understand the intelligence cycle, the 
various sources of intelligence, the problems in evaluating 
intelligence, and the methods of analysis and dissemination 
of joint intelligence. The following learning objectives 
further define PJE efforts in this area(from CJCSI 1800.01 
dtd 1 March 1996): 
Learning Objective lb - Explain the organizational framework 
within which joint forces are employed. 
Learning Objective le - Explain the purpose, roles, 
functions, and relationships of the National Command 
Authorities (NCA), National Security Council (NSC), Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, Service 
Chiefs, and Joint Force Commanders (JFCs). 
Learning Area 2 - Joint doctrine (for Intelligence and C4I 
Systems). 
Learning Area 3 - Joint and multinational forces at the 
operational level of war (for Intelligence and C4I Systems). 
Learning Objective 4d - National Intelligence organization 
support to JFCs. 
Learning Objective 4e - Campaign planning (for Intelligence 
and C4I Systems). 
Learning Objective Sa - RMA vs. MTR. 
Learning Objective Sb - C4ISR systems applications at all 
levels of war. 
Learning Objective Sc - Integration of joint and service 
systems at the operational level of war (for Intelligence and 
C4I Systems). 
Course Structure: Instruction in this course is provided by three 
means: a syllabus of required and supplementary readings; a 
series of lectures by the instructor of record, plus occasional 
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subject matter experts from the Joint C4I Academic Group and 
Operations Research Department. 
There will normally be two lectures per week, each lasting 
two hours. Students are expected to read and be prepared to 
discuss current political/military developments in a daily 
newspaper (e.g., The New York Times or The Early Bird), and 
current intelligence summaries (available on INTELINK via JDISS) 
in the SCIF. The initial portion of each class will involve 
discussion of a current issue in the C4ISR arena and this 
discussion will comprise a portion of each students "class 
participation" grade. 
One hour lab sessions will be reserved for students to 
conduct Current Intelligence Briefings. These sessions will 
normally meet Friday mornings. Student briefing teams will be 
established to support topics of interest along Unified CINCs 
lines. A handout will be provided with specific guidance on the 
format and content of the briefings. 
At least one, two hour lab session will be need to allow 
students to get hands-on experience with GCCS in the Science and 
Technology Lab (STL) . 
A staff study will be required by mid-quarter that 
highlights a problem regarding C4ISR support to the JCS, a CINC, 
or a JTF. The paper should be on the order of 10 pages, will 
use the staff study format in AFSC Pub 1, and will include 
footnotes, a bibliography, and a one-page executive summary. A 
handout will be provided separately with specific guidance on the 
format and content of the paper. 
Readings, lectures, and discussion are intended to support 
and reinforce, rather than duplicate, each other. The "Study 
Questions" included in the Schedule of Classes, below, are 
provided as an aid to understanding the assigned reading, and to 
help focus the weekly discussion. 
Course Reading: The following books are required: 
M. I. Handel, Intelligence and Military Operations, Frank 
Cass & Co., 1990. 
James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive, Cornell, 1991. 
Additional readings are detailed in the Schedule of Classes. 
Official publications are available on-line via the Joint 
Electronic Library, access to which is described below. Other 
assigned material will be distributed at the start of the term. 
Assigned readings are divided into two groups. Required readings 
should be read by everyone, and together with the lectures will 
provide a common foundation for class discussion. Supplementary 
readings may be assigned to individuals for in-class reports, but 
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everyone should try to read at least some of the supplementary 
reading for each class. Finally, Recommended readings are 
provided for the information of those who wish to learn more 
about specific topics covered by the course. All assigned 
reading should be done in advance of the class in which it will 
be discussed. 
Joint and Service Publications Online. Joint Publications are 
available online via the Joint Electronic Library. This site 
links to an array of related materials, including Service, 
Unified Command, and DoD sites, the Unified Joint Task List, 
Joint Vision 2010, Joint Forces Quarterly, The National Security 
and National Military Strategies, etc. All these can be 
downloaded and read with the Adobe Acrobat (v3.0 or later) 
Reader, available for free as a download from the Joint Doctrine 
Home Page: www.dtic.mil/doctrine. Most of the official material 
assigned in this course is included in the Joint Electronic 
Library and its immediate links. Hard copy publications are 
provided for those that are not. 
Course Requirements and Grading Policy: This course requires two 
take-home examinations, plus active and informed participation in 
class. The current intelligence b~iefing accounts for 25% of 
your grade; the staff study for 25% and the final examination for 
50%. Class participation and discussion is also considered 
important and will be factored into your grade as a tie-breaker 
at the end. All work is assigned a letter grade from A to F. 
For purposes of determining your course grade, letter grades are 
averaged, using the weightings just described, after being 
converted to the following numerical values: 
A = 4.0 A-= 3.6 B+ = 3.3 B = 3.0 B- = 2.6 
C+ = 2.3, and so on. 
Your final average will be rounded up or down to the nearest 
letter grade. Class participation includes student awareness of 
current events, daily assigned readings and discussion during 
class. The standards used to evaluate examinations are described 
at the end of this syllabus. 
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Schedule of Classes 
Part I: 
Joint Force Organizational Framework 
(LO lb) 
1. Course Introduction and SCIF/JDISS/INTELINK Orientation. 
Required Readings: 
"How to Conduct and Analysis and Present the Results", Army 
Logistics Management College, Feb 1989. 
"The Joint Staff Officer's Guide" AFSC Pub 1 (May 97), USGPO 
(extract) 
Handout on Current Intelligence Briefings. 
Handout on Staff Studies. 
Study Questions: 
Describe a joint operational experience you may have had. What 
personal experience have you had in dealing with joint C4I and 
in particular, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) issues? 
What do we mean by ISR systems? 
How important is C4ISR and intelligence to the Joint Force 
Commander? How do intelligence and C4I systems play in the 
joint arena? 
Can you describe the Intelligence structure from NCA to JTF? 
2. Fundamentals of Joint Warfare and The Joint Campaign. The 
Joint Command Structure, Joint Staff, Planning Overview. 
Required Reading: 
Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Forces, Chapts III and IV. 
National Security Strategy, May 1997 (Excerpt) 
Recommended Reading: 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) NSC-35 (Secret) 
Director Central Intelligence (DCI) Guidance 1997 (TS/SCI) 
Study Questions: 
How does the NSS drive priorities for the Intelligence Community? 
Why is "knowing yourself'' as important for an intelligence 
officer as it is for an operator? 
What do "capabilities and intentions" mean in terms of "knowledge 
of the enemy"? 
What are Centers of Gravity and how does intelligence support the 
Joint Force Commander in identifying them? 
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Part II: 
National Level to JTF Commander's Roles 
(LO le and LA 2) 
1. The NCA, NSC, CJCS, CINC S, Services, and JFC s. 
(Select Current Intelligence Briefing dates) 
Required Reading: 
Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)," 
Chapters I-IV. 
Study Questions: 
What are the key elements of every Unified Action? 
What are COCOM, OPCON and TACON and why does the J2 and the J6 
care about them? 
How are joint mission objectives determined? How does 
intelligence play in the process of defining objectives? 
How important is interoperability in supporting the joint concept 
of continuous coordination? 
Do Service Intelligence organizations have their own distinct 
Roles, Missions and Functions? 
Why has the UCP has become a key factor in defining the structure 
and mission of Joint Intelligence organizations? Is there 
a better way? 
PART III. 
Joint Doctrine for Intelligence 
(LA 2) : 
1. The Nature and Purpose of Intelligence. 
Required Reading: 
"Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations" 
(Joint Pub 2-0), Chapters I-IV and VI~ 
Recommended Reading: 
"Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations" (Joint 
Pub 2-0 Draft) . 
Study Questions: 
From what perspective does the JFC view intelligence operations? 
What is the JFC's role in intelligence. 
What are the three levels of intelligence and what key factors 
separate them? 
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With which major staff codes does the J2 interface during each 
phase of the intelligence cycle and why? 
What is meant by the phrase: "Prepare the Theater"? 
How does intelligence support deception planning? Can you give a 
recent example? 
Why is it important for the J2 to participate in the planning 
process from the outset? 
2. Joint intelligence at the JCS and CINC level. 
Required Reading: 
R. N. Channell, Joint Intelligence is JIC/JAC/NMJIC Intelligence. 
JP 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, 
Chapters I-IV. 
JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 
Chapter II, "Joint Intelligence Planning." 
Supplementary Reading: 
James D. Marchio, "Days of Future Past: Joint Intelligence in 
World War II" from Joint Forces Quarterly, 116-123. 
Recommended Reading: 
JP 2-0 (Final Coordination Draft), Joint Doctrine for 
Intelligence Support to Operations. 
Study Questions: 
How does the JIC/JAC/JISE structure support Unity of Effort in 
joint operations today? 
How does the NMJIC play in the Request for Information (RFI) 
process? Where does National level support fit into the 
structure? 
How does the JIC structure and the Joint Intelligence 
Architecture support information flow up and down 
the joint chain? 
What are some of the major considerations for intelligence when 
planning for joint operation?; a multinational operation? 
How is the Intelligence Estimate used to support the Cormnander's 
planning? 
PART IV. 
Support from National Intelligence Organizations 
(LO 4d): 
1. Joint Intelligence at the national level. 
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Required Reading: 
Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to 
Operations, Chapters V and VII. 
R.N. Channel, The Contribution of the National Intelligence 
Organizations. 
"The U.S. Government's Experience with Intelligence Analysis: 
Pluses and Minuses" and "Intelligence Analyst/Manager 
Relations at the CIA" from Intelligence Analysis and 
Assessment. 
Supplementary Reading: 
JP 2-02 (Draft), National Intelligence Support to Joint 
Operations. 
Recommended Reading: 
A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence, Director of Central 
Intelligence publication. 
Study Questions: 
What were the most significant "intelligence failures" from World 
War II to the present? 
What do we mean by collaborative analysis? What primary vehicle 
does the Intelligence Community (IC) use to convey a 
consensus of opinion to policy-makers and Joint Force 
Commanders? 
What are the "family of hazards" that confront the IC today? 
What is meant by the term "bureaucratic middle age" as a 
description of the current IC? What is meant by the 
"politicization of intelligence"? How do these flaws impact 
on the accuracy and therefore credibility of national level 
intelligence analysis? 
How can an agency's organization and management policy impact on 
its ability to conduct unbiased and competitive intelligence 
analysis? 
2. Theories of strategic surprise and the reasons for 
intelligence failure. 
Required Reading: 
Walter Laqueur, "The Causes of Failure" from A World of Secrets: 
The Uses and Limits of Intelligence, Chapter 9. 
Handel, M.I., "Intelligence and Problem of Strategic Surprise", 
War, Strategy and Inteligence, Chapter 5, Frank Cass & Co., 
1989 (Excerpt) . 
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Study Questions: 
Handel says that "surprise is almost always unavoidable - and 
will continue to be so in the foreseeable future - despite 
all efforts to the contrary." Is this true? And if so, why? 
Why does the "warning gap" between attacker and defender favor 
the offense over the defense? What factors dictate success 
or failure? 
Laqueur provides a number of theories of surprise. Can you think 
of some recent or historical examples of each theory? 
What are some of the "methodological dilemmas" inherent to 
intelligence analysis and perception? 
Handel says that the level of acceptance by policy makers and 
senior military leaders is often influenced by politics. 
What does he mean? Can this tendency be overcome? 
3. Lab: Current Intelligence Briefing #1. 
Per established schedule. 
4. National Intelligence Agency Support to the Warfighter. The 
National Reconnaissance Office/Operational Support Office 
(NRO/OSO). NOTE: Various experts from National Intelligence 
organizations (NRO/OSO, NIMA, NSA, CIA etc) will be made 
available either in person or via JWICS VTC during this course. 
Each is intended to support PJE Learning Objective 4d. Students 
are expected to read ahead about the National Agency, whose 
representative is scheduled to speak. 
(Select joint staff study topic.) 
Required Reading: 
Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to 
Operations, Chapters V and VII. 
R.N. Channel, The Contribution of the National Intelligence 
Organizations. 
JP 2-02 (Draft), National Intelligence Support to Joint 
Op er a ti ons. 
Recommended Reading: 
A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence, Director of Central 
Intelligence publication. 
TENCAP Manual, available via JDISS on NRO/OSO's INTELINK Homepage 
Study Questions: 
Why is it important for the JFC to understand sensor limitations? 
How do national system complement one another? What can they do 
to support the JFC and his planners? 
What do we mean by "cross-cueing"? Can this function be 
performed using national sensors as well as theater and 
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tactical sensors? 
Do components in a JTF get a "say" in the collection management 
process for national overhead systems? How? 
Who "brokers" national sensor support for the JFC during a Joint 
Operation? 
PART V. 
Applications of C4ISR at the Operational Level of War 
(PJE LA 3, LO 4e, and Sb). 
1. Intelligence in Vietnam, the Tet Offensive. 
(Guest speaker: Prof Wirtz) 
Required Readings: 
James J. Wirtz, The Tet Offensive: An Intelligence Failure, 
Cornell, 1991, pages 1-13, 87-139, 180-223, 252-275. 
Study Questions: 
What were the four pillars of the "People's War" strategy used by 
North Vietnam? · 
What strategy was Gen Westmoreland using in Vietnam? Was it 
successful? If no, why not? 
What was the Intelligence Community's biggest problem leading to 
Our "surprise" over the Tet Offensive? What were some of 
the "symptoms" of our malaise? 
What do we mean by the phrase "Theory of Unmotivated Biases"? 
How does this theory apply to our intelligence analysts and 
decision makers in Vietnam? 
How did the North Vietnamese manage to get "inside our decision 
cycle"? What does it mean? 
2. Lab: Current Intelligence Briefing #2. 
3. Joint Intelligence Analysis: The Relationship Between 
Operations and Intelligence. 
Required Reading: 
M. I. Handel, Intelligence and Military Operations, pages 1-87. 
Study Questions: 
Why does a commander still need good operational art if he has 
"perfect intelligence"? 
Sensor collected data ire not considered part of Handel's 
definition of intelligence. Why not? Do you agree? 
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At which level does Handel believe intelligence to be the most 
successful? Why? Which level is least effective? Why? 
What does Handel mean by the phrase, "situating the 
appreciation"? 
Handel says educating the commander in understanding the use of 
intelligence is crucial. Why is it so important? 
4. National Intelligence Support to the Warfighter: National 
Security Agency (NSA). 
Required Reading: 
JP 2-02 (Draft), National Intelligence Support to Joint 
Operations. 
R.N. Channel, The Contribution of the National Intelligence 
Organizations. 
Recommended Reading: 
A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence, Director of Central 
Intelligence publication. 
NSA's Homepage available via JDISS on INTELINK. 
Study Questions: 
What are NSA's primary missions? How can an operational 
commander task NSA for support? Who is the JFC's "broker" 
at the national level for SIGINT support? 
What are "RSOCs" and how do they support joint operations? 
How do national, theater and tactical cryptologic assets support 
one another? How do they work together to provide 
consolidated support to the JFC? 
What is the National SIGINT Requirements List (NSRL) and how can 
this list impact your Joint Operation? 
What types of information can SIGINT provide the commander? What 
are the dangers of relying too heavily on SIGINT information 
alone? 
How can SIGINT be used to complement other sources in support of 
the JFC and his ops planners? 
5. LAB: Current Intelligence Briefing #3. 
6. Applications of C4I at the Operational Level of War: 
Case Studies from World War II (Midway and PQ-17). 
Required Reading: 
Layton, And I Was There, Chapters 30-32 (Excerpt on Midway) . 
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Handel, Intelligence and Military Operations, "Convoy PQ-17," by 
P.Beesly (Pages 292-322). 
Study Questions: 
Midway: How did cryptologists uncover Japanese plans? Did 
Nimitz truly have "perfect intelligence"? How did intelligence 
analysis "fill in" the picture for the commander? 
Midway: What did Nimitz ask Layton to do, as his intelligence 
officer, just before the battle? 
Midway: Could Nimitz have fought the battle the same way if 
Midway were to happen under the current joint structure? 
PQ-17: Did Adm Pound have good intelligence prior to and during 
PQ-17? If so, why didn't he use it to his benefit? 
PQ-17: Did Cdr Ned Denning do his job as he should in support of 
his cormnander and the operation? 
Midway & PQ-17: Is there a relationship in terms of Admirals 
Nimitz and Pounds leadership qualities as well as their 
understanding and use of intelligence? 
7. National Intelligence Support to the Warfighter: Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
Required Reading: 
Joint Pub 2-02 (Draft), National Intelligence Support to Joint 
Operations. 
R.N. Channel, The Contribution of the National Intelligence 
Organizations. 
Recommended Reading: 
A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence, Director of Central 
Intelligence publication. 
Study Questions: 
What are CIA's primary missions? How can an operational 
cormnander task CIA for support? Who is the JFC's "broker" 
at the national level for HUMINT support? 
The CIA has several "centers" that support the warfighter as well 
as the political leadership in several key areas of 
interest. What are they and what function do they perform? 
What structure does the CIA have established ashore to support 
both diplomatic and military requirements? How can the JFC 
"tap" into this structure to resolve information gaps and 
assist in operational planning? 
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8. LAB: Current Intelligence Briefing #4 (if required). 
PART VI. 
Joint and Service C4I Systems Doctrine 
(LOs 2a, 2b, 2d, 4e, Sa, Sb, Sc and Sd) : 
1. Joint Vision 2010 and the Military Technologi.cal Revolution 
(MTR). Guest speaker: LTC Chuck Shaw, USA. 
Required Reading: 
Joint Vision 2010 
Shalikashvili, J.M., GEN, CJCS, "JV2010: America's Military -
Preparing for Tomorrow", Joint Forces Quarterly, Surruner 96. 
Expanding Joint Vision 2010. 
Recommended Reading: 
FitzSimonds, J., CAPT, USN, "Revolutions in Military Affairs", 
Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 94. 
Echevarria, A., "War, Politics and the RMA - The Legacy of 
Causewitz", Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 95-96. 
Link, C.D., "21st Century Armed Forces", Joint Forces Quarterly, 
Fall 96. 
Echevarria, A., "Dynamic Inter-dimensionality: A Revolution in 
Military Theory", Joint Force~ Quarterly, Spring 97. 
Morningstar, J.K., "Technologies, Doctrine, and Organization for 
RMA", Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 97. 
Study Questions: 
What is the purpose of JV2010? Is it doctrine? 
What initiatives are underway in the form of field tests, ACTDs, 
Etc to support the concepts of JV2010 and what are some of 
these requirements to implement these initiatives? 
What are some of the "risks" involved with these 
concepts/doctrine? 
Is there an "Intellectual Revolution" underway as well as a 
"Technological Revolution"? Are these truly equivalent to 
an RMA driven by JV2010? 
2. "C4I for the Warrior," C4I Doctrine, Issues, and Service C4I 
Systems. Guest speaker: LTC John Gibson, USAF. 
Required Readings: 
Joint Publication 6-0, Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint 
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Operations, Executive Summary 
C4I Handbook for Integrated Planning," Chapters 1 ("Handbook 
Overview, especially, "The Problem"), 7 ("Communications 
Systems, Networks, and Programs"), and 8 ("Tools for 
Estimating Communications Requirements") 
Concept for Future Joint Operations, Chapter 5, "Information 
Superiority" 
Study Questions: 
What is the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and who are 
its real users? Is there real utility for the "man-in-the-· 
foxhole" or does its utility end at the JTF level? 
What is the overall structure of the Global Information 
Infrastructure (GII)? How does the Defense Information 
Systems Agency affect U.S. participation in the evolution of 
the National Information Infrastructure (NII) and the DII? 
What is the relationship between information superiority and 
combat effectiveness? 
What are the goals of C4I systems? 
What characteristics must be considered when developing and 
fielding a communications system to ensure support to the war 
fighter? 
3. C4IS Lab: Joint C4IS and GCCS. (Root Hall Science and 
Technology Lab [STL]). Guest speaker: LTC John Gibson, USAF. 
Required Reading: 
"Global Command and Control System" Pamphlet 
"C4I for the Warrior" Pamphlet 
"C4I Handbook for Integrated Planning," Chapter 7 
("Communications Systems, Networks, and Programs"). 
Study Questions: 
Explain the migration of the Worldwide Military Command and 
Control System. Why was this evolution necessary? 
What key mission areas does GCCS support? 
What is the Common Operating Environment? How does it benefit 
the warf ighter? 
Bandwidth is frequently the limiting factor in providing imagery 
to· the war fighter. How might the GCCS, functioning within 
the DII, help to mitigate bandwidth concerns? 
The JS/J6 is concerned about the ease with which potentially 
hostile entities may acquire sensitive information by 
accessing the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(NIPRNet), as well as the need to ensure any user accessing 
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sensitive information has a genuine need-to-know. What 
steps might be taken to protect friendly information from 
inadvertent disclosure or intentional exploitation? 
Describe the concept of "Smart Push - Warrior Pull" as it may 
apply to GCCS. 
Much of the user interface for GCCS applications are browser 
based. What advantage does this present? 
PART VII. 
Applications of C4I Systems 
(LO 2d, 4d, Sa, Sb and Sc): 
1. U.S. Army Tactical C2 Systems/Organization. 
Guest speaker: LTC Chuck Shaw, USA. 
Turn in Staff Studies. 
Required Reading: 
OSD, C4I Handbook for Integrated Planning, Chapter 5 
("Conununications Organizations and Services") . 
************************************************************ 
PART VIII. 
Integration of Joint and Service Intelligence and C4IS 
At the Operational Level of War (LO 2d, Sa, and Sc) 
1. Intelligence in Joint Operations: The Gulf War, Haiti and 
Bosnia. 
Required Readings: 
"Conduct of the Persian Gulf War - Final Report", Appendix C, 
Intelligence. 
Wilson, T.R., RADM, USN, "Joint Intelligence and Uphold 
Democracy", Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 1995, pp. 54-58. 
Allard, Kenneth, "Information Operations in Bosnia: A Preliminary 
Assessment", Strategic Forum No.91, Nov. 96. 
FitzSimonds, James R., "Intelligence and the Revolution in 
Military Affairs", Chapter 18, Brassey's 1995. 
Recommended Reading: 
"Improved Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield", 
Defense Science Board Studies from 1995-96. (Secret) 




What were the major areas of success for the IC and what were its 
biggest problem areas or failures? 
In Operation Uphold Democracy, RADM Wilson says that the IC made 
Significant improvement in its support to the warfighter. 
What were they? Do you agree? 
Ken Allard says that we continue to have problems getting 
intelligence to the "trigger puller" at the tactical level 
of war. Do you agree? If so, then "how much is enough?" 
CAPT FitzSimonds looks into the future in his paper. What does 
he see as the IC's role in the next RMA? Where should the 
IC concentrate its energy and resources on over the next 20 
years? 
2. The Role of Service Intelligence - Office of Naval 
Intelligence. 
Required Reading: 
"Naval Intelligence: Ready for Joint Operations", ONI, 1995. 
"Commander's Guide to Intelligence", USMC FMFM 3-20, Feb 1991 
(extract). 
Study Questions: 
How many "hats" does the Director of Naval Intelligence wear? 
What are they? 
What is ONI's primary mission? Ho~ can an operational commander 
task ONI for support? 
How is Scientific and Technical (S&T) intelligence used and why 
is it important? 
What happened to the Fleet Ocean Information Facilities and 
Centers? Who performs their missions now? Have we lost 
anything in terms of tailored support to the battlegroup? 
What does USMC Intel bring to the fight? How do they coordinate 
with USN? 
3.Ground Warfare Intelligence. 
Guest speaker: LTCOL Terry Johnson, USA-Ret. 
Required Reading: 
"Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)" (extracts); 
CEWI Organization Notes. 
Study Questions: 
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How is the Army's Military Intelligence (MI) arm organized? and 
What are MI's primary functions? And how can it support the JFC? 
What does the Army mean when it talks about Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)? 
4. The Role of Service Intelligence: Air Warfare Intelligence 
(SOFs due; take-home Final Exam handed out) 
Required Reading: 
"Unity of Control: Joint Air Operations in the Gulf - Part Two", 
Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1995, p 59-63. 
"Air Combat Command Intelligence Support the JFACC Concept", 
C4ISR Integrated Architecture Program (CIAP), 30 Sep 97 
(extract). 
Air Combat Command Intelligence Handbook, 1997 (extract). 
Study Questions: 
Who is the DNI's equivalent on the Air Staff? What's his/her 
primary function? 
What is AIA's forte in regard to Scientific and Technical (S&T) 
intelligence? How is this information used and why is it 
important? 
What is AIA's primary mission? How can an operational commander 
task AIA for support? 
How does the Air Force concept of "reachback" work in supporting 
joint operations? 
How does Air Force Intelligence support the JFACC? What's the 
relationship between the JAIC and the JAOC? 
What do we mean by JFACC Afloat? Who does it, how does it work 
and for how long? 
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Grading Standards for Papers and Examinations 
1. "A" [Excellent] Paper 
An "A" paper is a superior effort, presenting a demanding argument with depth and clarity. It displays a 
firm, independent command of complex material, and most or all of the following characteristics: 
1.1 The introduction avoids flat, lifeless, or obvious statements, and presents the central idea or thesis in a 
way that engages the interest of the reader. 
1.2 The conclusion is revelatory or suggestive rather than simply repetitive. It goes beyond a summary of 
what has already been said to clarify or heighten its significance. 
1.3 Supporting evidence is specific, relevant, and sufficient to justify the conclusion. 
1.4 The argument is free of logical fallacies, and demonstrates a thorough grasp of the issues at stake. 
Judgments and conclusions are clearly stated, and include appropriate recognition of the degree of 
tentativeness they may involve. Counter-arguments and alternative interpretations are fully acknowledged 
and weighed fairly. 
1.5 The style is precise, idiomatic, and rhetorically effective, meaning that it is well-suited to persuade an 
intelligent reader. 
1.6 Paragraphs are tightly organized, and transitions between them are smooth and logical. 
1.7 Errors of grammar, spelling, and punctuation are few. Footnotes and other apparatus are formatted 
correctly and used appropriately. 
2. "A-" [Very Good] Paper 
A vety good paper must possess some elements of a truly excellent paper, even if it falls short in others. 
Most such papers tend to be strong on content, but somewhat weak in presentation. This weakness typically 
manifests itself in one or more of the following ways: 
2.1 The introduction and conclusion may simply mirror each other. That is, while they may present the main 
argument of the paper clearly, they also leave the reader with the impression that little has been learned in 
between. 
2.2 The supporting evidence may not always be relevant to the main argument. In a very.good paper, 
however, such digressions must be of modest proportions. 
2.3 An A- paper may not demonstrate complete command of all the issues it raises, but it must be free of 
gross logical fallacies, and reasonably attentive to counter-arguments and alternative interpretations. In 
contrast to an excellent paper, however, the reader may still feel that something more needs to be said. 
2.4 The language and style of a vety good paper may occasionally be flat or repetitive. 
2.5 Transitions between paragraphs, although generally natural and logical, may sometimes be awkward or 
misleading. 
2.6 The mechanics of a vety good paper may reflect a higher degree of carelessness than an excellent paper, 
or a faulty command of the details of paper preparation. The overall impression, however, must still be 
strictly professional. 
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3. "B+/B" [Good to Average) Paper 
A grade of B+ or B is indicative of normal and acceptable graduate-level work, the difference between them 
being one of degree. Such a paper need not be especially striking or original, but it must still display 
workmanship, competence, and clarity. Its subject, although less complex or engaging than a very good 
paper, must be non-trivial, and it.must be treated in a way that demonstrates an understanding of the basic 
facts. In addition: 
3 .1 The central idea or argument must be reasonably specific, appropriate to the scale of the paper, and 
clearly stated in the introduction. This idea or argument must provide the main focus throughout. 
3.2 Assertions, judgments, and conclusions must be plainly stated. Supporting evidence may sometimes lack 
concreteness or relevance, but not to the point where the main argument is undermined. 
3 .3 A good-to-average paper may contain some faulty reasoning, but it must not rely on faulty reasoning for 
its conclusions. Even if the argument is not entirely convincing, in other words, it must still be plausible and 
consistent with the evidence presented. If alternative points of view are not fully explored, neither are they 
totally ignored. 
3.4 Paragraphs must be coherent, and transitions between them, while not invariably smooth, must not be 
disorienting. 
3.5 The language of a good-to-average paper must be free of slang and jargon, and generally idiomatic. 
Words must be used properly and consistently. 
3.6 The mechanics of a good-to-average paper may be faulty in various ways, but they must not present a 
barrier to understanding, or call the credibility of the author into question. Errors of spelling, punctuation, 
and grammar, even if numerous, must be incidental. A paper on the Cold War that repeatedly misspells 
Eisenhower's name cannot be considered average work. 
4. "B-" through "F" [Below Average] Papers 
In graduate courses, a grade below a B indicates that a paper lacks, in some degree, the basic attributes of 
average work. The subjects or contents of such papers may simply be too general or inconsequential to meet 
the demands of the assignment. In addition, "C" papers display at least one, and "D" or "F" papers more 
than one, of the following serious defects: 
4.1 The introduction may fail to establish the main point of the paper. Or, if a central idea is presented at the 
start, the rest of the text may wander off from it in confusing and unpredictable ways. 
4.2 The conclusion may introduce irrelevant issues or confounding information; or it may bear only 
marginally on the main argument of the paper. 
4.3 The supporting evidence may include a large proportion of clich6s, generalities, or irrelevancies. 
Unsubstantiated assertions and faulty reasoning may call the credibility of the whole paper into question. In 
contrast to an average paper, which may not be entirely convincing, a below-average paper will be quite 
unconvincing. Logical errors will not be incidental, but central. 
4.4 Paragraphs may lack internal unity, and transitions between them may be misleading or non-existent. 
4.5 The mechanics of below-average papers may be notably sloppy, including significant deviations from 






Strategic Planning and the Military 

Instructor: Prof. Mitch Brown 
Office: Glasgow Hall, Room 372 
Office Hours: Tue/Wed 1300-1400 
Office Phone: 656-2286 
Email: mbrown@nps.navy.mil 
Class Tue/Thu 0800-0950 
Laboratory - Fri 0900 
Glasgow Hall, Room 388 
(or designated NPS Lab) 
NS 3230 - Spring 1998 
Strategic Planning and the Military (4-1) 
Course Description: 
"Introduction to strategic planning approaches and methods inherent 
to national security policy formulation and specifically, military 
defense planning. Includes long range strategic planning, scenario 
building and forecasting of macro-trends affecting defense policies 
and capabilities, and the military dimensions of those factors. 
Theory and process meet through case study/analysis of U.S. defense 
planning practices and the evolution of the Joint Strategic 
Planning System (JSPS), including the changing roles of the Joint 
Staff, Unified CINC and Component, Joint Task Force, and Service 
Staffs following passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and post-
Cold War international security developments. This course covers 
various learning objectives specified by CJCS Phase I Program for 
Joint Education (PJE) criteria. PREREQUISITES: NS 3252, NS 3020 
or prior NS 3000/3050, NS 3154 or 3i59 (may be taken concurrently) 
and a SECRET clearance." 
PJE Course Objectives, Overview: 
Students will gain a comprehension of both the art and science of 
U.S. operational and strategic planning as they are evolving toward 
the twenty-first century, with special emphasis on joint military 
components of planning and their doctrinal structure. PJE Phase I 
Learning Areas and Objectives covered in this course include: 
LA 1: National Mili.tary Capabilities and Command Structure 
LA 2: Joint Doctrine · 
LA 3: Joint & Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War 
LA 4: Joint Planning and Execution Processes, and 
LA 5: Systems Integration at the Operational Level of War 
Various PJE Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) also are addressed 
Course Requirements: 
This is a seminar-style course, in which student participation is 
necessary for success. Students are expected to complete required 
readings prior to class and when/if assigned, come prepared to lead 
discussion on selected topics. Course grading criteria follows: 
20% class participation, 20% midterm exam, 20% case study project 
presentation, 20% written project report, and 20% final exam. 
Course Readings: 
1) Required Texts 
"Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military", 
Stephen Peter Rosen, 1991 
"Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance", Harlan K. Ullman, 
James P. Wade, Jr. with L.A. Edney ... [et al.], 1996 
Via Internet: [www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/books/shock/index.html] 
Quadrennial Defense Review, SECDEF, 1997 
Via Internet: [www.dtic.mil/defenselink/pubs/qdr/] 
- Provided by Instructor: (Return "hard copies" at end of course) 
"Dominant Battlespace Knowledge", Johnson and Libicki, 1995 
"Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies", 
Alberts, 1996 [www.ndu/edu/ndu/inss/books/uc/uchorne.htrnl] 
"Joint Vision 2010", Shalikashvili (CJCS), 1996 
Via Internet: [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jv2010] 
Concept for Future Joint Operations, CJCS 1997 
Joint Doctrine Available @ [www.dtic.mil/doctrine/index.html] 
Users Guide to Joint Operation Planning, JCS, Sep 1994 
JCS Pub 3.0, Doctrine For Joint Operations, Feb 1995 
JCS Pub 4.0, Doctrine For Joint Logistics, Jan 1995 
JCS Pub 5.0, Doctrine For Planning Joint Operations, Apr 1995 
JCS Pub 5-00.1, JTTP for Campaign Planning, May 95 (Draft) 
JCS Pub 5-00.2, JTF Planning Guidance and Procedures, Sep 91 
JCS Pub 5-03.1/2, JOPES Vol I/II Aug 93 and Mar 92 (Excerpts) 
NDC Pub #4, Naval Logistics 
NDC Pub #5, Naval Planning 
Additional handouts as provided in class (Binder is suggested) 
2) Supplementary Readings: 
"The National Military Strategy", CJCS (J-5), 1997 
Via Internet: [www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms] 
"Defense Reform Initiative Report", SECDEF~ Nov 1997 
Via Internet: [www.defenselink.mil/pubs/dodreform/index.htrnl] 
"National Defense Panel Report", NDP, 1 Dec 1997 
Via Internet: [www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc.pdf] 
Annual Report to the President and the Congress, April 1997 
Via Internet: [www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr96/index.html] 
A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997 
Viq Internet: [www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy] 
3) Additional Recommended Readings: 
"The Joint Staff Officer's Guide", AFSC, 1997 
Via Internet: [www.afsc.edu/publ.htm] 
"Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National 
Security Council", Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, 1988 
"Preparing For the Twenty-first Century", Paul Kennedy, 1994 
Course Scheduie: 
Section I: Strategic Planning - National Military Capabilities and 
Command Structure - the NSC and the DOD/Military System 
ILC/PJE LA #1 Learning Objectives: 
la. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of 
U.S. military forces. 
b. Explain the organizational framework within which 
joint forces are employed. 
c. Explain the purpose, roles, functions, and 
relationships of the National Command Authorities 
(NCA), National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, Service 
Chiefs, and Joint Force Commanders (JFCs). 
ld. Summarize how joint force command relationships 
and directive authority for logistics support joint 
warfighting capabilities. 
le. Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to 
plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint and 
multinational operations. 
week 1 - (30 Mar - 03 Apr) SGL: 
Session 1 - Introduction/Class Organization/PJE Overview/Survey 
Course materials and requirements 
Readings: NSA Dept Basic Document Series, Vols I and II 
(Review from previous PJE seminar work) 
Session 2 - USG Planning Process: Overview of the relationship 
between the NSS/NMS/NSC/PPBS/JSPS and U.S. military 
nuclear and conventional strategic planning from WW II 
up to the present. (Concept Timel~ne rec~p) 
Readings: NSA Dept Basic Document Series, Vols I and II 
"Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols", Locher; 
"Defense Organization Today", White; "Origins 
of the NSC" (excerpts), Inderfurth & Johnson. 
Special Area of Emphasis 10: Strategic Deterrence 
Lab 1 - Distance Learning Lab, Root Hall, Room 256/260 
Week 2 - (06 - 10 Apr) SGL: 
Third International Conference on "Technology and the Mine 
Problem" held in King Hall and other locations at NPS, 
6-9 April 
Session 3 - Planning and Capabilities: Prospects for Innovation in 
Peacetime 
Readings: Rosen, pp. 1-105; "U.S. Department of Defense 
. Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus", Lovelace 
and Durrell-Young 
Session 4 - No class - students must attend at least two hours of 
the "Technology and the Mine Problem" Conference 
Special Area of Emphasis 12: Mine Warfare 
Lab 2 - Jnformation Warfare/Information Operations, G-388 
Guest lecturer, CAPT James Powell Chair of IW/IO, NPS 
Special Area of Emphasis 15: Information Operations 
Week 3 - (13 - 17 Apr) SGL: 
Session 5 - The U.S. JSPS and the Pentagon: Theory and Process 
Readings: "Strategic Planning in the Pentagon", Kreiger; 
CJCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 7, Mar 93; 
National Militar¥ Strategy, CJCS 1997 
Selected classified documents for overview 
Session 6 - Current Views of U.S. National-Level Strategy 
Readings: "A National Security Strategy for a New Century", 
May 1997; Annual Report to the President and the 
Congress, April 1997 (excerpts); "U.S. Foreign 
Policy into the 21st Century", speech by Sandy 
Berger, March 27, 1997 
Lab 3 - Military Implications of Exploiting Space Capabilities, 
G-388, guest lecturer, Prof Dan Boger, (NPS C4ISR Group) 
Week 4 - (20 - 24 Apr) SGL: 
Session 7 - The Evolving U.S. Security Planning Process and Impact 
on Service and CINC Operational Planning 
Readings: Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), May 1997; plus 
other handouts and commentary on the QDR process 
Defense Reform Initiative Report, SECDEF, Nov 97 
National Defense Panel Report, NDP, 1 Dec 97 
Session 8 ~ Organizational Struc~ure for Innovation, Peace and War 
Readings: Rosen, pp. 107-182; Unified Command Plan; 
"Examining Alternative UCP Structures", 
Robb; "Keeping the Strategic Flame", Builder; 
"Institutionalizing Innovation: Objective or 
Oxymoron?", Hayes 
Lab 4 - Lab: Logistics in Joint Operational Planning, G-388 guest 
lecturer, LTC Charles Shaw, USA, OA/OL Faculty, NPS 
Week 5 - (27 Apr - 1 May) SGL: 
Section II: Joint Doctrine, Joint and Multinational Forces at the 
Operational Level of War; Joint Planning and Execution 
Processes 
ILC/PJE LA # 2, 3 and 4 Learning Objectives: 
2a. Comprehend current joint doctrine. 
2b. Give examples of the factors influencing joint 
doctrine. 
2d. Summarize the relationship between Service 
doctrine and joint doctrine. 
3b. Explain how theory and principles of war apply at 
the operational level. 
3d. Review wars, campaigns, and operations and explain 
the link between national objectives to supporting 
military objectives, and the importance of defined 
conflict termination. 
3e. Summarize the relationship between the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of war. 
4a. Through the framework provided by joint planning 
processes, explain the relationship between national 
objectives and means availability. 
4b. Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, 
policy changes, and political development on the 
planning process. 
4c. Explain how the defense pl.anning systems affect 
joint operational planning. 
4e. Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning. 
Session 9 - Maritime Strategy: an Innovation Case Study, and its 
operational/strategic-level campaign interfcctce role 
Group Project Team Discussions/Initial Coordination 
Readings: Session 7 Readings plus selected classified 
documents for overview 
Special Area of Emphasis 6: Joint Training Overview 
10: Strategic Deterrence 
Session 10 - Command Structures,. Organizational Concepts, Command 
Relationships in Joint and Combined Cormnands and Joint 
Task Forces and Logistic Planning 
Readings: "Joint Doctrine Development: Overcoming a 
Legacy", Lovelace and Young; User's Guide to 
Joint Operational Planning JCS Pub 4.0, Joint 
Logistics, NDP #4 Naval Logistics, various JCS 
5.0 series Doctrine Publications and Handouts 
Lab 5 - Focused Logistics and JV 2010, LTC Shaw, USA, G-388 
Week 6 - (04 - 08 May) SGL: 
Session 11 - JOPES: Deliberate Planning Process and Its Influence 
on the PPBS and JSPS 
Readings: JCS Pub 3.0, Doctrine For Joint Operations 
JCS Pub 5.0, Doctrine For Planning Joint 
Operations, JCS Pub 5-00.3 JOPES (Excerpts), 
NDP #5 Naval Planning, Various Handouts 
Special Area of Emphasis 14: Reserve Component Employment 
Session 12 - JROC Impact on PPBS/JOPES and Deliberate Planning 
Readings: "JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military 
Affairs", Owens; "Overseeing Cross-Service 
Tradeoffs", Owens and Blaker; PPBS Handouts; 
Shock and Awe, pp. ix-xxi; Classified documents 
overview 
Special Area of Emphasis 13: JROC/JWCA 
Lab 6 - Secure Systems Technology Laboratory (SSTL), Root Hall, 
Room 202, Indoctrination Briefing/Overview of the Global 
Command and Control System (GCCS), MAJ John Gibson, USAF 
and PO Lozano 
Week 7 - (11 - 15 May) SGL: 
Session 13 - JOPES: Crisis Action and Campaign Planning Processes 
Readings: JCS Pub 3. 0, Doctrine For Joint Operations, JCS 
Pub 5. b, Doctrine For Planning Joint Operations 
JCS Pub 5-00 .1 (Draft) , JCS Pub 5-00. 2, Various 
handouts; Selected classified documents for 
overview 
Session 14 - Planning Joint Campaigns (Continued from Se:-:;sion 13) 
Project Groups outline their presentation topics 
** Take-home midterm examination distrihuted ** 
Lab 7 - SSTL/GCCS exercise on the classified Siprnet, MA.J Gibson 
(Scenario-based training on GCCS) 
Special Area of Emphasis 8: GCCS 
Section III - Systems Integration at the Operational Level of war. 
This section focuses on a knowledge of systems and 
an understanding of the processes supporting 21st 
century battlespace for the integration to achieve 
operational-level joint force missions. 
ILC/PJE LA # 3 and 5 Learning Objectives: 
3a. Surrunarize the considerations of employing joint and 
multinational forces at the operational level of war. 
Sa. Comprehend the relationship between the concepts of 
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the 
Military Technical Revolution (MTR) . 
Sc. Comprehend how joint and Service systems are 
integrated at the operational level of war. 
Sd. Understand that opportunities and vulnerc-tbilities 
are created by increased reliance on technology 
throughout the range of military operations. 
Week 8 - (18 - 22 May) SGL: 
Session lS - CJCS Joint Vision 2010 and the Concept for Future 
Joi~t Operations: Views on the "System of Syscems" 
:Readings: "Dominant Battlespace Knowledge", Johnson and 
Libicki, ed; Joint Vision 2010, Concept for 
Future Joint Operations, and Shock and Awe, 
pp. 1-103. 
Session 16 - JV 2010 and Service Roles in Technology Innovation 
Readin~s: "Shali Pushes Future Force Structure", Holzer; 
"The Army's Fancy PR and Glossy Pictures", Gold 
JPD Vol 4 (Future Capabilities, JPD, FY 98-03) 
Rosen, pp. 18S-261; Shock and Awe, pp. 10S-13S. 
Special Area of Emphasis 11: Military Ops and the Media 
Lab 8 - SSTL/GCCS exercise using RDA (TPFDD Planning); continue use 
of classified Siprnet; available to support NS 3~30 Group 
Project Research/Presentations 
Week 9 - (25 - 29 May) SGL: 
Session 17 - RMA/Systems Integration and Implications for DoD 
Readings: "Dominant Battlespace Knowledge", Johnson and 
Libicki, ed; "Directions For Defense", White; 
"Revolution in Military Affairs? Competing 
Concepts, Organ~zational Responses, Outstanding 
Issues", Galdi; Various other handouts 
Session 18 - Contrasting Views on the Emerging "System of Systems" 
Readings: Ch 15, NDU Strategic Assessment 1996; J-7 System 
of Systems Information Handout (Various articles) 
Shock and Awe, pp. 135-196; "Knowledge-Based 
Warfare: A Security Strategy for the Next 
Century", Casper et. al. 
Special Area of Emphasis 7: Combat ID 
Lab 9 - Logistics and Multinational Operations in Bosnia - New 
Concepts and Trends, G-388, LTC Shaw, USA 
Special Area of Emphasis 4: Peace Operations 
week 10 - (01 - 05 Jun) SGL: 
CJCS PAJE Team Accreditation Visit to NPS 
Session 19 - RMA/Systems Integration: Reliance versus Vulnerability 
Readings: "Unintended Consequences of Information Age 
Technologies, Alberts, pp. 221-261, Rosen; 
"Warfare 2020", Newman; "How We Lost the High-
Tech War of 2007", Dunlap; Various handouts: 
"Stealth, Lies and Videotape", Weiner; etc. 
Universal Joint Task List, CJCSM 3500.04 dtd 15 
May 95, JMETL Development Handbook (review only) 
Special Area of Emphasis 2: Professional Military Values 
6: Joint Training Overview 
Session 20 - Course Wrap-up Discussion, to include Force Protection 
and Risk Management issues, Group Project Teams meet 
to finalize presentations/coordinate briefing plans 
Readings: TBA 
Special Area of Emphasis 1: Force Protection 
Lab 10 - Ingersoll Hall, warlab, ~reparation for Classified JTLS or 
RESA Wargame (Persian Gulf Scenario), Prof Tom Hallwachs 
and NPS Secure Computing Facility (SCE/Warlab staff), 
OA/OR Dept 
Special Area of Emphasis 9: Modeling and.Simulation 
SECTION IV: Case Study - Student ·Presentations on Macro Scenario 
Building and Joint Planning, summary Planning Final, 
and conduct of Wargame Exercise 
ILC/PJE LA #1, 2, 3, and 4 Learning Objectives: 
la. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of 
U.S. military forces. 
2c. Formulate and defend solutions to operational 
problems using current joint doctrine. 
3c. Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint 
forces at the operational level of war. 
LA #4 - all (application) 
Week 11 - (08 - 12 Jun) SGL: 
Session 21 - Two Group Presentations: 1) Deliberate Planning with 
FY98 forces; 2) Crisis Action Planning/FY 98 forces 
Session 22 - Two Group Presentations: 1) Deliberate Planning with 
FY 03 forces; 2) Crisis Action Planning w/FY 03 forces 
** Distribute take-home final planning summary examination 
** Complete SOFs, including extra PJE Course Questions ** 
Lab 11 - Warlab - RESA War Game on Korea/Prairie Warrior Scenario 
Special Area of Emphasis 9: Modeling and Simulation 
Week 12 - (15 - 19 Jun) Final Exam du·e by COB, Tue 16 Jun 
- No Laborator-Y session scheduled 
- No SGL scheduled 
NOTE!! **Return Instructor-issued "Hard Copy" books with final** 
Good Luck to you All in planning for our increasingly Joint Future! 
Depending on NS 3230 class forma~ and scheduling decisions: 
Expected Lab Sessions: 1) Distance Learning Laboratory (Root 256) 
2) Information Warfare/Operations, G-388 
3) Joint Space Systems Capabilities, G-388 
4) Joint Operational Logistics #1, G-388 
5) Focused Logistics/JV 2010, G-388 
6/8) Secure Systems Technology Lab (SSTL)-
Root Hall Room 202, Global Command and 
Control System (GCCS) - both ,JOPES and 
Joint Operational Logistic applications 
9) Multinational Logistics/Bosnia, G-388 
10/11) Secure Computing and Simulation Lab 
(NPS Wargaming Lab) - Ingersoll Hall, 








NPS Distinguished Visitors 1996 
NAME TITLE PURPOSE OF VISIT DATE(S) 
> 
Mr. Cliff Geiger NAB Deputy to Deputy CNO, Logistics Fort Ord Facilities/ Operational Logistics 16-17 Jan 96 
Currie. 
RADM John J. Bepko III, USN Cmdr., Logistics Group, West Pac. Operational Logistics Currie Orientation 18 Jan 96 
MG Kenneth Simpson, USA Commanding Gen. USA Rec. Cmd. Orientation to the NPS 19 Jan 96 
Ms. Deborah Christie Asst. Sec. of the Navy for Financial Mngmt. Practical Comptroller Course Speaker 22 Jan 96 
Orientation to the NPS 
ETCM (SW) John Hagan MCPO of the Navy ( SGL Enlisted Community 05-06 Feb 96 
MG Stephen Silvasy, Jr., USA Dir, Operational Plans & Interoperability SGL & Interservice Rilvalry and the 04;.06 Mar 96 
American Armed Forces Conf. 
Ms. Deborah Cristie Asst. Sec. of the Navy for Financial Mngmt. MC Senior Financial Management Course 10-11Mar96 
Speaker 
Dr. Michael Mestrovich Dep. Dir. For Joint Requirements Analysis & C4 l/IW Developments 14-15 Mar 96 
Integration 
GEN William W. Hartzog Consultant and Voluµteer Augmentee in the BASOPS/BRAC/ Environmental 18-19 Mar 96 
Sec of Def. Crisis Coordination Ctr. Overview 
BGen Clifford L. Stanley, USMC Asst. Chief of Staff for Manpower & SGL 18-19 Mar 96 
Reserve Affairs, HQ USMC, DC 
Mr. Edwin Dom Under Sec.of Defense for Personnel & Visit NPS & DMDC 26-28 Mar96 
Research 
V ADM Philip M. Quast, USN Cmdr'. Military Sealift Cmd Graduation Guest Speaker 27-28 Mar 96 
John J. Hamre Under Sec. of Def. (Comptroller) Seaside Ribbon Cutting 28-29 Mar 96 
V ADM Harold M. Koenig Surgeon Oral. of the Navy Salinas High School Recruiting Visit 28-30 Mar 96 
Gen Arturo T. Enrile Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Visit NPS & DRMI 29-31Mar96 , 
Philippines 
RADM George A. Huchting Direct Reporting Program Mngr. for AEGIS, Advanced CIC meeting w/ RADM Evans, 01-02 Apr 96 
ASN(RD&A) Provost & Dean Schacher 
Mr. Thomas E. Harvey Chief Counsel and Staff Dir. of the U.S. SGL 01-03 Apr 96 
Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs 
RADM Edward S. McGinley, USN Vice Cmdr, Naval Sea Syst. Cmd/ Sr. Engineering Duty Officer Sem. 03 Apr 96 
Engineering Duty Officer 
_L 
V ADM Philip M. Quast~ USN Cmdr. Military Sealift Cmd. Covey Training 08-11 Apr 96 
Dr. Shashi Tharoor Spec. Asst. to the UN Under Sec. Oral for SGL 09 Apr 96 
Peacekeeping Ops. 
Philip Dimitrov Former Prime Minister of The Rep. of Visit NPS 10-11Apr96 
Bulgaria 
Mrs. Jeanne B. Fites Deputy Under Sec. of Defense VisitDMDC 11Apr96 
Mr. John W. Douglass Asst. Sec. of the Navy (Research SGL 13-16 Apr 96 
Development & Acquisition) 
Highlands Group Highlands Group Conf. 14-16 Apr 96 
Ms. Karen Alderman Dir. of Performance Measures and Results, Status update on NPS Travel 15-16 Apr 96 
Under Sec.of Def. (Comptroller) Reengineering Effort 
MG Essam El-Din Youseflbrahim Egyptian Deputy Chief of the Armament Enrollment for new Ph.D students and 16-20 Apr 96 
Authority receive Master's programs briefs· 
RADM Paul E. Tobin, Jr. Oceanographer of the Navy Visit FNMOC (Guest Speaker) & NPS 17-20 Apr 96 
BG George J. Brown, USA Cmdr. Gral., Madigan Army Med. Ctr., Lead Visit NPS and DLI 22-24 Apr 96 
Agent Region 11, and Comm. NW Health 
I Service Support Area, Fort 1.ewis 
Mr. Dick Cheney President and CEO of Halliburton Congress and the Making of Defense 23 Apr96 
Policy 
FMAR Billy Tumas Chief Def. Mngmt. Ctr. Indonesia Discuss cooperative mngmt. programs 24-25 Apr 96 
L TC Djumarno MBA, Def Mngmt. Ctr. Indonesia 
L TG Otto J. Guenther, USA Dir. of Info. Systems for Cmd, Control, Acquisition &C3 Seminars 24-26 Apr 96 
Comms & Computers. 
Foreign Naval Attaches Spring Tour 96 46 International Naval Representativ~s Visit NPS 25-27 Apr 96 
RADM Michael W. Cramer, USN Dir. of Naval Intel. N2 Foreign Naval Attaches Visit, Currie Rev. 25-.27 Apr96 
RADM John T. Hood Program Exec. Officer for Theater Air Combat Systems Sciences & Technology 30 Apr-01 May 
Defense, ASN (RD&A) Currie. Rev. 96 
COL Glenn Weidner, USA Cmdr. MILGROUP in Honduras Civ-Mil Relations in Honduras Sem. 05-07 May 96 
. Maj Gen Perry Smith, USAF (Ret) Pres. of Visionary Leadership, Ltd SGL 06-07 May 96 
RADM Osie "V" Combs, Jr. USN Chief Engineer, SP AW AR 05 Electronic Systems Engineering Currie. 07-08 May 96 
Rev. 
Mr. David Chu Fonner Asst. Sec. of Def. for PA&E Class Speech 08 May 96 
Maj Gen Redden, USAF Commanding General Joint Warfighting Ctr. Update Brief on Joint "Vision 201 O" 08-11May96 
Ms: Alice Maroni Principal Deputy Under Sec. Def. Practical Comptroller Class & Financial 09-14 May 96 
Mngmt Course Speaker 
MG ClaudiaJ. Kennedy, USA Asst. Dep. Chief of Staff for Intel. BriefNPS 10 May 96 
Dr. Charles B. Engle, Jr. Technical Advisor DISA, Chief, Joint Predictions for New Directions in Software 12-14 May 96 
Interpolarity & Engineering Organization Engineering Within DoD. 
Pakistan Delegation I Pakistan National Defence College Party NPS Research Activities Rondtable 13-22 May 96 
BG David R. Gust, USA Prog. Exec.Officer Intel. & Electronic Warf. VisitNPS 15-16 May 96 
Gen Richard Hearney Asst. Commandant of the MC VisitNPS 16-17 May 96 
RADM Stephen R. Loeffler, USN ACNP/Military Personnel & Career VisitNPS 23-24 May 96 
Development, PERS-2 
Dr. Andrew Ellis Majority Staff Dir. Committee on Nat'l Sec., Guest Speaker on "Special Topics in 01-04 Jun 96 
U.S. House of Representatives I American Gov. 
Col Charles G. "Snip" White Jr., USAF Dir. Air Univ. Research Coordinator Office Explore opportunities for research 03-06 Jun 96 
collaboration among Military Ed. 
Institutions 
RADM Michael L. Bowman, USN Cmdr. Naval Doctrine Cmd. SOL 10-11 Jun 96 
BGen Joseph T. Anderson, USMC Vice Cmdr, Nav. Air Systems Cmd. Material Logistic and Aeronautical 11-13 Jun 96 
Engineering Currie. Review 
RADM Lowell E. "Jake" Jacoby . USCINCPAC Dir. of Intel. VisitNPS 11-13 Jun 96 
Mr. Vincent P. Roske, Jr. Dep. Dir. for Wargaming, Simulation, and Joint Modeling and Simulation Executive 11-13 Jun 96 
Ops., J-8 Panel (JMSEP) 
Ms. Linda Cavalluzo Ctr. for Naval Anal. VisitNPS 11-14 Jun 96 
RADM Paul G. Gaffney II, USN Cmdr Naval Met. & Oceano Cmd. FNMOC Change of Command 12-15 Jun 96 
BGen Peter N. Schmitz German Attache, Washington DC German Faculty Memo. of Understanding 13-16 Jun 96 . 
(Signing Ceremony) 
Dr. Catherine McArdie Kelleher (SES-6) Sec of Def Rep. Europe and Defense VisitNPS 16-21Jun96 
Advisor, USNATO 
Mr. Keith Webster 
I 
Defense Sec. Assistance Agency Foreign VisitNPS 17-20 Jun 96 
Affairs Specialist 
V ADM Brent M. Bennitt, USN Cmdr. Naval Air Force, U.S. Pac Fleet NPS Graduation Guest Speaker 19-20 Jun 96 
Congressman Patrick Kennedy Democrat, Rhode Island VisitNPS 22 Jun 96 
Republic of Uzbekistan Delegation Army, First Deputy Minister of Defense, VisitNPS 22-25 Jun 96 
COD, Chief Med. Dept, AF Dept. Head 
MG Joseph G. Garrett III, USA Dir. Strategy, Plans and Policy Direotorate Visit DLI 24-27 Jun 96 
Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Ops. and Plans 
V ADM Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr., Cmdr. Third Fleet C41 Symposium 27-28 Jun 96 
USN 
RADM Richard I. Ridenour, USN Cmdr. Nat'l Nav. Med. Ctr.· VisitNPS 10-11 Jul 96 
Dr. Mark Chamberlain Chairman Math Dept. USNA Applied Mathematics Currie. Rev. 10-12 Jul 96 
Mr. Sean O'Keefe Former SECNA V Visit NPS 14-16 Jul 96 
Dr. John T. Hanley, Jr. Program Dir. for Strategic Studies Ctr. for SOL 15-17 Jul 96 
Nav. Warf. Studies Nav. War College 
RADM Frank M. Dirren, Jr., USN Cmdr. Naval Safety Ctr. Operational Risk Mngmt Lecture 23 Jul 96 
Mr David E. Porter Navy Acquisition Reform Exec. Acquisition and Contract Mngmt Sem. 24-26 Jul 96 
ADM James R. Hogg, USN (Ret) Dir. of the Strategic Studies Group of the Interview SSG Candidates 30-31Jul96 
Navy 
. -
V ADM Philip M. Quast, USN Cmdr. Military Sealift Cmd. VisitNPS 30-31 Jul 96 
Dr. Bernard Rostker Asst. SECNA V Monterey Bay Stand-Up and Assumption 06-08 Aug 96 
> 
of Command Ceremony 
Mr. Charlie Abell Professional Staff Member of the Senate Visit NPS, DLI, and DMDC 12-14 Aug 96 
Armed Services Committee 
Ms. Sharon Anderson DA CO WITS Visit NPS for DACOWITS Project 12-15 Aug 96 
Mr. Roger E. Tetrault Pres. Land Systems, Gral Dynamics VisitNPS 13-14 Aug 96 
RADM Richard A. Wilson, USN Deputy Dir., Space & Electronic Warfare Computer Science Currie Review 20-25 Aug 96 
( 
Mr. Timothy E. Douglas (SES-4) Navy Program Exec. Officer for Undersea Acquisition, Contracting, and Program 21-23 Aug 96 
Warfare Management Seminars Speaker 
RADM Paul G. Gaffney II, USN Cmdr Nav. Met. & Oceano. Comm. VisitNPS 05 Sep 96 
Mr. Thomas M. Crean Pres., Def. Acquisition University, NCATConf. 23-25 Sep 96 
Washington DC. 
V ADM Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr. Cmdr. Third Fleet Graduation Guest Speaker 25-26 Sep 96 
USN 
Congressman Glen Browder Third Congressional District, AL NPS Orientation 16-18 Oct 96 
Maj Gen George B. Harrison, USAF Cmdr. AF Operational Test & Eval. Ctr. AFOTEC Mission Brief to C41 Students 17-18 Oct 96 
(AFOTEC), Kirtland AFB, NM 
Honorable Steve Honigman Gral. Counsel of the Navy NOAA Pac. Fisheries Transfer Ceremony 24 Oct 96 
Dr. Reinhard Kuhn Asst. Sec. Of Def. For the Univs.ofthe NPS Orientation 24-31Oct96 
German Armed Forces 
RADM Barbara McGann, USN Cmdr. Nav. Rec. Cmd. Navy Ball Guest Speaker 25-26 Oct 96 
RADM John W. Craine, Jr. USN Dir. Assessment Div., N81 NPS Orientation 29-31Oct96 
Lt Gen W. G. Kritzinger Chief of Staff for Ops./ (SANDF) Seminar Presentation 31Oct-02 Nov 
96 
Lt Gen W. G. Kritzinger I Chief of Staff for Ops. South African Natl. SANDF Franz Eldeman Prize Winners, 31 Oct -02 Nov 
Def. Force (SANDF) Presentation Seminar 96 
Dr. Alexei G. Arbatov Member of Russian Parliament SGL 04-06 Nov 96 
RADM Michael T. Coyle, USN Dep. Cmdr., NA VSEA, SEA 03 Currie. Review 510, 520, 570 05-07Nov 96 
Foreign Defense Attache DATT Orientation Tour NPS Orientation 14 Nov 96 
RADM -Paul Gaffney, USN Chief of Nav. Research & Cmdr, Mine Warf. Symposium & METOC 17-18 Nov 96 
NA VMETOC. Cmd. I Currie. Rev. 
RADM Paul Tobin, Jr., USN Oceanographer of the Navy Mine Warf. Symp.& METOC Currie Rev. 17;.;19 Nov 96 
RADM Dennis R. Conley, USN Cmdr. Mine Warf. Cmd. Mine Warf. Symp. & Undersea Warf 17-19Nov96 
Currie Rev. 
RADM Richard D. Williams, USN Program Exec. Dir Officer Mine Warf. Mine Warf. Symp. & Undersea Warf 17-19Nov96 
Currie Rev. 
RADM Edmund P. Giambastiani, USN Dir. Sub. Warf. Div. N-87, OPNAV Mine Warf. Symp. & Undersea Warf 17-19 Nov 96 
Currie Rev. 
RADM Paul Gaffney II, USN ChiefNav. Research. & CmdrMETOCCOM Mine Warf. Symp.& METOC Currie Rev. 17-18 Nov 96 
Dr. John B. Goodman Dep. Under SECDEF for Industrial Affairs NPS Orientation 25 Nov 96 
& Installations. 
Mr.Yuri Shcherbak Ukranian Ambassador to U.S. CCMR Guest Speaker 01-01Dec96 
V ADM Arthur A. Cebrowski, USN Dir. Space, Info. Warf, Cmd & Control Strategic Studies Group 08-10 Dec 96 
ADM Leon Edney, USN, (Ret) Strategic Studies Group NPS Orientation 08-12 Dec 96 
RADM Thomas F. Stevens COMNA VSECGRU Info. Warf. Currie. Sponsor 09-12 Dec 96 
• • # fl' 
.. ' 
Dr. Herbert K. Fallin, Jr. Dir of Asses. And Eval., Office of the Asst. Seminar for Program Management Guest 11-12 Dec 96 
Sec. of the Army (Research & Acquis. Dep.) Speaker 
RADM Richard Wilson, USN Dep. Dir. Space & Elec. Warf. (N6B) Joint C41 Systems Currie Rev./ Aviation 11-13 Dec 96 
Safety Graduation Guest Speaker 
Gen Walter Kross, USAF CIC U.S. Transportation Cmd. & Cmdr., Air NPS Orientation 16-17 Dec 96 
Mobility Cmd., Scott AF Base, IL. 
V ADM Philip Quast, USN Cmdr. Mil. Sealift Cmd NPS Orientation 16-17 Dec 96 
Dianna Blundell Dir. of Plans, DSAA NPS Graduation 17-20 Dec 96 
I 
Prof. Victor E. Staney Chair. Dep. Of Democratic Def. Mgt./ NPS Orientation & Faculty Meetings 18-29 Dec 96 
Garmisch Germany 
6.c-2. 
Distinguished Visitors 1997 
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NPS Distinguished Visitors 1997 
1997 SGL Purpose of Visit Name Title Remarks 
31-Mar- Reseive Annual Training CAPT J. Gosier, SES-5 Director, Office of Clandestine Greensheet file - c:\myfiles\grnsht04.wpd 
12-Apr Information Technology, CIA 
04-Apr Visit MG Claudia Kennedy USA, to be Dep Chi of Staff Greensheet file - c:\myfiles\grnshto3.wpd 
for Intelligence 
6-7 Apr Visit Ms. Karen Alderman (SES4) Dir, Performance Measures 
& Results UNDSECDEF (Compt) 
08-Apr x Guest Lecture General Shelton CINCUSSOCOM Greensheet file - c:\myfiles\grnsht14.wpd 
10-Apr Visit LTG Mariano Chief of the Army, Philippines Greensheet file - c:\myfiles\grnsht16.wpd 
11-Apr Keynote Spkr - MATE The Honorable Sam Farr California 17th District Greensheet file - c:\myflles\grnsht19. wpd 
15-Apr x Guest Lecture OPEN 
-
16-17-Apr Visit RADM David R. Ruble Dir., Logistics, CINCLANTFL T 
17-18-Apr Visit MGen Victor Mayo Superintendent, Philippine 
Military Academy 
22-Apr x Guest Lecture RMDL William Pickavance SHAPE/NATO YNCM - 011-32-65-44-4625 
25-Apr SWODaylV VADM Alexander Krekich Com, Nav Sur Force, USPF Greensheet file - c:\myfiles\grnsht20.wpd 
RADM John Sigler Dep & Chi of Staff, CPF 
RADM Michael Mullen Com, Crsr Dest Grp TWO 
29-Apr x Guest Lecture Gen Eugene E. Habiger, USAF STRATCOM CDR Matts, (402) 294-7466/3927 
1-2 May Visit RDML Patrick Moneymaker Commander, Naval Space Command 
06-May Visit USS ARKANSAS Navy League Hosting 
07-May x Guest Lecture Honorable Richard Danzig Under Secretary of the Navy c:\office\wpwin\wpdocs\greensheet\danzig 
08-May Visit Royal Navy Pers Commodore A.M. Gregory British Naval Attache no greensheet needed 
13-May x Guest Lecture VADM Cebrowski Dir, SIWCC, N6, OPNAV c:\office\wpwin\wpdocs\greensheet\cebrowski 
14-15-May Visit RADM Lee Gunn Dep Chi of Naval Personnel Cancelled 
Dr. Zeman (SES-2) N-7B Cancelled 
20-May x Guest Lecture Dr. John Hanley Strategic Studies Group c:\office\wpwin\wpdocs\greensheet\hanley.wpd 
20-23-May Research Proposal Mr. Charlles P. Nemfakos Dep Under SECNAV (DONOMIT) c:\office\wpwin\wpdocs\greensheet\nemlakos. wpd 
22-23-May Guest of JCS General Arne Solli Chief of Defense, Norway Cancelled 
Norwegian Army 
1997 SGL Purpose of Visit Name Tiiie Remarks 
22-23-May Mine Warfare follow-up Mr. Roy Bird, Australian Army Sr. Professional Officer No green 
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27-May x Guest Lecture OPEN 
28-29May Visit VA, PCM Annex The Hon. Lane Evans Congressman, 17 Dist, Illinois c:\office\wpwin\wpdocs\greensheet\evans. wpd 
Speak to Prof Browder Stu 
29-May Visit General • Pan Director, Natl Defense Univ, China Greensheet pending 
29-30-May Visit OUSupply Corps Stu RADM Justin McCarthy Dep Dir, Mat. Mgmt, DLA c:\otfice\wpwin\wpdocs\greensheet\mccarthy. wpd 
29-31 May Retirement Speaker RDML A. Byron Holderby Dep Chief of Chaplains c:\otfice\wpwin\wpdocs\greensheet\holderby.wpd 
1-6 Jun Review funded research pgm Don Kline (SES-4) Provost Greensheet pending 
02-Jun Avia. Safety/Speak to T ARs RADM Stephen T. Keith COMNAVRESAIRRESFOR Greensheet pending 
03-Jun x Guest Lecture RADM Harry M. Highfill V. Director J-6/Dept. Dir. for Cancelled 
Defense-Wide C-4 Support JS 
03-Jun x Guest Lecture RADM John Scott Redd Director, Strategic and Policy, J5, JS Awaiting response on acceptance/decline of SGL 
4·5Jun Interim Currie Review (ME) RADM Michael T. Coyle Deputy NavSEASYSCOM Greensheet pending (POC: CDR Klocek) 
5·6Jun Informal FM Currie Review RADM James Amerault Director Cudgel and Reports N-82 Greensheet pending (POC: Prof Mutty) 
06-Jun Flag Req. Study Ervin Kapos Greensheet pending (POC: Prof Schacher) 
06-Jun BG SIN Booh Wah Defense Atache, Embassy of Singapore Greensheet pending (POC: Danielle Kuska) 
and delegation of 5 
6-13 Jun NPS Orientation RADM Karl Wilhelm Rosberg Director, Maint & Procurement CDR Werkhaven, US Embassy, Bonn 
German Navy 011-49-228-339-2715 
9-12 Jun Quota Determination John O'hara + 5 National Security Agency Greensheet Pending (POC: Levien/Lewis) 
10-Jun x Guest Lecture VADM William J. Fallon Deputy CINC/COS, U.S. LANTCOM 
16-19 Jun CINCSummit 25+ USN Flag Officers CINCPACFL T and CINCLANTFL T Greensheets pending/CDR C Chavez Action Officer 
19-Jun Graduation ADM J. Paul Reason CINCLANTFLT VADM Browne as backup? 
24-Jun Summer break 
5-7 Jul Sloat Landing Participant RADM William L. Putnam CDR, CRUDESGRU THREE Traveling via POV 
08-Jul x Guest Lecture Prof Alberto Coll Naval War College Tom Buiak POC: 401-841-2032 
7-9Jul Orientation Visit Irving Blickstein Asst. Dep. CNO (NBB) COG: 01 
Resources, Warfare Reqs and Assessments 
1997 SGL Purpose of Visit Name Title Remarks 
8-9Jul Follow-up GEN Minnehan Visit RADM Richard Naughton TRANSCOM COG: 01 
9·11 Jul Ops Logistics Speaker RADM David R. Ruble, SC Dir, Logistics/Fleet Supploy Officer N41 COG: Prof Schrady 
S~ Co~ Assoc Speaker CINCLANTFLT 
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10-Jul Menneken Lecture RADM Dennis Connley Commander, Mine Warfare Command COG: Al Bottoms 
11-Jul Orientation Visit Mr. Ulrich Romer Helmut Kohl Sr. Legis. Mbr COG: Prof Browder 
Mr. Axel Schlegtendal Senior Legal Advisor to Helmut Kohl 
Ms. Rochelle Dornatt Escort, Rep. Sam Farr's Office 
9-13 Jul TRAC Director's Meeting Mr. Michael Bauman SES5 Director, TRAC COG: Col Wood, TRAC Monterey 
Mr. Roy Reynolds, SES4 
Mr. Jim Fox, SES4 
COL Meyer Dep. Dir., TRAC Meetings to be held in Spanagel 101A 
15-Jul x BOA Member/Guest Lecture Mr. Walter Anderson Parade Publications, Editor 
16-17..Jul BOA Meeting LCDR Cowan Action Officer 
17-18 Jul BOA Debrief VCNO, N1, N7B, N8B LCDR Cowan Action Officer 
ADM Gehman, VADM Oliver, Dr. Zeman, Mr. Blickstein 
21-Jul NPS Orientation Dr. Marvin J. Langston DON Chief Information Officer COG: Prof Irvine, x2461 
22..Jul x Guest Lecture BLOCKED Offered to ADM Ray canceled 
USNATO/USM, PSC 81Box151, APO AEJ: POC: Penny 011-322-707-4964 
23-Jul Sean O'Keefe Former SECDEF POC: Dean Blandin 
24·25Jul DV Orientation Tour Angolans Interest in IHRM, DAMI & CCMR 
COL Roser Action Officer 
O Jul -1 Aug Orientation Visit BG Wilfried Scheffer CO, German Armed Forces of US/CDA POC: Col Roessler 
04-Aug Visit The Honorable Larry C. Napper U.S. Ambassador to Latvia Proposed by RADM Evans 
05-Aug x Guest Lecture Ambassador Robert E. Hunter U.S. Ambassador to NATO SGL 
Dr. Shireen T. Hunter Sr. Assoc., Ctr for Strategic and Intl Studies seminar Middle EasVCentral Asia 
08-Aug NNOA Banquet Speaker MajGen Charles F. Bolden Deputy Commanding General, IMEF 11th Annual NNOA Scholarship Banquet Speaker 
7·13 Aug Leave Mr. John P. Murtha, D·PA Representative, 12th District, Pennsylvania COG: Gordon Schacher 
Mr. Charlie Homer, Assist 
12-Aug x Guest Lecture OPEN 
12-Aug Courtesy Call BG Geo!Jl.e Brown Commander, Madigan Army Medical Clinic 
1997 SGL Purpose of Visit Name Title Remarks 
12-14 Aug Orientation Visit Mr. Bill Lynn Dir, Progra Assessment and Evaluation, OSD 
13-Aug Orientation Visit L TG Peter Schoemaker Commanding General, Spec Ops Command Maj Sonnier and SGM Rambo traveling with 
Fort Bragg 910.432.2577/ DSN 239/ 910.432.1059 fax 
needs car and driver COG: Paul Stockton/Muary Weir 
13-15 Aug Orientation Visit Kay Goss Associate Director, FEMA COG: Gordon Schacher 
da~hter 
3:40 PM, 14-10·97 
NPS Distinguished Visitors 
13-15 Aug DAU Orientation Visit Mr. Daniel Czelusniak Director, Acq Policy Integration, Office of COG: Col Dave Matthews, (Rel.), SM Prof. 
Undersecretary of Defense of Acq & Tech 
14-Aug Procurement Conference RADM Mike Sullivan Principal Dep ASN (RD&A) COG: LCDR Travis Smith, OLA 
Congressman Sam Farr Representative D-CA Local COG: LCDR Cabling, NSAMB 
18-Aug SSG Interviews ADM James Hogg Naval War College, SSG COG: CAPT Burin 
19-Aug x Guest Lecture ADM Thomas J. Lopez CINCUSNAVEUR/CINCUSAFE Greensheet pending 
19-21 Aug Orientation Visit RADM Perry Ratliff Director, Intelligence U.S. Pacific Command 
J2 
23-27 Aug OL Currie Review VADM William "Bill" Hancock DCNO for Logistics, N4 COG: Prof. Manuel Falcon 
24-Aug Orientation Visit RADM Jackie Allison Dir for Ops, Defense Spec. Weapons Agency 
26-Aug x Guest Lecture CAPT Steve Soules Dir., Decision Support Ctr, OSD (C31) POC: Prof. Pat Parker 
CANCELED WANTS TO COME SEPT/OCT 
02-Sep Assessment of German Dr. Peter Wichert German Ministry of Defense COG: Col Roessler 
Participation @ NPS 
02-Sep x Guest Lecture Open 
03-Sep Orientation Visit BG Fletcher Lamkin Dean of Academic Board, West Point 
4-8 Sep SOLIC Orientation Visit RADM Thomas R. Richards COMNAVSPECWAR COG: Prof McCormick 
09-Sep x Guest Lecture Mr. Dan Tellup Former CEO, Lockheed 
11-12Sep OA Currie Review RADM John Craine Director, Assessment Div .. 
16-Sep x Guest Lecture OPEN 
22-25 Sep Orientation Visit/Research Mag Mr. William Bazzy Chairman/CEO, Horizon Pubs 
22-26 Sep Disting. Prof. Presentation Maj. Carlos Noriega Astronaut 
1997 SGL Purpose of Visit Name Title Remarks 
23-Sep NO SGL -- Finals Week 
25-Sep Graduation RADM Daniel Murphy Director, Surface Warfare, N86, OPNAV 
30-Sep x DAU PAT Apt/Acquisition Rev Bill Hauenstein Navy Deputy for Acquisition Career Man. 
07-0ct x Guest Lecture OPEN EO Refresher Trng 
14-0ct x Guest Lecture 
21-0ct x Guest Lecture 
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24-0ct Navy Ball Guest of Honor RADM William Pickavance COMCARGRU ONE 
27-0ct Guest Speaker Archie Barrett Dep Assistant Sec. (Manpower/Res Aff.) "Relationship Btwn Congress/DOD 
27-0ct Office call/tour Walter L. Busbee Dep Asst to SECDEF for Chem/Bio Def Tour Chem/Bio Labs: POC: Prof. Schacher 
28-0ct x Guest Lecture Kirk MacNulty Paradigm POC: Gross Scruggs, Inman lecture Series 
29-0ct Brief Space Sys Students RADM Moneymaker Commander, Naval Space Command 
04-Nov x Guest lecture NONE (MILCOM) 
-
2-5 Nov Conference MILCOM Conference 
ADM Archie Clemins CINPACFLT Sponsored by Lockheed. location: Hyatt 
Gen Howell Estes Ill CINC U.S. Space Command 
VADM Cebrowski Dir, Space, Information Warfare, C & C 
12-14Nov Conference CNO/CINC Conference 
ADM Johnson CNO 
ADM Larson USNA 
ADM Lopez CINCUSNAVEUR 
ADM Pilling VCNO 
ADM Bowman DIRNAVNUCPROP 
ADMClemins CINCPACFLT 
ADM Reason CINCLANTFL T 
ADM Gehman USA COM 
12-14Nov OA Biennial Curricular Rev. RADM John Craine Dir, Assessment Division, N81 
13-Nov Lecture Dennis D. Fitzgerald Dir, SIGINTSystems Acquisition/Ops Tent. 
18-Nov x Guest Lecture Prof. Tom Murphree Research Assoc. Prof. MR El Nino' 
18-Nov Office calVExec time· RADMHinkle N87 
18-19 Nov NPS Orientation Brig Gen Norton A. Schwartz Commanding General SOCPAC (in trans POC: Lt Col Gearing 
TBD Change of Command 
TBD Celebration of the Season 
04-Dec Guest Speaker RADM Herbert C. Kaler Dep Dir Joint Theater Air Missile Def Org SNAAPSymp. 
18-Dec Graduation VADM John S. Redd Dir, Strategic & Policy - J5 
13-Nov x Guest Lecture Martin Luther King ill Tent. 
13-15 Jan Conference PME Conference 
03-Feb x Guest lecture Dr.G~Vest Prin. Asst. DUSO In conjunction w/ Environmental Security Conf. 
10-Feb x Guest lecture Amb. Armit1!9_e 
17-Feb x Guest Lecture Deborah lee ASD for Reserve Affairs 
01-Mar Graduation Guest Speaker RADM Giambastiani Dir, SUB Warfare Div Aide: l T Scott Seal (703) 695-0058 
x Guest Lecture OPEN 
x Guest Lecture OPEN 
5:02 PM, 04·11·97 

6.c-3. 
National Security Affairs 
Department Guest Speakers· 
' ,)
! J 
NSA Guest Speakers 
Prof. Colin S. Gray, University of Hull, UK, "From the First 
Nuclear Age to the Second." May 2, 1995 
Alain Rouvez, Leviers S.A., Brussels, Belgium, "Industrial 
Restructuring and Defense Conversion in the Former Soviet Union," 
August 30, 1995 
Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Special Representative of the 
President for Arms Control Non-Proliferation, "The US Non-
Proliferation Agenda After 1995," November 30, 1995. 
Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, John F. Kennedy School of 
government, Harvard University, "Identifying and Ranking U.S. 
National Interests," and "The Interface between the Intelligence 
Community and Policy-Makers," December 7, 1995 
Dr. William C. Green, California State University, San Bernadina, 
""The Russian Navy in Its 300th Year," "The U.S.-Russian Military-
to-Military Contacts Program," and "The Russian Elections: 
Parliamentary Past, Presidential Future," January 22-23, 1996 
Dr. Marcel Leroy, Head, Multilateral and Regional Affairs, 
Political Affairs Division, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 
"European Security and Defense Identity: NATO, the WEU, and the 
European Union," January 24, 1996 
Col. Jeffrey D. McCausland, U.S. Army, Director of European 
Studies, Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army 
War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, "Foreign Area 
Officer Education in the U.S. Armed Forces," and "European 
Security and the CFE Treaty: Status and Prospects," February 2, 
1996 
Dr. Thomas J. Welch, Associate Director for Science and 
Technology, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, "The Nature of Future Warfare: Some Trends and Issues," 
February 2, 1996 
Dr. Aaron L. Friedberg, Associate Professor of Politics and 
International Affairs, Director of the Research Program in 
International Security, Princeton University, "Is East Asia Ripe 
for Rivalry?" February 12 and 13, 1996 
Dr. Bruno Tertrais, Policy Adviser, Ministry of Defense, Paris, 
"Nuclear Issues in France," and "French Defense and Security 
Policy," February 20, 1996 
Dr. Joseph F. Pilat, Nonproliferation and International Security 
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Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, 
"Preparing for Future War: The Issue of Virtual Threats and 
Responses, " February 21 and 22, 1996 
Henry Sokoloski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy 
Education Center, Washington, D.C., "Strategic Weapons 
Proliferation and the Revolution in Military Affairs," February 
26, 1996 
Thomas G. Mahnken, National Security Fellow, John M. Olin 
Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, "Intelligence 
and Military Innovation: U.S. Assessments of Japan in the Interwar 
Period," March 4 and 5, 1996 
Dr. Stephen McFarland, Auburn University, "The Rise of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff," March 5, 1996 
Dr. Jeffrey Barlow, Naval History Office, "Interservice Rivalry in 
the Early Cold War," March 5, 1996 
Lieutenant Colonel David Fautua, USA, United States Military 
Academy, "Task Force Smith Revisited: The U.S. Army and 
Interservice Rivalry, 1945-1960," March 5, 1996 
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Clodfelter, USAF, University of North 
Carolina, "Interservice Rivalry and the Air War," March 5, 1996 
Dr. Walter Poole, Joint History Office, "Responding to the 1972 
Easter Offensive," March 5, 1996 
Dr. Carl Builder, RAND Corporation, "Service Strategies since 
Goldwater-Nichols," March 5, 1996 
Dr. David Armstrong, Joint History Office,"Interservice Rivalry in 
the Early Cold War," March 5, 1996 
Dr. Caroline Ziemke, Institute for Defense Analyses," "The 
Consequences of Interservice Rivalry: Vietnam as a Case Study," 
March 5, 1996 
Dr. Peter Roman, Dusquesne University, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff: 
The Corporate System Versus the Goldwater-Nichols System," March 
6, 1996 
Dr. Hal Winton, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, "Partnership 
and Tension: The Army and the Air Force between Vietnam and Desert 
Shield," March 6, 1996 
Colonel Richard Szafranski, USAF, Air War College, "Interservice 
Rivalry in Action: The Endless Roles and Missions Refrain?" March 
6, 1996 
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Ms. Reina Pennington, University of South Carolina, "Interservice 
Rivalry and the Rise of Jointness," March 6, 1996 
Dr. Don Snider, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
"The U.S. Military in Transition to Jointness: Surmounting Old 
Notions of Interservice Rivalry," March 6, 1996 
Ms. Kori Schake, Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation, 
"The Continuing Value of Interservice Rivalry," March 6, 1996 
Colonel Richard Witherspoon, USA, Army War College, "Goldwater-
Nichols and the Changing Institutional Environment," March 6, 1996 
Dr. Thomas McNaugher, RAND Corporation, "Goldwater-Nichols and the 
Changing Institutional Environment," March 6, 1996 
Dr. Alexander Cochran, Air War College, "Educating for Jointness," 
March 6, 1996 
Dr. Douglas Lovelace, Army War College, "Force 21 and the Future 
of Joint Operations," March 6, 1996 
Dr. William Turcotte, Naval War College, "Service Perspectives on 
the Present and Future," March 6, 1996 
Dr. Ronald Kurth, Air War College, "Service Perspectives on the 
Present and Future," March 6, 1996 
Dr. Archie Barrett, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, "Goldwater-Nichols: Ten 
Years After," March 6, 1996 
Major General Perry Smith, USAF (Ret), "Strategic Thinking and 
Planning," May 7, 1996 
Vice-Admiral Jean Betermier, French Navy, Retired, "French Defense 
Policy: NATO, Europe, and the New Military Program-Law," May 16, 
1996 
M. Patrice Dabos, Research Fellow, Center for European Studies, 
Stanford University; Ministere de la Defense Nationale, Paris, 
"The Role and Importance of Europe in guaranteeing Stability in a 
New World Order," August 1996 
Dr. Peter Schmidt, Senior Research Fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, Ebenhausen, German, "The Impact of European 
Integration on the Formulation of Security Policy: The Case of the 
West European Union," November 1996 
Representative Lane Evans, U.S. Congress, on Congress-DOD 
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relations, May 29, 1997 
Dr. Jonathan Tucker, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 
on Congress-DOD relations, June 4, 1997 
Rear Admiral L. E. Jacoby (USCP J2), "Joint Intellgience Support 
to Military OPs," June 12 1996 
Rochelle Dornatt, Chief of Staff, U.S. Rep. Sam Farr, on Congress-
DOD relations, June 16, 1997 
Steve Covington, Special Advisor to SACEUR for NATO-Russian 
Cooperation from SHAPE, Rountable Discussion, June 24, 1996 
Dr. Juergen Scheller, Deputy Consul General of Germany, San 
Francisco, "European Unification and Transatlantic Relations," 
June 1997 
Karsten Voigt, Member of Parliament, Deutscher Bundestag, Bonn, 
Germany; Member of North Atlantic Assembly, "NATO Enlargement, 
European Unification, and Transatlantic Relations: A Critical 
Triangle?" July 28, 1997 
Professor Richard Gunther, Department of Political Science and 
Director of the Mershon Center's Democratization Project, Ohio 
State University, "The Spanish Democratic Transition: Lessons for 
Other New Democracies?" August 9, 1996 
David Whitney (NRO/OSO), "National System Support to the 
Warfighter," August 1996 
Colonel Gene Beauvais, USAF (DLI), "Air Force Intelligence and 
JFACC Support," September 20, 1996 
Bill Manthorpe (JHU-APL), "Intelligence Support to Information 
Warfare," October 1996 
Lieutenant Colonel Mark England (NSA), "SIGINT Support to the 
Warfighter," October 1996 
Dave Whitney (NRO/OSO), "National System Support to the 
Warfighter," January, April 24, and November 5, 1997 
LGEN Ken Minihan (DIRNSA), "Information Operations/Information 
Warfare," February 4, 1997 
Robert W. Maggi, Deputy Director for Arms Transfer Policy, Office 
of Arms Transfer and Export Control Policy, "U.S. Arms Transfer 
Policies," February 10, 1997 
Colonel Joe Kost (NIMA), "National Imagery Support to the 
4 
Warfighter," February 12, 1997 
Dr. Ralph Cossa, Executive Director of the Pacific Forum, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, "Multilateral Security 
Initiatives and Confidence Building Measures in the Asia Pacific 
Region, " March 13, .1997 
Alexei Arbatov, Director of the Center for Geopolitical and 
Military Forecasts, Member of the Russian State Duma, "Russian 
Strategic Nuclear Forces to the Year 2000 and Beyond," March 25, 
1997 
Major (Ret) Alexandre Belkine, Deputy Executive Secretary of the 
Council for Defense and Foreign Policy, "The System of Defense 
Decision-Making in Russia," March 25, 1997 
Pavel Felgenhauer, Defense and Security Editor for Moscow daily 
Segodnya, "Russian/Soviet Military Reform--Ten Years of Failure," 
March 25, 1997 
Mikhail Pogorelyi, Editor, Krasnaya Zvezda (official organ of the 
Russian Defense Ministry), "The Wars in Chechnya and Afghanistan: 
A Comparative Analysis of their Impact on the Soviet and Russian 
Military," March 26, 1997 
Alexandre Saveliev, Senior Fellow, Institute of World Economics 
and International Relations, Moscow, "Ballistic Defense in Russian 
Policy," March 26, 1997 
Colonel (Ret) Vitaly Shlykov, formerly of the Russian General 
Staff, "The Political Economy of Russian Defense," March 26, 1997 
Dr. Jack Schick, Senior Economic Officer, US Department of State, 
"The Integration of Environmental Issues into US Foreign Policy," 
April 3, 1997 
Lieutenant Colonel Renee Strickland (NIMA), "National Imagery 
Exploitation and Analysis," May 8, 1997 
Dr. Emilio Meneses, Catholic University, Santiago, Chile, "Latin 
America: Security Issues," May 21, 1997 
Christine MacNulty and Kirk MacNulty, Applied Futures, Inc., 
"Paradigm Shifts and Case Studies Involving the Future of 
Education in the Navy," August 5, 1997 
Michael Wheeler, SAIC, "Early U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Command 
and Control," August 6, 1997 
Valeri Yarynich, Institute for World Economics and International 
Relations, "Russian Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control," 
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August 6, 1997 
W. Andrew Terrill, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, "Iraqi 
CW Use during the Iran-Iraq War," August 6, 1997 
Tim McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, "Iraqi BCW and Missile Policies during the 
1991 Persian Gulf War," August 6, 1997 
Gregory F. Giles, SAIC, "Iranian Decision Making and Chemical 
Weapons, August 6, 1997 
Gerald Green, RAND Corporation, "WMD in Iranian Military Thought 
and Practice," August 6, 1997 
Avner Cohen, U.S. Institute of Peace, "Nuclear Arms in Crisis 
under Opacity: Israel and the 1967 and 1973 Wars," August 6, 1997· 
John Lepingwell, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 
"Monitoring WMD Proliferation Threats: Open Source Approaches," 
August 6, 1997 
Bates Gill and James Lamson, "China and WMD: Perceptions, 
Policies, Use," August 7, 1997 
W.P.S. Sidhu, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
"India's Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control," August 7, 
1997 
Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan, 
"Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control," August 
7 / 1997 
Joe Bermudez, Jane's Information Group, "Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea: Motivation, Strategic Thought, and Possible 
Employment of WMD, " August 7, 1997 
Seth Carus, National Defense University, "WMD and Non-State 
Actors: The Rajneesh Cult Case," August 7, 1997 
Rear Admiral Mike Ratliff (USCP J2), "J2 Vision and Future Threat 
in PACOM," August 20, 1997 
Dr. Werner Hoyer, State Minister, Federal Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; Member of Parliament, Deutscher Bundestag, Bonn, Germany, 
"NATO's Future Role in Europe," August 25, 1997 
Art Sweetman (NSA), "NSA Organization and SIGINT Support to the 
Warfighter (via JWICS VTC)," June 10 and November 14, 1997 
Dr. Peter Wichert, State Secretary, Federal Ministry of Defense, 
6 
Bonn, Germany, "The Impact of the Changing Security Environment in 
Europe on Germany and the BU:hdeswehr," September 2, 1997 
Carl Broom (NIMA), "Presidential Priorities for Intelligence and 
the DCI' s Response (DCI Guidance) , " September 11, ·1997 
Lieutenant Colonel Traufried Elias, GEA, AiTinobile Forces Command, 
German Army, Regensburg, Germany, "On the Road to Normalcy: German 
Military Restructuring to Tighten the Cooperation with Allies and 
Friends in Military Affairs: The Case of the Airmobile Forces 
Command," October 29, 1997 
Prof. (Emeritus) M. Siddieq Noorzoy, University of Alberta, "The 
Politics and Economics of Oil and Gas in the Non-Arab Middle East 
and Central Asia," October 29, 1997 
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Selva, USAF, Military Assistant, Office of 
Net Assessment, on space systems and precision-strike capabilities 
(SECRET-NOFORN), October 30, 1997 
Dr. Eden Naby, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard 
University, "Iranian Policies in Central Asia and Afghanistan," 
November 12, 1997 
Thomas Handel, Executive Director, Naval Information Warfare 
Activity, on information warfare issues (SECRET-NOFORN), November 
18, 1997 
Dr. Thomas J. Welch, Associate Director for Science and 
Technology, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, on trends in future warfare (SECRET-NOFORN), December 2, 
1997 
Captain M. Barkell (CIA OMA), "CIA Support for the Warfighter, 




















SPECIAL OPERATIONS CURRICULUM 
SPEAKER SERIES AND SHORT COURSE SCHEDULE 
1995 --1997 
Jim Quinlivan 
Vice President, Army Research Division, RAND 
Coup-Proofing the Military 
Larry Cable 
University of North Carolina- Wilmington 
Peace Operations 
COL Thomas Beres, USA 
Chief, Special Operations Branch, Special Operations Division 
J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
SOF and the Joint Process 
COL Glenn Harned, USA 
Marine Corps War College 
SOF - GPF Integration 
Caesar Sereseres 
University of California, Irvine 
U.S. Support for Insurgency - A Nicaraguan Case Study 
Ambassador David Passage 
Political Advisor to the CINC Special Operations Command, 
US State Department · 
James Q. Roberts 
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense, SO /LIC, 
Policy and Missions 
Intelligence Requirements for Special Operations 
Trevor Dupuy, COL (Ret) 
The Dupuy Institute 
Small Unit Combat Engagements 
Piracy and Maritime Security Roundtable 
Thomas C. Fitzhugh III, Executive Director, Maritime Security Council 
Flemming Ramsby, Deputy Director General, BIMCO 








SPECIAL OPERATIONS CURRICULUM 
SPEAKER SERIES AND SHORT COURSE SCHEDULE 
COL Daniel D. Devlin, USA 
Chief, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Principles of Psychological Operations 
Eden Naby · 
Central Asian Enterprises/Harvard University 
A Comparison of Resistance Movements: The Basmachi, East Turkestan 
(Xinchiang) and Afghanistan 
COL Geoffrey C. Lambert, USA 
Commander, 10th Special Forces Group 
Strategy 95: Equilibrium 
COL Mark D. Boyatt, USA 
Commander, 3rd Special Forces Group 
Special Operations in Haiti 
CDR Joseph A. Tenaglia, USN 
Deputy Division Head, SABER, ONI 
Weapons of Mass Destruction: 'SABER Support to Special Operations Forces 
CDR Bob Schoultz, USN 
SOF Chair, Naval War College 
SOF Instruction at the Naval War College 
Major Ralph Millsap, USAF 
Air Command and Staff College 
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: A Frame of Reference 
David Tucker 
Deputy Director for Low Intensity Conflict, Policy Planning 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO /LIC 
Combating Terrorism, Past and Future 
August 11 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CURRICULUM 
SPEAKER SERIES AND SHORT COURSE SCHEDULE 
USASOC SEMINAR 
1) Dr. Stewart, Command Historian 
History of Special Operations Forces 
2) Major Steven Strain, SOF Doctrine Development Office 
Current and Evolving SOF Doctrine 
3) Mr. Jeff Cornelius, Strategic Planning Office 
SOF in the 21st Century 
August 21, 22 Larry Cable 
University of North Carolina- Wilmington 
1) Where are I: The Insurgent Continuum and LIC Case Studies 
2) Self Inflicted Wound or How the US Defeated Itself in Vietnam 
February 16, 1996 George "Digger" O'Dell 
LTC, USMC (Ret) 
Special Operations in Grenada 
March 1 Jim Quinlivan 
Vice President, Army Research Division, RAND 
Force Implications of Stability Operations 
April 11 Dr. Caesar Sereseres 
University of California, Irvine 
The Guerrilla War in Guatemala 
May 29 Dr. Bruce Berkowitz 
Consultant, Technology Investments 
Information Warfare and Special Operations. 
August 8 Dr. Carl Van Dyke 
From Kabul to Grotznyi 
August 29 COL Vladimir Sobichevsky, USA (Ret) 
Special Operations: Past and Future 
September 5 Robert Kitrinos 
Senior Analyst, Middle East Branch, Joint Staff, J2 











May 19 & 20 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CURRICULUM 
SPEAKER SERIES AND SHORT COURSE SCHEDULE 
Dr. Tom Marks 
Author, Freelance Reporter 
Insurgency in Sri Lanka 
George 11Digger" O'Dell 
LTC, USMC (Ret) 
· CIA and the War in Laos 
David Tucker 
Deputy Director for Low Intensity Conflict, Policy Planning 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO /LIC 
The D~velopment of US Policy to Combat Terrorism 
LT Jim Papineau, USN 
JSOC 
Counterproliferation 
LTC Kevin Higgins, USA 
PSYOPS and Deception in Panama & JUST CAUSE 
MOMEP: Peru/Ecuadorian Border 
History of Special Operations in Latin America 
GEN Henry Shelton, USA 
Commander, Special Operations Command 
Joint Vision 2010 
COL Dan Devlin, USA 
Commandant, Defense Language Institute 
Former Chief, PSYOPS Branch, J3-SOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
The Psychological Aspects of Warfare and Psychological Operations 
LTC Charlie Cleveland, USA 
10th Special Forces Group, Executive Officer 
C2 in Bosnia 
Major Ed Reeder, USA 
SOUTHCOM, J35 
Counter Drug C2 in SOUTHCOM 
·~, 
May29 
June4 & 5 






SPECIAL OPERATIONS CURRICULUM 
SPEAKER SERIES AND SHORT COURSE SCHEDULE 
Major Greg Lynch, USAF 
USSOCOM - J-5 
Joint Vision 2010 - SOF.Perspective 
COL Joe Rosek, USA 
OASD-SOLIC (Counterterrorism) 
C2 Concepts in Counterterrorism 
David Tucker 
Deputy Director for Low Intensity Conflict, Policy Planning 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO /LIC 
The Future Direction in Substate Conflict 
L TG Peter Schoomaker, USA 
Commanding General, USASOC 
Current Perspectives: USASOC 
COL John Meyer, USA 
SOCOM,J7 
C4I and SOF 
COL Hy Rothstein, USA 
JSOC 
Classified 
Major Ed Reeder, USA 
SOUTHCOM, J35 
Counter Drug 'C2 in SOUTHCOM 
RADM Thomas Richards, USN 
Commander, NA VSPECWARCOM 
Current Perspective: NAVSPECWARCOM 
Major Joel Clark, USA & Page Durning 
USSOCOM, J7C 
JANUS Computer Simulations 
Nov. 13 
. Nov. 19 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CURRICULUM 
SPEAKER SERIES AND SHORT COURSE SCHEDULE 
George "Digger" O'Dell 
LTC, USMC (Ret) 
Special Operations in Grenada 
BGEN Norton Schwartz, USAF 
Commander, SOCP AC 
Current Operations: SOCP AC 
. ' 
6.c-5. 










INSTITUTE FOR JOINT WARFARE ANALYSIS 
SPEAKERS AND PRESENTATIONS SINCE AUGUST 1995 
1995 
Dr. Jim Tritten - Naval Doctrine Command, Norfolk, VA 
'Naval Doctrine' 
Dr. John Hanley - Strategic Studies Group (SSG), Newport, RI 
'SSG Issues' 
Lcdr Phil Purdue, USN - JCS J8 
'Ballistic Missile Defense Attack Operations' 
.~ 
1996 
Dr. Elan Moritz - Naval Surface Weapons Center, Coastal Simulation 
Center, Panama City, Florida 
'Simulation & Model for Expedition Navy Warfare' 
Capt. Peter Bukeley, USN - Naval Doctrine Command, Norfolk, VA 
'Emerging Naval Doctrine' 
Ltc. Edward Felker, USA - Chief, Future Concepts, Joint WarFighting 
Center 
'JCS Chairman's Warfighting Vision 2010' 
---------
Dr. Thomas J. Welch - Office of Secretary of Defense, Office of Net 
Assessment 
7-8 February 
'The Nature of Future Warfare, Some Trends and Issues' 
Col. B.J. Thornburg - JCS J8 Directorate 
'Nimble Vision Analysis Efforts' 
'· 
12-13 February Dr. Aaron L. Friedberg - Princeton University 
'Is East Asia Ripe for Rivalry?' 
16 February Dr. Thomas Grassey - Editor, Naval War College Review, Newport,RI 
'Writing for Publication in Professional Journals' 
22-23 February Lt.Col. Mark Gibson, USMC - JCS J8 Directorate 
'The JWCA Process and Current Issues' 
29 February 
25 April 
6 June (C4I) 












LCDR Pat Clark, USN - Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe, VA 
'Joint Warfighting Center, Mission and Goals' 
'Naval Simulation System, A Pacific View' 
Col. Roy Edwards, USA - JCS, J6A, Advanced Concepts Division 
'New Concepts in C2 and Space Support' 
Capt. Ed Smith, USN - Deputy Director, CNO Executive Panel (OOK) 
'Vision 2020 - Guidance for the the Navy of 2020' 
1997 
Maj. Gen. George Harrison, USAF - Air Force Operational Test and 
Evaluation Command (AFOTEC) 
'AFOTEC and Issues iv Systems Testing' 
SACLANT NATO Briefing Team 
"NA TO Issues' 
Cdr. Donald Mcswain - NRAD Compass Office 
'Compass Program' 
VADM Art Cebrowski - N6 and reps from JCS J6 Directorate 
'Network .Centric Warfare' 
RADM McCarthy - Defense Logistics Agency 
- 'Joint Logistics Issues' 
Col Taylor, British Army, Ret., Int. Inst. of Strategic Studies (USS) 
'Iraqi Chemical Weapons Program' 
Lt. Gen. William Odom, USA, Ret. 
'Making Military Forces Meet American Imperial Responsibilities' 
'Military Technology and the International Pecking Order' 
-. 
27-28 October Mr. Henry Sokolski - Executive Director,NonProliferation Policy Ed. 
Center 
'Fighting Strategic Weapons Proliferation, Winning, Losing, and ' 
Coping' 
3-4 November Prof. William Green - CSU San Bernadino 
'Organizational Constraints on Russia's Evolving Military Posture and 
Grand Strategy' 
12-13 November Dr. Joseph Pilat - Los Alamos National Laboratory 
----·-----
'Future Terrorism: NBC Weapons and Other Strategic Threats' 





INSTITUTE FOR JOINT WARFARE ANALYSIS 
REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS WARGAMING 
AND OTHER ADVANCED CONCEPTS DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES 
Boldface indicates a wargame or major exercise. Two asterisks (**) indicates NPS 
participation supported but not funded by IJW A. 
FISCAL YEAR 94 
13-17 March 94 Cooke Conf~rence NWC Newport, RI 
8 -9 May STRATCOM Liaison Visit Omaha 
23-25 May Connections Conference AFCSC Maxwell AFB 
31 May-3 June Expeditionary Warfare Conference NWC Newport, RI 
9 -15 July Global Wargame NWC Newport, RI 
22-25 August Expeditionary Wargame Prep NDC Norfolk & Pentagon 
6 - 8 September Expeditionary Wargame Preplay NWC Newport, RI 
17-25 Sept. Expeditionary Wargame #1 NWC Newport, RI 
FISCAL YEAR 95 
15-19 October MORS JWCA Mini-Symposium CNA, Washington, DC 
15-16 November Expeditionary Warfare Conference Amphib Base,San Diego, CA 
29 Nov-5 Dec CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT Liaison Honolulu, HI 
Visit 
6 - 8 December JWCA Debrief & Wash, DC; Quantico, VA 
Exp Wargame II Prep 
11-16 December Progressive Response Wargame NDU Washington, DC 
JCS (JS) 
1995 
1 -12 January 95 Rainbow II Dry Run 
29 Jan-3 Feb Rainbow II Expeditionary 
Wargame 
8 - 10 March 
26-30 March 







OSD/NA RMA Series 
Navy Operational Concepts II 
Rainbow III 
Wargame Dry Run 
ACOM/CINCLANTFLT Liaison 
Visit 
Rainbow III Wargame 
Navy RMA Series 
Maritime Wargame I 
Global Wargame 95 
OSD/N A RMA Series 
Navy Operationa! Concepts 
NWC Newport, RI 
MCCDC Quantico, VA 
AFCSC, Maxwell AFB 
NDU Washington, DC 
TACTRAGRULANT 
Dam Neck, VA 
Norfolk, VA 
TACTRACRULANt 
Dam Neck, VA 
NDU Washington, DC 
NWC Newport, RI 
NDU Washington, DC 
· September 
--- Marine RMA Game Quantico, VA 
17-22 Sept 
4 - 6 October 
Technology Initiatives Game 95 Suitland, MD 
FISCAL YEAR 96 
Navy RMA Series 
Maritime Wargame II 
NPS Monterey, CA 
18-20 October 
210ct-3Nov 
Nimble Vision II Planning Meeting 
& Attack OPS Briefing 
Nimble Vision I 
J8 Pentagon 
Washington, DC 
Army War College 
Carlisle, PA 
28-29 November SIMEX I Wargame NSWC Dahlgran, VA 
5-7 December Army RMA Series 
Dominating Maneuver 
Wargame II 
Army War Coll~ge 
Carlisle, PA 
10-13 December SIMEX II Wargame NWC Newport, RI 
18-19 December 
(**) 
25-26 January 96 
26-28 February 





7 - 9 May 
Strategic Studies Group XV 2020 Asilomar, Pacific Grove, CA 
Advanced Technologies Symposium 
1996 
Nimble Vision II 
PACOM OOTW Conference 
Navy RMA Series 
Maritime Wargame III 
Nimble Vision III 
NRO RMA Series 
Forward Focus I 
Strategic Studies Group 
XV Wargame 
Nimble Vision IV 
Falcon AFB 
Colorado Springs, CO 
NPS Monterey, CA 
NWC Newport, RI 
ANSER Arlington, VA 
NDU Washington, DC 
NWC Newport, RI 
Booz Allan McClean, 
VA 
Air Force RMA Series DLA Ft. Belvoir, VA 












1 - 3 October 
21-26 October 
30 October 
Littoral Ops Development Conference TACTRAGRULANT 
Dam Neck, VA 
Joint Modeling and Simulation NPS Monterey 
Working Group (J 8) 
SIMEX III Panama City, FL 
Navy RMA Series DLA 
Future Navy Game I Ft. Belvoir, VA 
Precision Strike/C4ISR Symposium CNA Arlington, VA 
NRO RMA Series NRO Chantilly, VA 
Forward Focus II 
Naval Concept Development 
Committee Meeting 
Navy RMA Series 
Future Navy Game II 
OSD/NA RMA Symposium 
(Dr. Jan Breemer) 
PACOM OOTW Conference II 
FISCAL YEAR 97 
MORS QRAM Mini-Symposium 
(supporting the QDR) 
NA VDOCCOM Norfolk, VA 
NPS Monterey, CA 
Embassy Suites Hotel 
Seaside, CA 
NPS Monterey, CA 
Booz Allen McClean, VA 
Strategic Concepts Wargame VI NWC Newport, RI 
Naval Concepts Dev. Committee NWC Newport, RI 
18-21 November Navy RMA Series 
Future Navy Game III 
NWC Newport, RI 




Precision Strike/ C4ISR Symposium 




Center - Pacific Grove,CA 
11-13 December OSD/NA RMA Series NPS Monterey, CA 
Future Warfare 20XX Wargame 
1997 
27-30 January 97 MORS OOTW Mini-Symposium 
3 - 8 March NRO RMA Series 
Forward Focus III 
9-12 March Hunter Warrior USMC A WE 
Fleet Battle Experiment 'A' 
CENTCOM Tampa, FL 
NROHDQTRS 
Chantilly, VA 
Camp Pendleton, CA 




1 - 3 May 




Information Warfare Wargame I 
Strategic Studies Group XVI 
Wargame 
OSD/NA Future Warfare 20XX 
Symposium 
Arsenal Ship Concepts 
Wargame 
Fleet Battle Experiment Concepts 
Conference 




NWC Newport, RI 
DLA Ft. Belvoir, VA 
SAIC McClean, VA 
NWC Newport, RI 
CN A Alexandria, VA 
NAS North Island, CA 
Norfolk, VA 
NAS North Island, CA 






Fleet Battle Experiment Exp "B" USS Coronado 
Marine RMA Wargame MCCDC, Quantico, VA 
FISCAL YEAR 98 
OSD/NA RMA Series NPS Monterey, CA 
Space CONOPS Wargame II 
PACOM HADR Conference Norfolk, VA 
Strategic Concepts Wargame VIII NWC Newport, RI 
OSD/NA RMA Future Warfare 20XX SAIC McClean, VA 
Wargame IV Workshop 
PROJECTED 
9-12 December OSD/NA RMA Series Naval Academy 
27-30 January 
-··--·-·----
Future Warfare 20XX Wargame IV Annapolis, MD 
1998 
Navy RMA Series 
Future Navy Game 97-1 




FY 1996 Conferences 
_f 
i j 
·- .- •,µ ..... ~ • - •• ,.. •. - "'"'"' ,.._,_., 
FY 96 Conferences at NPS 
FULL TITLE CLASS START END SPONSOR EXPECT NR 
MARITIME WAR GAMES SECRET 10/ 3/95 10/ 6/95 IJWA 40 
MEETING OF THE EXPERTS SECRET 10/12/95 10/13/95 NSA 15 
OF THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY AUTHORITIES 






SYSTEM LETHALITY SCORE SECRET 10/19/95 10/20/95 BALLISTIC MIS. BMDO 10 
SUBGROUP MEETING AND 





ELECTRONIC WARF ARE UN CLAS 10/I 8/95 IO/I9/95 INSTIT DEF ANALYSIS 30 
TECHNOLOGY WORKING 
GROUP 





CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS UN CLAS 10/30/95 11/ 2/95 JOINT STAFF 0 
OF STAFF, PROCESS FOR 
THE ACCREDITATION OF 
JOINT EDUCATION 




ADVANCING RESEARCH UN CLAS Ill 7/95 l ll 8195 NPS-NCMA-F AI 80 




ANTI SUBMARINE SECRET Ill 7/95 1ll9195 CINCLANTFLEET/PACT 100 
WARFAREIMPROVEMENT 
CONFERENCE 
FY 96 Conferences at .NPS 
FULL TITLE CLASS START END SPONSOR EXPECT NR 
HUMAN FACTORS UN CLAS 1116195 1119195 ARL FT HOOD, TX 100 
ENGINEERING TECHNICAL 
ADVISORY GROUP (TAG) 
35TH MEETING 
JOINT SERVICE COMBAT SECRET/NOFORN 11114195 11/16/95 USAF 400 
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS 
CONFERENCE FOR 1995 
NAVAL SCIENCE ON CLAS 127 5795 127 7795 NSAP PROGRAM 100 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
(NSAP) ALL THEATER 
CONFERENCE 
HARM (HIGH-SPEED SECRET 12/ 5195 12/ 7/95 NA WCWPNS CHINA LAKE 12 
ANTIRADIA TION MISSILE) 
TACMAN REVIEW 
US/CHINA CONFERENCE ON UN CLAS 12119195 12/22/95 ONR 20 
SHALLOW WATER 
ACOUSTICS 
AIAA STRA'IEGIC AND SECRE l/NOFORN l/16796 1/18796 AIAA 500 
TACTICAL MISSILE 
SYSTEMS CONFERENCE 
SIMULA TOR VALIDATION SECRET 1/30/96 1131196 NRL 30 
WORKING GROUP (SVWG) 
MEETING 
foINT DIRECTORS OF TOP SECRET 27 6/96 218196 CECUM, REC, IEWD 25 
LABO RA TORIES 
TECHNOLOGY PANEL FOR 





CM) COMMITTEE MEETING 
FIRST ANNUAL UNCLAS/NOFORN 216196 218196 NA VAIR AND UTC. 150 
COORDINATION MEETING 
OF THE NATIONAL 
COORDINATING 
COMMITTEE (NCC) FOR 
THE TURBINE ENGINE 
HIGH CYCLE FATIGUE 
(HCF) PROGRAM 
CONFERENCE ON UN CLAS 315196 316196 IJWA, AIR/ARMY WAR C 150 
FY 96 Conferences at NPS 
FULL TITLE CLASS START END SPONSOR EXPECT NR 
INTERSERVICE RIVALRY 
AND THE AMERICAN 
ARMED FORCES 
SIXTH ARP A SYMPOSIUM NOFORN 214196 317/96 ARPA 200 
ON PHOTONICS SYSEMS 
FOR ANTENNA 
APPLICATIONS - PSAA-6 





I 996 IRIS SPECIAL TY SECRET 3711796 3713796 DOA, COTR, IRIAC 300 
GROUP MEETING ON 
PASSIVE SENSORS AND 
THE 9TH NATIONAL 
SYMPOSIUM ON SENSOR 
FUSION 
NA TO DEFENSE RESEARCH SECREI 3718796 3719796 NAIO 15 ' 
GROUP, ALLIED 
COMMITTEE 243, PANEL 9, 
RSG.10 ON ELECTRONIC 
WARFARE SUPPORT 
MEASURES MEETING 
.FOUR POWER SENIOR SECRET 3718796 3722796 DOA 40 
NATIONAL 
REPRESENTATIVES (ARMY) 
TARGET WORKING GROUP 
MEETING 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF UN CLAS 3/18/96 3122196 NPSANDACES 250 




7TH ANNUAL U.S. ARMY SECRE l/NOFORN 3726796 3728796 ADPA AND TACOM 450 
TANK-AUTOMOTIVE AND 
ARMAMENTS COMMAND 
(T ACOM) COMBAT . 
VEHICLE SURVIVABILITY 
.§YMPOSIUM 
INTEGRATED DEFENSE SECRET 3/27/96 3128196 TACOM 30 
FY 96 Conferences at NPS 
FULL TITLE CLASS START END SPONSOR EXPECT NR 
SYSTEM PROGRAM 
REVIEW 
VETERANS TOWN HALL UN CLAS 1119/96 3/19/96 CONGRESSMAN FARR 100 
CONGRESSMAN FARR ON CLAS 371796 37 1796 CONGRESSMAN FARR 150 
HEALTH CARE OPEN 
FORUM 




DOE, DOD CONFERENCE ON SECRET 2729796 37 1796 U.S. S'IRA'IEGIC COMMA 75 
(NUCLEAR) STOCKPILE 
TRANSPARENCY 
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY SEcRE l/NOFORN 2728796 2729796 cRANE,NsWc 350 
EXPENDABLE AND 
DISPENSER SYSTEMS 
(ATEDS) PROGRAM REVIEW 
CONFERENCE 
BLUEMAX III, ESAMS, SECRET/NOFORN 4130196 513196 WRIGHT LABORATORY 80 
ALARM,RADGUNSAND 
DIME (BEARD) USER 
GROUP MEETING AND 
CONFIGURATION CONTROL 
BOARD 
AN/ALQ-99 LOW BAND SECRET 4/22/96 5110196 CRANENSWC 30 
TRANSMITTER SOURCE 
SELECTION CONFERENCE 
AMERICAN DEFENSE SECRE'17NOFORN 5714796 5715796 NSWC, DAHLGREN 300 
PREPAREDNESS 
ASSOCIATION 46TH 
ANNUAL BOBMB AND 
WARHEAD TECHNICAL 
MEETING 
MICROWAVE POWER TUBE ONcLAS/NOFORN 5721796 5724796 OUSD 300 
CONFERENCE 
FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL TOP SECRET/scl/SEClIB 3796 5/16/96 NA WC, WEAPONS DIV 300 
. JOINT ELECTRONIC 
WARF ARE CONFERENCE 
(JEWC) 
JOINT DIRECTORS OF -~mcrurr·· 5114196 5115196 WRIGHT LABORATORY 40 
LABO RA TORIES 
~~~~----~--
-- -------------
FY 96 Conferences at NPS 
FULL TITLE CLASS START END SPONSOR EXPECT NR 




INTERNET UN CLAS 5/15/96 5115196 DLI 40 
DEMONSTRATIONS FOR 
DLI COMMAND LANGUAGE 
PROGRAM MANAGER 
SEMINAR 
FIRST ACM (ASSOCIATION ON CLAS 57 9796 5710796 NPS/NSA 40 
FOR COMPUTING 
MACHINERY) wORKSHOP 
ON EDUCATION IN 
COMPUTER SECURITY 




TECHNICAL PANEL ON C3 
COMMAND AND CONTROL 
RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM 
THE TECHNICAL -UNCLAs 6/l0/96 6/14/96 NA WC, CHINA LAKE 30 
COOPERATION PROGRAM 
ANNUAL MEETING OF 
SUBGROUP U, TECHNICAL 
PANEL-7 (UTP-7), HUMAN . 
FACTORS IN AIRCRAFT 
ENVIRONMENTS 
OUTSOURCING SUPPORT UN CLAS 613196 617196 DON SHOR INST ALL MGM 30 
OFFICE MEETING 
JOINT MODELING AND UN CLAS 6/11/96 6/13/96 JOINT STAFF 50 
SIMULATION EXECUTIVE 
PANEL (JMSEP) _ 
ANNUAL TRI-SERVICE SECRET 6124196 6127196 NRL 350 
RADAR SYMPOSIUM 




1 OTH QUADRILATERAL UNCLAS 711196 713196 DOA, DISC4 26 I"' 
ARMY COMMUNICATIONS 
AND INFORMATION 
FY 96 Conferences at NPS 
FULL TITLE CLASS START END SPONSOR EXPECT NR 
SYSTEMS 
INTEROPERABILITY GROUP 
(QACISIG) PLENARY . 




WORKSHOP ON BoRoN CONFIDENTIAL 8720/96 8/22/96 WPAFBDEA 20 
· SLURRY RAMJET 
TECHNOLOGY 
INTERIM DEFENSE ON CLAS 971 l/96 9712796 NRL MARINE METEO DIV 150 
RESEARCH AND 
ENGINEERING NETWORK 
(IDREN) USER'S MEETING 
INITIAL MOSAIC USERS' SECRET/NOFORN 9/16/96 9/17/96 WRIGHTLABORATORYI 70 
GROUP MEETING (MOSAIC 
IS AN ADVANCED IR 
COUNTERMEASURE 
EFFECTIVENESS DIGIT AL 
SIMULATION THAT 
REPLICA TES IR MISSILE 
FLOYOUTS AND THE 
EFFECTS OF IR JAMMERS 
AND FLARES) 




'tJS ARMY YUMA PROV fNG UNCLAS 9725796 9726796 YUMA PROVING GROUND 20 




AND MINE CLEARANCE 
6.e-2. 
FY 1997 Conferences 
'. 
'· 
FY97 Conferences/Meetings at the Naval Postgraduate School 
12-14 Nov 96 Computer Mususe and Anomaly Detection (CMAD) IN-122; 
Workshop (UNCLAS) Engineers' 







National Security Agency, 80 
Central Intelligence, and Air 
Force Information Warfare 
Center 




03-06 Feb 97 1997 IRIS Specialty Group Meeting on Targets, 
Backgrounds and Discrimination (SECRET) 
19-20 Feb 97 
04-06 Mar 97 
17-21Mar97 
Eighth Meeting of the Multinational Future Very 
Short Range Air Defense System/Short Range Air 
Defense System (VSHORADS/SHORADS) 
Steering Committee 
Advanced Technology Expendables and Dispenser 
Systems (ATEDS) Program Review (SECRET) 
Annual Review of Progress in Applied 














Research, Development and 
Engineering Center, Night 
Vision and Electronic 
Sensors Directorate 
DoA Program Executive 
Office, Tactical Missiles, 
Redstone Arsenal 








28-31Jul97 1997 IRIS Specialty Group Meetings on Infrared 
Materials and Infrared Detectors (SECRET) 
King DoA Communications- 400 
Electronics Command, 
Research, Development and 
Engineering Center, Night 
Vision and Electronic 
Sensors Directorate 

